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Abstract 
 
The study is premised on the understanding that African conflict challenges have been 
consistent and seem rather unending even after attempted peace, due to the application of 
external solutions. Hence, the research is built on the argument that African solutions to African 
conflict challenges lie within her own bosom. This research acknowledges the existence of 
other useful external solutions but argues that these solutions should not take precedence in 
addressing African conflict challenges as identified in most cases. In this light, this study 
adhered to the objective of clarifying perspectives around the notion of ASAP and its 
importance in developing effective mechanisms that are localized and indigenous in addressing 
African conflict challenges. The study traces the concept of ASAP to the ideals of Pan-
Africanism and outlines how it is an important cause to pursue if effective peace and security 
are to be established in Africa’s conflict-ridden societies. The study utilizes conflict 
transformation and positive peace theories as a measure to bring understanding to the various 
dynamics of conflict, understanding the diversity of society and also promote alternative 
thinking as vital components in addressing African conflicts. The study employs the use of case 
studies (of Somalia, Darfur and Burundi) which provided three unique backdrops which 
exposed different variations in peace approaches. They exposed the weaknesses and strengths 
that are encountered in addressing typical African challenges. There are also various traditional 
and indigenous societal tools that are identified in these communities that can be key in 
addressing conflict which has often been neglected or undermined because they do not exist in 
the guidelines of liberal peace structures. The adoption of hybrid peace meant the promotion 
of the bridging of top-down and bottom-up approaches, encourage inclusive peace initiatives 
between external and local/indigenous peace approaches and to ensure that there is local 
ownership of peace processes which allows sustainable peace. However, the study identifies 
that the challenge of hybrid paternalism replaced liberal peace frameworks such that localized/ 
indigenous peace mechanisms and the effect of ASAP remain undermined. The 
implementation of the peace processes examined still exposes huge limitations and setbacks. 
This research concludes that despite the existence and adoption of a perfect platform, ASAP as 
a mechanism remains far from being a reality and the role of indigenous peace is still 
undermined in practice. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction   
 
Background and content of the study 
 
Africa as a continent remains saddled by conflicts, many of which are prolonged in nature. 
There is no doubting the fact that conflict pervades many of the countries on the African 
continent (Ikejiaku and Dauda, 2011). There has therefore been a serious need for effective 
solutions to curb these challenges. Over the years, most solutions have been, provided and 
enforced through liberal peace frameworks by actors such as the United Nations (UN), World 
Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other international 
actors.  However, these efforts have failed to bring lasting peace to the continent. This has thus 
led to the need for a transition to the “Try Africa First” approach, but this has not done much 
to alleviate the misery on the continent. African leaders such as former President of South 
Africa, Thabo Mbeki who emphasized that it is critically important that the African continent 
should deal with these conflict situations (Williams, 2008: Ferim, 2013), have echoed this. 
Rwandan President, Paul Kagame, reiterated the call, by stressing that the best approach is 
“…to help Africans develop their capacity to deal with these problems” (Williams, 2008:14). 
Therefore, this means that the principle of ‘African solutions to African problems’ (ASAP) 
thus implies a resurgence of African renaissance and a zeal to combat the tyrannical forces of 
neo-colonialism (Ferim, 2013). However, for the father of ASAP, Ayittey ‘African solutions 
for African problems’ does not mean just about any solution crafted by African dictators, 
organizations or a group of Africans.  Rather an ‘African solution’ implies one has to be 
anchored or rooted in African tradition, culture or heritage (Ayittey, 2010:5).  
 
Understanding the Challenges to African Peace Processes 
 
It is also undeniable that the methods employed by conflict management organisations in 
conflict situations on the African continent have been, much more premised on the top-down 
approach. The prevention, management and transformation of conflict strategies that have been 
employed in various conflict situations have been implemented through liberal peace 
frameworks, that is highly paternalistic in nature and driven by top-down approaches 
(Lederach, 1997; Doe, 2009; Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al., 2011; Curtis, 2012). The less 
involvement of the people in their own processes of peace is the biggest setback to establishing 
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sustainable mechanisms for local peace. The peace debate, since Boutros-Ghali’s (1992) 
“Agenda for Peace”, has focused on building strategic initiatives that play a crucial role in 
sustaining fragile and hostile environments for peace to prevail. However, governments and 
peace organisations have relied more on liberal peace frameworks rather than local peace 
approaches, which has often diverted them from the challenges on the ground. Devon Curtis 
(2012:15) concurs that peacebuilding initiatives in Africa are dominantly driven by 
international actors and donors (i.e. World Bank) who foster ideas on how peace should be 
built, which has distorted “the meanings and values from within African countries and locales”.  
 
Conflicts in Africa are a lot more complex than many conventional discourses portray. The 
instigating and aggravating factors of contemporary armed conflicts and wars in Africa are 
multi-dimensional in the same way that the actors, interests, and stakeholders are diverse and 
dynamic (Omeje, 2008:91). This means most African conflicts are much more challenging to 
deal with if they are engaged more from liberal peace perspectives which are alien and distant 
to the various political, social, cultural, and traditional values of the African conflict 
communities. Murithi (2006; 2007; 2008) insists that most African peace strategies are 
constantly failing to produce results due to imposed paternalist peacebuilding initiatives by 
dominant organisations such as the United Nations (UN) which often neglect indigenous and 
endogenous practices. Scholars agree that this top-down approach not only undermines the 
contributions that traditional conflict management systems in Africa can make towards 
ensuring peace but sometimes perpetuates conflict situations (Curtis, 2012; Doe, 2009; Murithi, 
2008). The emphasis, therefore, needs to be placed on the bottom up approaches which stipulate 
how Africans can provide their own peace.  
 
It is an impractical cause to imagine that a strategy to deal with Africa’s complex conflicts 
could sustainably succeed while being divorced from the actual realities of the conflict 
environment and the people affected being part of the architecture of the peace process. Tshirgi 
(2004) suggests that in every conflict zone, local peace actors and stakeholders should give 
their views on new external peace ideas as a measure to promote pragmatic peacebuilding 
outcomes.  As such, Albert (2008:45) concludes that “marginalisation of traditional African 
approaches equates to attempting to fly an aeroplane with one wing, it is a fallacy.” Therefore, 
this study does not seek to glorify the traditional approaches to conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding as the panacea to the African problems, but it seeks to emphasise the need to 
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integrate the traditional African approaches into the mainstream conflict resolution strategies 
on the continent. 
 
Unpacking the (Research) Problem to Durable Peace in Africa 
 
The major problem in most African conflict countries is the lack of durable or sustainable 
peace. Most countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Burundi, Mozambique, 
Sudan and South Sudan just to mention a few, are a testament to conflict resurgence within a 
period of less than 5 or 10 years following peace agreements or implementation peace projects. 
Peace scholars on African conflict have come to agree that durable peace cannot be fully 
attained in the continent without the inclusion and integration of local approaches into the 
conflict management strategies (Murithi, 2006; 2007; 2008; Hoffman, 2009; Curtis, 2012).  
 
 
Challenges to the effective building of sustainable peace remain highly identified in external 
peace initiatives. Scholars such as Lederach (1997; 2005) and Hoffman (2009) critically argue 
that the process of building lasting peace should be developed from local. As such, Ndubuisi 
(2016:1) establishes that,  
 
“…the interest in Africa’s solutions in conflict resolution is based on the growing 
misgivings about external interventions in Africa as well as the dominant belief and 
activism among African thinkers and politicians that only African oriented 
solutions can secure lasting solutions to Africa’s challenges.”  
 
Scholars echo this such as Salem (2007) who have argued that in terms of the conflict 
transformation discourse there is more of a tendency to resort to western/dominant power’s 
fundamental assumptions, beliefs, values and thought processes. This has fuelled the need for 
alternative options and this has been in the form of a search for context-specific solutions as a 
panacea for ending violent and often protracted conflicts in the world. Cusimano (2000) and 
Hoeffler (2008) agree that the problems facing Africa such as conflicts, state failure, poverty, 
underdevelopment, terrorism, flawed governance systems etc are not uniquely African per se 
but are global problems. This thinking, therefore, problematizes the entire notion of African 
solutions to African problems as it seeks to suggest that the only prescription to the challenges 
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affecting the continent can only be prescribed by Africans and thus ruling out any potential 
external assistance which might be useful in coming up with a well-co-ordinated solution to 
the problems facing the continent. Nathan (2013) noted that although the maxim ASAP is 
relevant to every issue on the continent, it is widely used in relation to the conflict resolution, 
peace and security issues facing Africa. 
 
There is an overarching understanding from such scholars as Brock-Utne, 2001; Nhema, 
2008:3; Boege, 2011; Bukari, 2011; and Run, 2013 who suggest that the western imposed 
forms of intervention are usually coercive in nature using more militaristic and legalistic 
approaches in dealing with the African challenges. Therefore, it is befitting to note that, the 
African continent thus has its own diplomatic and less coercive forms of initiatives that may 
be utilised to quench the flames of violent wars confronting its doorstep. Walker 2004 (cited 
in Ndubuisi, 2015:5), argues that the research and practice in conflict resolution perpetuate 
colonialism and upholds the hegemony of western views, while indigenous worldviews are 
marginalised.  
 
According to Murithi (2009 in Abdalla et al, 2009: v), the urgent task of building sustainable 
peace in Africa, lies within the lessons that can be learnt from indigenous institutions and the 
cultural traditions that are endowed with insight on local issues. Thus, despite the dominance 
of various peace missions in Africa, the biggest problem remains in the detachment of the 
liberal peace strategies from the pragmatic challenges that exist in the local communities. In 
this case liberal peace strategies refer to top-down hegemonic peace initiatives that are often 
facilitated with little or no involvement of local or contextual actors in prescribing the 
necessary solutions (Richmond et al., 2011). For instance, the use of military force in countries 
such as Libya, Somalia and even Afghanistan has been prioritised as a more effective manner 
than negotiations or other alternatives towards peace with little success. Therefore, the need 
for inclusive integration of strategies that are mainly driven by local solutions.  
 
Origins of Pan Africanism 
 
The origins of Pan- Africanism can be traced to the African Diasporas in the late 19th century. 
The ideals of Pan Africanism emerged in the mid-19th century from the works of Martin 
Delany, Alexander Crummel, and Edward Blyden. Delany and Crummel were African 
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Americans from the western hemisphere of the United States. Blyden was a West Indian. They 
believed that African Americans could not co-exist with the whites and the best home for them 
was Africa (Body-Evans, 2017). However, the birth of modern Pan-Africanism in the late 19th 
century is accredited to William Edward Burghardt DuBois1. The tenets of Pan Africanism 
have their roots on the altars of anti-slavery, anti-imperialism, anti-racial and anti-colonialism. 
The development and strength of Pan Africanism also refer to various proponents of black 
liberation and solidarity of the African race such as Henry Sylvester Williams2 and Marcus 
Garvey3 with his ‘Back to Africa’ movement (World History, 2015).  
 
Pan Africanism has no single definition. It comprises of a rich background which developed 
from just an idea into a political and cultural movement for unity and liberation of African-
Americans and later Africans in the African continent (SA History Online, 2015). David 
Maimela (2013:34) posits that Pan Africanism was an “anti-thesis to European imperialism, 
domination and racism” right from the onset. Tondi (2005) clearly identifies four themes that 
are key to understanding the core values of Pan Africanist evolution. These themes include (i) 
“Pan-Africanism: a universal expression of black pride and achievement’; (ii) ‘Pan-
Africanism: A Return to Africa by the people of African descent living in the diaspora’; (iii) 
‘Pan-Africanism: A Harbinger of Liberation’; and (iv)‘Pan-Africanism: The Political 
Unification of the Continent” (Tondi, 2005:308-10).  
 
Pan Africanism & the Roots of ASAP 
 
It is essential to note that ‘African Solutions for African Problems’ (ASAP) is not a policy but 
rather a concept that requires detailed back-up to provide a sound argument. Therefore, to 
effectively outline and adopt ASAP, one has to understand the meaning and values of Pan 
                                                          
1  WEB DuBois was the first African American to graduate from Havard University with  a Ph.D. in 1895 and a 
pioneer of modern Pan-Africanism. He was an activist for African-American rights in the early 20th century and 
co-founded the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) in 1909 which he 
effectively utilised in advancing modern Pan-Africanism.  
2 He was a lawyer from Trinidad and a wide promoter of pan-African solidarity. He is accredited for organising 
the first Pan-African Conference which was held in London in the 1900.   
3 Marcus Garvey was the leader of the Black Nationalist movement. He was well known for his use of economic 
ideas of Pan Africanists as a means of resource accumulation and redistribution in urban centres. He was a 
founder of Negro World newspaper, an international shipping company called Black Star Line and the Negro 
Factories Corporation in New York in 1916. “During the 1920s, his Universal Negro Improvement Association 
(UNIA) was the largest secular organization in African-American history” (http://www.history.com/topics/black-
history/marcus-garvey).  
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Africanism. This will then help one to guide the thinking behind ASAP agenda and interests. 
The roots of the concept ASAP are entrenched in the Pan African ideals of sovereignty, total 
independence and self-sustenance (Solomon, 2015). Though Pan Africanism can be traced 
back to the later 1800s, it became dominant in Africa in the 1960s.  
 
The ideals of Pan Africanism quickly took a foothold on most African leaders at the front of 
liberation movements from colonialism in the 1940s and 1950s. These leaders later became 
key figures of independence in their countries include: Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo 
Kenyatta of Kenya, Sékou Ahmed Touré of Guinea, Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, Julius 
Nyerere of Tanzania, Amilcar Cabral of Guinea Bissau, Patrice Lumumba of Congo4, Hastings 
Banda of Malawi, Muammar Gadhafi of Libya and Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria. Most of 
these African leaders were inspired directly by the Pan African congresses5 and took the 
initiative to utilise ideals of Pan Africanism to effectively organise and advocate for unity 
amongst African towards liberation. For instance, Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and 
Nnamdi Azikiwe attended the fifth Pan African Congress in 1945 in Manchester (Britain), 
which called for the effective organisation in driving towards political, social and economic 
emancipation (Potekhin, 1964). It is at this Pan-African Congress in Manchester where the 
African heirs of Pan-Africanism agreed on the programme of action towards the liberation from 
colonialism through national independence and African unity (Kasanda, 2016). 
  
The development and growth of Pan-Africanism in Africa, was nurtured by the need for 
political emancipation and ending colonialism, and the desire for self-representation of African 
identity and sovereignty (Kasanda, 2016).  Kwameh Nkrumah’s scholarly work contributed 
immensely in outlining the goals of African unity as the ultimate goal of Pan-Africanism in 
Africa (Nkrumah, 1963). He was largely inspired by Marcus Garvey, thus he believed that at 
the epitome of Pan-Africanism in Africa, there should be one African state, thus in his advance 
for Africa’s political emancipation he sought to provide the roadmap for achieving unity. More 
so, the works of Frantz Fanon, after attending the first conference of Union of Africa in Accra 
(1958) as a member of the Algerian delegation advanced the idea of African solidarity 
(Kasanda, 2016). Fanon (1979) outlined on the importance of African solidarity as an outcome 
                                                          
4 Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly known as Belgian Congo. 
5 Pan-African Congress was spearheaded by the first Pan-African conference in 1900. A series of Pan-African 
congresses followed in 1919 (1st) in Paris, 1921 (2nd ) in London, 1923 (3rd) in London, 1927 (4th ) in New York, 
1945 (5th ) in Manchester, 1974 (6th ) in Dar es Salaam, and 1994 (7th) in Kampala.  
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of national awareness which would eventually lead to the promotion of African consciousness 
and national construction. As such it is important to note that, Fanon’s views are widely cited 
as the foundation of postcolonial theories (Mbembe, 2006) and as one of the core contributors 
to the knowledge of Pan-Africanism (Bhabha, 2007).  
 
The interest to effectively establish Pan-African ideas was manifested through the formation 
of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Kwame Nkrumah, Haile Selassie and 
Malcom X spearheaded and confronted the Pan Africanist agenda in Africa as soon as Ghana 
attained independence (the first country to attain independence in 1957). The agenda 
materialised with the interest of defeating colonialism, spearheading co-operation amongst the 
African States; and defend African sovereignty.  Despite the fact that Africa was partitioned 
into more than 50 states, leaders such as Nkrumah understood the difficulty, but the mistake 
was in generalising the local realities of some African states (Kasanda, 2016). Hence, 
weakening the position and development of Pan-Africanism as a practical idea which can be 
translated in addressing peculiar and contextual changes such as internal civil wars which are 
became dominant in most post-independence states and still remain in this day.  
 
The transformation and re-structuring of the OAU into the African Union (AU) in 2002 was 
fuelled by the subsequent realization that Africa had new challenges that required 
comprehensive structures and united effort. As such, Murithi (2007) noted the need for political 
will in addressing Africa’s problems. He identifies these problems as internal issues that 
pertains to “social and political exclusion, authoritarianism, economic mismanagement and the 
misappropriation of state resources” (Murithi, 2007:143) which has resulted in conflict 
emergences. Thus, the purpose for translation Pan-Africanism in fostering new and effective 
structures that can address the current African challenges and problems. Oloruntoba (2015) 
emphasises that there is lack of knowledge production that translate Pan-Africanism in 
addressing the current crises faced in Africa today. Therefore, this realization is still to be 
translated effectively into tangible and sound implementation; hence, there is still a need for 
the continued search for socio-economic and political means to achieve the envisaged reality.  
 
 
Understanding ASAP 
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The ASAP  mantra has been heralded much in the political environment on the continent, as a 
measure for driving African oriented solutions to the wide range socio-economic and conflict 
problems (Nathan, 2013). Thus, the idea seeks to shift the African paradigm from the passive 
mentality of being beggars for solutions, towards the one that is more proactive and involves 
the Africans playing a vital role in the creation of their own sustainable solutions. In so doing, 
this enables the Africans to own the challenges they face uniquely as a continent as well as 
those they share with the world (but experience them differently in their own context).In this 
context it is a drive that fuels the search for more internal responses to the challenges such as 
wars and violent conflicts. Murithi (2007) laments how the OAU, the predecessor of AU, 
significantly reduced itself to an observer role while the continent was ravaged by conflict 
despite having a mechanism for ‘Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution’ which was 
created in 1993. Such ineffectiveness hugely influenced the discourse of the AU organization, 
which then sought to address its problems and devise processes of overcoming them hence 
invoking the notion of ‘African Solutions for African Problems’. 
 
On a global scale, it is important to note that Africa is not an isolated continent. It is, therefore, 
clear that it has not been spared from the massive forces of globalization. This means that its 
capacity to curb the problems that it is facing is therefore swept away, and hence to imagine 
that the continent can merely solve all her problems in her own way can be far too much of an 
imagination than a possible solution. Pan-Africanism thus provides a platform for African 
education and initiatives that are free from dependence and from negative characters of the 
imported knowledge, which hinders the recognition of internal or local potential in developing 
new ideas (Oloruntoba, 2015). Thus, though this study does not seek to demean any western 
ideas and liberal peace frameworks, it argues that Africa’s conflict problems are internal and 
involving more liberal peace approaches leads to a mutation of more problems than solutions 
(Zambakari, 2017; Hoffman, 2009).    
 
Debating the Roots of ASAP Challenges 
 
The idea of the ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ seems to point out and reflect a timeous 
and prompt action which leads to a more sustainable result. Nonetheless, a large number of 
initiatives that were carried out under this glorious banner have many times proven that they 
are exotic creations, fuelled from the outside more than they are from within. The crafters and 
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subsequent funders of such operations are themselves foreign to and unfamiliar with the 
problems and this has had an impact on the sustainability and impact of these solutions relating 
to the problems in Africa. Therefore, it is befitting to note the disparities between African 
problems and problems in Africa. However, it is this very notion of ASAP that has provided 
the concrete base for the formation of indigenous African forces which are multi-national in 
nature such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Murithi, 2007). 
 
Over the past decade, which is the period under scrutiny in this study, ASAP has received wide 
attention in the areas of conflict resolution and security issues that are bedevilling the continent 
(Lipman, 2010). Despite all its well-intentioned objectives on paper and its impact on policy 
changes and orientation, it is still unclear in terms of what it entails and how it ought to unfold. 
Therefore, it has remained a rather obscure concept lacking a concrete definition thus blurring 
the implementation process with inconsistencies and making it almost impossible to implement 
effectively. There have been numerous instances where the notion of ASAP has been invoked 
as an excuse for non-intervention by the west even in situations they played a role in creating 
and aggravating the problems. It is essential to note that there is nothing wrong with the west 
in taking a non-interventionist position, however, it is a challenge when they are involved  to 
have historically contributed or currently contributed to the problem. For instance, when 
justifying their non-engagement as in the case of the Rwandan genocide and Darfur, western 
powers have tried to excuse the historical abdication of their responsibilities, by resorting to 
the idea that those were African problems and should be resolved by Africans. More so, in 
other cases such as the Mali crisis, where the principles failed due to the subsequent failure to 
amass the necessary resources to back the political will that was garnered from the continent’s 
leaders. 
 
For more than a decade, Africa has embarked on a journey of redressing its wide-ranging 
challenges from development to politics and this has been widely motivated by employing 
methods, which are driven by homegrown solutions.  These initiatives vary from organising 
and utilizing African institutions to cater for specific African crises such as the interventions 
by regional and continental bodies (Solomon, 2015). These interventions embody the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) in the case of Zimbabwe in 2008, the mediation of 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the crises in Sierra Leonne and 
Liberia as well as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa 
(Lipman, 2010). However, the success rate of these cases has left a lot to be desired regarding 
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the utility and effectiveness of the ASAP concept. It is also befitting to note that, the mounting 
pressure for change needs to be birthed primarily from the loins of the African peoples through 
their leaders in these larger platforms with the support from the international community 
(where desired and upon invitation by the Africans). 
 
These multi-national forces need to be analysed further in the sense that they also bring about 
some challenges embedded in their very nature, which further impedes the possibility of an 
effective solution. According to the great philosopher, Niccolo Machiavelli (1952:77), 
 
"When one asks a powerful neighbour to come to aid and defend one with his 
forces…These forces may be good in themselves, but they are always dangerous 
for those who borrow them, for if they lose you are defeated, and if they conquer 
you remain their prisoner."  
 
Such can be said to be true in the case of AMISOM in Somalia, which has allowed the 
interference into its internal affairs, by its neighbours, Kenya and Ethiopia. The neighbours 
have hijacked the phrase ASAP to justify its involvement in the Somali conflict. This, therefore, 
leads to the emergence of an interrogation into what constitutes an African solution and how 
this affects the indigenous peoples, given that Africa is not a homogenous entity. 
 
Challenges to peacekeeping missions in Africa 
 
Peacekeeping refers to security support and measures put in place in conflict situations to help 
create lasting peace. It can be defined as a process of managing conflict and ensuring the 
reformation of security sectors in a conflict country through international or regional 
deployment of police, correctional services personnel and military support. This meant to 
boost, support and train local security personnel to maintain peace, law and order as measure 
to ensure that conflict is quelled and sustainable peace measures are engrafted ().  
 
Literature highlights that peacekeeping is a United Nations (UN) instrument/ tool “to assist 
host countries to navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace” (United Nations 
Peacekeeping, 2017). United Nations Peacekeeping (2017) posits that “peacekeeping is one 
among a range of activities undertaken by the United Nations to maintain international peace 
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and security throughout the world”. Thus, peacekeeping operations are support-oriented 
missions that are mandated with support roles for ensuring security measures in ceasefire or 
peace agreement processes. Peacekeeping also plays a significant role in ensuring peace-
making processes and securing sustainable peacebuilding initiatives (United Nations 
Peacekeeping, 2017). It is important to note that if ASAP is to be engaged properly, there is 
need to understand the nature of peacekeeping missions in Africa.  
 
Peacekeeping missions have become a norm in Africa and are highly utilised as a strategy in 
addressing conflict at the continental level. These are commissioned peace projects by the 
international or regional bodies such as United Nations (UN) and AU mandated to counter 
conflict and curtail violent situations. The first peacekeeping mission to be engaged in Africa 
was in the Congo in 1960s by the UN. Ahere (2009: 2) explains peacekeeping as “a unique and 
dynamic instrument developed by the [UN or AU] organization to help countries that are torn 
by conflict to create the conditions for lasting peace”. 
 
 African conflict countries have relied on peacekeeping missions as a measure to address 
conflict challenges since the 1960s. However, in understanding the continuous challenges of 
unending conflict faced by these missions it is important to note that the peacekeeping missions 
cannot be the ultimate solution to the challenges facing the continent. The available evidence 
on the shortcomings of such a mechanism shows that it cannot be relied on as the sole remedy 
for conflict. For instance, Peacock (2011) forwarded that the solution to the Somali conflict 
can no longer be sought solely through AMISOM. This underscores the need for the re-
evaluation of the African peace initiatives and the establishment of other viable means of 
transforming the violent conflicts on the continent. Hull and Svensson (2008) have gone on 
further to question, the viability and organisational capacity of the AU in terms of maintaining 
the concept of ASAP. Furthermore, Hull and Svensson (2008) conclude that the AU will only 
be able to maintain the concept of ASAP and conduct successful peace operations with support 
from the international community and without it, no progress can be made. With such debates 
stirred in the literature, the main question to be asked is if the AU should solely carry the burden 
of eradicating wars and conflicts on their own or whether it should seek co-operation with other 
non-African entities for effective solutions. 
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Understanding Somalia, Burundi & Sudan Cases 
 
The study seeks to establish whether the remedy for Africa’s conflict problems lies within 
Africa itself. As mentioned above, it adopts the understanding of ASAP to unpack the values 
of African architecture in framing peace initiatives that are divorced from western ideas and 
liberal peace framework in transforming conflicts.  This is because African conflict challenges 
are mostly driven by internal issues that demands contextual approaches which are mostly 
distorted by liberal peace frameworks and western ideas (Zambakari, 2017). Nathan (2013) 
believes  that ASAP as a continental project can be utilised to build capacity for African 
engagement in addressing conflicts, providing security,  building and promoting peace. Such 
can lead to proper structures that can avoid crises such as the genocide in Rwanda, the western 
design solutions such as the ones engaged in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire in 2011, and the liberal 
peace frameworks that have witnessed continuous conflict resurgence in countries such as 
DRC, Somalia and South Sudan for decades.  The study seeks to bring understanding that 
‘African Solutions to African Problems’ is not a myth but rather a foundational concept on 
which African conflict challenges can build redemptive solutions from. This study is thus 
premised on exploring  African inspired mechanisms which have been employed in the quest 
to transform conflict. It will, therefore, seek to zoom in onto the challenges faced in the 
implementation of these mechanisms on the transformation of conflicts on the African 
continent and provide possible remedies on how these mechanisms can be made effective and 
efficient. 
 
In order to gain a more broader understanding of the conflict transformation efforts on the 
continent, especially the ones that the AU has spearheaded and taken a pivotal role on, the 
scope of the case studies has been widened to include  prolonged cases, short-term cases and 
recent insurgencies hence engaging the Somalia, Burundi and Sudan cases.  
 
Somalia 
 
Somalia is identified as one of the relevant case studies in this research because of the 
prolonged nature of its conflict. There has been  much scholarly debate within the continent as 
to whether it constitutes a peculiar African problem and a failure of the continent’s capacity to 
contain and tame conflicts. The civil and territorial conflict in Somalia which has been waged 
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over decades also presents a wealth of scenarios in which the ASAP has been invoked and 
tested and thus provides a healthy analysis into the conflicts and the methods employed to 
transform the violence into peace. The focus on Somalia is because the AU has been active 
enough in the conflict over a long period and hence it has employed a multi-dimensional 
approach to the conflict, with an array of mechanisms ranging from military, diplomatic, and 
mediatory means to resolve the conflict. This, however, does not mean that by focusing on the 
Somali example, the researcher may make general conclusions uniformly across the continent. 
This study does acknowledge the diversity of the nature of conflicts in the continent.  
 
Burundi 
 
The research also notes the role that the AU has played in other conflict crises. Burundi plunged 
into an election related violence in 2015. The crisis occurred at a time when the African 
Standby Force was declared to be operationally ready and thus presented an opportunity for 
this mechanism to be tested. There was  attempt to deploy the African Union’s African 
Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU). The research will thus delve into 
the complications that led to the failure to deploy the mission and explore the militaristic nature 
of peacekeeping missions versus mediation efforts in the continent.. 
 
Sudan (Darfur) 
 
The case of the Darfur region is also explored after the AU pioneered a mission to deal with 
the conflict between 2004 and 2007.  In 2007, the joint AU-UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID) 
was established (active to date), and the AU continues to play a role in the crisis.  Given the 
nature of the mission and its shared responsibility with the UN within the conflict, a reflection 
on Sudan, therefore, gives an insight on the challenges that African mechanisms face when 
they are implemented with the help of the non-African actors. This also presents a case in point 
of where co-operation has been employed in resolving disputes hence the idea of the concept 
being entirely African or the need for it to be “African’ then is questioned through such a study.  
The research thus focuses on these three limited cases for it to be more manageable, and in-
depth while interrogating the African solutions in resolving the conflict. Through these cases, 
the research thus presents the study of approaches and standing principles that major conflict 
resolution players within the continent such as the AU have adopted in the creation of African 
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solutions to the conflict settings on the continent and thus assess their effectiveness when 
implemented. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 
The need for the ASAP gained prominence in late 2007 and as such it has been operational for 
almost a decade but there seems to be no real evidence of how this has materialised into real 
solutions for African problems. Therefore, with no such clear demonstration of effectiveness 
and success, there is a need to dig deeper into the concept and identify the challenges that have 
crippled this noble idea and hindered it from bearing its desired fruits.  
This study employs the two theories, conflict transformation theory and positive peace theory 
to explore the African mechanisms in ending violent conflicts on the continent. The study is 
needed to clarify whether the African mechanisms used currently are successful as well as 
highlight the challenges that these mechanisms encounter in practice. The study seeks to give 
a deeper understanding of ASAP and map out its importance in the trajectory of conflict 
management, resolution, transformation and peacebuilding in the continent. It seeks to unpack 
the importance of ASAP in endorsing the value of local peace initiatives in building sustainable 
peace. This research also seeks to explore the use of the Panel of the Wise as a council of elders 
and debate it role in Africa peace mechanisms looking at the relationship between the African 
traditional systems with the AU peace structures. The research uses case studies of countries 
that have been affected by conflict to help review the factors that are limiting the effective 
materialisation of ASAP and how strategies can be put in place to make it a feasible reality. 
The research will also provide policy recommendations targeted at African institutions and 
governments to remedy the conflict crises on the continent.  
 
Rationale or significance of the research 
 
The significance of this study lies in its anticipated contribution to the existing literature. It 
seeks to address the problems in the realisation of the mantra “African solutions for African 
problems” towards the transformation of violent conflicts on the African continent. Ideas on 
advancing African solutions have become well entrenched in much of the literature on African 
politics and development issues. However, much more work needs to be done in conflict 
resolution and conflict transformation. This research will contribute in this regard by exploring 
 
 
15 
 
the conflict resolution mechanisms used in the African context for the last decade, and evaluate 
their successes and failures as ASAP inspired mechanisms.  
 
Aims and objectives of the research 
 
1.To identify the mechanisms that have been employed in transforming conflict on the African 
continent (2007 to 2016) and how they have assisted in aborting violent conflict as well as 
building peace in Africa. 
2.To establish the extent to which the African institutions, (the AU, regional bodies, 
governments etc.) have worked collectively and independently towards transforming conflict 
in Africa and ascertain the success and challenges that they have faced in transforming 
prolonged violent conflict in Africa. 
3. To identify the policy recommendations, which can be adopted by the African institutions 
and governments with regards to transforming conflict on the continent. 
 
Research questions 
 
The study seeks to unpack the challenges in implementing African conflict resolution 
mechanisms. It is therefore paramount to note what denotes these mechanisms. For the purpose 
of this study, the mechanisms will mean but will not be limited to:  
 The official continental missions that have been dispatched to curtail the violent 
conflicts across the globe. It is also befitting to note that the mission deployment might 
alternatively be seen as a foreign concept but this study will utilise them based on the 
fact that the indigenous peoples are the ones at the driving seat of these missions and 
thus it becomes an African initiative 
 The mechanisms will also include the various government and continental reports that 
have been compiled and documented for the sole purposes of curtailing conflict in the 
continent 
 The exploration of whether the AU uses  African indigenous skills in mediation. For 
example the use of the elders in mediation is purely an African trait that the leaders are 
treated with respect hence they are thus seen as playing a pivotal role in the 
transformation of the conflict situations especially on the continent. Mediation is not 
uniquely an African solution but the drivers of the process especially in the African 
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conflict resolutions have been the elders. The establishment of the Panel of the Wise by 
the African Union to deal with this issue further stresses the importance and relevance 
of the elders in resolving disputes. 
 
Major questions to be asked are as follows: 
1. What mechanisms have been adopted and used in African conflicts (over the period 
2007 to 2016) and how did they assist in ending the violent conflict? 
2. To what degree were these mechanisms inspired by African indigenous approaches? 
3. To what extent did the AU, regional bodies and institutions succeed in ending the 
conflict and what were the major challenges they encountered? 
4. What policy recommendations can be adopted by the actors with regards to ending the 
conflict and what lessons can be acknowledged from the case studies? 
 
Limitations of the study 
 
The research restricts its examination to the exploration of the challenges with the 
implementation of the indigenous African mechanisms in conflict transformation in African 
conflicts from the period 2007 to 2016. By indigenous this study refers to African driven peace 
initiatives and also traditional indigenous peacebuilding mechanisms such as Gacaca6 courts 
and Xeer7. The dissertation also engages actualisation of African solutions in response to the 
problems related to violent conflicts. The research will also focus on the mechanisms that have 
been implemented under the mantra of the African solutions to African problems and explore 
how these have encapsulated the ideals and values of the African traditional methods of 
resolving conflict. Indigenous African mechanisms differ from other peace approaches 
particularly the liberal peace approaches in the sense that they explore relevant local methods 
that are inclusively driven and legitimately recognised, valued and owned by the locals. The 
research is limited to exploring the African Union mechanisms for conflict transformation as 
the continental body. The research will make use of three case studies from within the 
continental conflicts and these are Burundi, Somalia and South Sudan. 
 
                                                          
6 The traditional court systems of Rwanda that function at a local community level. These were used to 
facilitate transitional justice and peace reconciliation following the Rwandan genocide of 1994.  
7 This a traditional Somali legal system which plays a significant role in engaging negotiation and community 
peace. 
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Structure of the dissertation 
 
The dissertation comprises of seven chapters. These chapters will follow the format below: 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This chapter gives the background of the research, establish the understanding of various 
guiding principles of the study and highlight the major argument.  The problem statement is 
defined at length. The major research objectives are explored and key research questions are 
outlined.  
This chapter gives a brief understanding of what this research seeks to explore. It introduces 
key important aspects that are relevant to understanding the relevance of the study. It outlines 
the background and development of ASAP and why it needs to be properly engaged as an 
important mechanism in addressing Africa’s conflict problem. The chapter presented the 
research argument, objectives, questions aims and the structure of the research.   
 
Chapter 2:  Definition of concepts and key terms 
 
This chapter provides the definitions of key terms and concepts explored in the research. It also 
provides a background to the understanding of the mechanisms of peace.  
 
Chapter 3:  Review of Related Literature and Theoretical Framework 
 
Provides a review of the literature on the subject. It also locates the research within the central 
theoretical framework. The major theories of analysis for this research, the conflict 
transformation theory and the positive peace theory are unpacked to provide the foundation 
within which the arguments are premised. 
 
Chapter 4: Research Methodology & Design of the Study 
 
Focus on the description of research methodology utilised in this research study in order to 
realise its objectives and in answering the key questions, it poses. Qualitative content and 
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discourse analysis research methodology will be explored and utilised in realising the intended 
research results. 
 
Chapter 5: AU Mechanisms for Conflict Transformation 
 
Engages indigenous African mechanisms implemented in African conflict situations from the 
period 2007 to 2016. The chapter is dedicated to unpacking the African mechanisms and the 
study will seek to make a clear disparity between the conventional mechanisms as well as the 
African mechanisms to highlight that not every solution made in Africa is in actual fact, an  
African solution per se. 
 
Chapter 6: Case studies of Peacekeeping interventions on the African continent  
 
 This chapter of the research provides an in-depth analysis of the case studies employed. The 
case studies focus on three diverse situations within the continent; firstly, the case of Somalia 
is explored with the focus on the AMISOM. Secondly, Sudan is unpacked with the emphasis 
on the United Nations- African Union hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) being the case in 
point. Lastly, the chapter explores the Burundi crisis and provides conclusions on the findings. 
 
Chapter 7: Findings, Discussion and Analysis of Research 
 
This chapter of the study records the research results and analysis of results. Identifies all major 
findings and analyses them in detail. 
 
Chapter 8:  Conclusion & Recommendations of Research 
 
The chapter outlines a comprehensive summary and conclusions on the findings. Policy 
recommendations for possible adoption and remedies to mitigate the challenges are provided 
in this chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Defining key concepts  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to provide the definitions of key terms and concepts explored in the research. 
It also provides a background to the understanding of the mechanisms of peace. The chapter 
unpacks also defines the terms and concepts in the manner in which they will be applied in this 
research. 
 
Defining Key Conceptual Terms 
 
There are diverse concepts and terms that are commonly used in peace and conflict studies. In 
most cases, some these terms are used interchangeably without a proper understanding of how 
they feed into the study of peace. Concepts such as conflict transformation, conflict resolution 
and conflict management are often confused. Scholars such as Paffenholz (2009) and 
Ramsbotham et al (2011), justify that though these concepts complement each other, the 
understanding and practices that guide them are different. For instance, Ramsbotham et al 
(2011) clarify that conflict transformation is the “the deepest level of the conflict resolution 
tradition”. Furthermore, Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) argue that the process towards 
sustainable peace outcomes requires various thinking elements to strengthen the guiding 
practices. Therefore, some of the conceptual terms that need to be clearly defined include 
peacebuilding, peace-making, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These terms are often 
confused since they often take place side by side. Cousens et al (2001:14), outlines that 
peacebuilding unlike other process has no fixed timeframe and happens in “advance, alongside, 
or even in the absence of a peacekeeping operation or a formal peace-making effort”. 
Understanding these conceptual terms is important for this study.  
 
Defining the “African” 
 
For the purposes of this research, it is important to highlight the over-simplification and 
reductionist risk that accompanies the generalisations about particular groupings (geographical, 
cultural or social) as they are confined in terms such as African and Non-African. This is due 
to the nature of the globalised environment in which people exist. It is an injustice to classify 
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people based on distinct groupings since it ignores the fact that a person from an African origin 
may hold interests and values, which are identical to those of a person from the western origin. 
The research notes that the use of these categorizing terms is by no means an attempt to 
essentialize the values, principles and interests of the African peoples. For this purpose, the 
research thus adopts the rather limited notion of African, which is premised on the subsequent 
interrogations of the historical experiences and geographical history together with some 
common shared values and interests that punctuate the African continent. 
 
To refer to that which is non-African, the research thus uses interventions by external and 
foreign actors as non-African interventions unless stated otherwise. This is a complex concept 
to comprehend regarding the fact that some of these interventions incorporate local actors in 
their operations during the interventions. Therefore, it is important to note that incorporation 
of local actors whilst advancing liberal peace agenda remains a non-African. However, in cases 
whereby external and foreign actors are involved to aide local initiatives and practices towards 
peace, this should be considered African. In the same light, since the continent is not 
homogenous, an intervention by one African country or organisation into the crises of another 
may as well be regarded as an external intervention and foreign to the specific country in chaos.  
 
The interventionist approaches in the world today are without a doubt dominated by the 
precepts of the western ideology hence for the other frameworks to be recognised it is important 
to pay attention to the other dimensions and present them at the global arena. This is the reason 
the research will unpack the concept of the African solutions and interrogate it within the 
broader world order that is controlled by the powerful non-African actors. Although the search 
for African solutions to African problems may be applied to vast challenges, in this research 
the African solutions to African problems will be limited to the problem of conflict in Africa 
and the solutions to counter it. 
Conflict Transformation 
 
Conflict transformation is regarded as a school of thought that values relationship-centred 
approaches in processes of building peace. John Paul Lederach (2003:14) defines conflict 
transformation as, “to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving 
opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice 
in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human 
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relationships”. To further clarify, Paffenholz (2009:4), outlines that this is a process which does 
not only seek to end the conflict but focuses also on establishing communicative platforms that 
are endless for people at all levels, for the purpose of sustainable future peace outcomes. 
Agents of conflict transformation 
 
Conflict transformation embodies approaches and mechanisms that seek to foster broader 
social change through the transformation of the existing antagonistic relationships between the 
conflicting parties. It is premised on the notion that conflict exists not only as a result of a clash 
of interests and unmet needs, therefore, it situates these in the historically and socially defined 
relations between the collective identities of the parties to the conflict (Zistel, 2008). It is 
undoubted that in any conflict situation or setting there is always agents of violent resistance 
and those advocating for a peaceful change. It is important to note that peace requires inclusive 
approaches thus inward approaches generated from conflicting society need to be valued and 
considered before importing external expert initiatives that do not resonate with the cultures, 
traditions and local practices that need to be considered in the peace process. Thus though 
external resources and support might be need, the processes and ideas need to be considered 
by a pinch of salt. Therefore, traditional practice highlights the need and relevance of the socio-
political community to assert itself, its identity and its control of its norms in a conflict setting, 
not necessarily to be seen as key breakers of violence (Museveni, 1997:58).  
 
The Conflict Transformation theory concerns justice and suggests the need to develop 
capacities to engage in change processes at the interpersonal, inter-group, and social-structural 
levels. This entails people-to-people interactions (Reich 2002). The other set underscores the 
need to see, pursue, and create change in ways of organizing social structures, from families to 
complex bureaucracies, to structures at the global level (Naidu 1986). Participatory 
mechanisms allow for exchange ideas and awareness raising through dialogue which is key in 
the maintenance or change of social structures for the purposes of justice and peacebuilding.  
 
Conflict Transformation theory is therefore relevant to this study, as it seeks to understand how 
people are involved in their own process of managing their co-existence and promotes dialogue 
and non-violent engagements to bring about peace. It is also important in this study as it shows 
how conflicts need to be transformed on the continent hence any solution to the African 
problem should thus go beyond the mere ending of hostilities and ensure that the relationship 
between the previously warring factions is restored and they can live harmoniously together. 
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Conflict Resolution 
Conflict resolution as a process is more focused on reaching an immediate agreement as a 
measure of ending the conflict (Lederach, 2003). Therefore, its goal is to ensure the termination 
and reduction of various forms of conflict. The focus of conflict resolution is to produce content 
not to forge relationships. Henceforth, it relies on power-based approaches as a strategy to 
influence outcomes in settling conflict disputes and interest-based approaches as a measure to 
capitalise in purposed gains by the arbitrator in persuading conflict actors to settle for peace 
(Paffenholz, 2009).  
 
Conflict Management 
 
Conflict management can be defined as, “the process of limiting the negative aspects of conflict 
while increasing the positive aspects of conflict” (Ra him 2002: 208). According to Lederach 
(1997), conflict management is an institutionalised process of peace.  Thus, it entails and relies 
more on diplomatic strategies, initiatives and channels in addressing and ending the conflict 
(Paffenholz, 2009). Lederach (1997) problematizes conflict management for engaging in 
mediation roles that only target the top-level leadership of conflicting parties whilst neglecting 
the grassroots challenges and problems that often sustain conflict.  
 
Peacebuilding 
 
Peacebuilding is a broad term and has no absolute definition. Cousens et al (2001:13) explain 
peacebuilding as a process which can be pursued at any stage of a conflict and can be engaged 
even in the absence of a peace settlement or agreement. As such, various scholars define 
peacebuilding based on different theoretical approaches. Sandole (2010) establishes that there 
are minimalist and maximalist approaches to defining peacebuilding. The former views 
peacebuilding as an approach for establishing negative peace [immediate peace outcomes that 
might be short-term in nature]. Whilst the latter establishes peacebuilding as an approach for 
ensuring positive peace [a process of building lasting peace]. Therefore, peacebuilding is 
defined through different conceptual lenses. In liberal peace framework, peacebuilding is 
defined as a process to “prevent violent conflict, and to facilitate the construction of the liberal 
state, a social contract, democracy, the rule of law, civil society and development” (Richmond 
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2011:455). However, the definition that captures the thinking of this study  regards 
peacebuilding as,  
“a set of long-term endeavours undertaken continuously through multiple stages of conflict 
(before, during and after) and involving collaboration at several levels of society… 
peacebuilding emphasises transformative social change that is accomplished both at the 
process-oriented level, and through tools such as negotiation, mediation, and reconciliation, 
and on the structural level, through the development of resilient institutions and social 
processes that allow conflict to be resolved through political, rather than violent means” 
(Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2012: 7). 
This definition provides a broader perspective of how peacebuilding can be understood. 
Therefore, one can draw various understandings that are relevant to their cause.  
 
Peace-making 
 
Peace-making is regarded as a process of getting rid of conflict tensions in a conflict 
environment to create room for lasting peace solutions (Galtung, 1976). According to the 
United Nations Peacekeeping (2017), “peace-making generally includes measures to address 
conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a 
negotiated agreement”. However, peace-making efforts are not only restricted to government 
roles but are also engaged with various stakeholders such as civil societies, non-governmental 
organisations and persons who might work independently.  
 
Peace enforcement 
 
According to United Nations Peacekeeping (2017), “Peace enforcement involves the 
application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force”. Peace 
enforcement is often considered in special situations hence for its engagement and pursuit, the 
UN Security Council has to give an explicit authorization. Thus, peace enforcement can be 
explained as an act of restoring international security and peace in situations deemed to be 
violent and in breach of expected standards of peace by the Security Council.  
 
Understanding Mechanisms of Peace 
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Various peace mechanisms are in existence. These strategies and approaches are key in the 
processes of making, keeping and building peace in conflict and post-conflict environments to 
ensure lasting/sustainable peace. Peace mechanisms are identified across literature and have 
been practically utilized in solving conflict challenges across the world. These mechanisms 
identified across literature include inclusiveness, dialogue; legitimacy, state building, 
indigenous, endogenous, top-down and bottom-up mechanisms that have been undertaken to 
address and resolve conflict challenges. Peace mechanisms are aiding tools or strategies for 
strengthening processes of building peace. Thus, they are critical in recommending necessary 
measures to strengthen initiatives towards building sustainable peace, in this case ASAP.  
 
Top-down & Bottom-up  
 
The practice of peace is divided between two dominant mechanisms that are top-down 
approaches and bottom-up approaches. The former is regarded by various scholars a 
paternalistic and standardized mechanism which does not regard any local participation as vital 
for peace processes (Hoffman, 2009; Eriksen, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). The latter 
approach has received much consideration as a critique of the failures of the former, however, 
scholars justify that in as much as bottom-up approaches orients from local participation, they 
require nurturing and should not be romanticised to avoid redundancy (Hoffman, 2009; 
Ramsbotham et al, 2011). These mechanisms are emphasised across literature as the backbone 
of key strategic theories that exist in conflict and peace studies.  
 
Top-down approaches are regarded as institutional and are dominantly influenced by liberal 
peace frameworks (Richmond, 2011; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). According to Ramsbotham et 
al (2011), top-down approaches are conservative practices and maintain a hegemonic stance in 
which imposing of peace strategies and state building is regarded as the norm. These 
approaches have been utilised by various international organisations such as the UN and by 
most governments across the world as measures of addressing conflict. It is essential to note 
that in most African conflict countries; top-down peace approaches have failed to yield many 
results (Murithi, 2006; 2008; Okechukwu, 2011; Bayo, 2012). Various scholars have critiqued 
top-down peace approaches as paternalist and imposing strategies that have often resulted in 
the failure of peace practices in different parts of the world (Hoffman, 2009; Murithi, 2006; 
2007; Ramsbotham et al, 2011).  
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Bottom-up mechanisms to peace are also commonly referred to as grassroots approaches, and 
they include various local oriented peace strategies to peace. For example, grassroots peace has 
been dominantly utilised in addressing conflicts in Israel-Palestine, Mindanao and Sudan in the 
form of people-to-people initiatives (Akwanda &Harris, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). 
Lederach (1997; 2005) comments on the role of bottom-up approaches in stirring up local 
participation and encouraging communication between people in the communities and national 
leaders, which is essential for establishing lasting peace. Most bottom-up approaches are often 
neglected and without support/funding by international and government stakeholders as 
essential mechanisms in the peace process, become marginalised (Curtis, 2012). However, 
scholars in the 21st century are widely agreed that the grassroots approach to peace which 
includes local, traditional, cultural, indigenous and endogenous values to peace need to be 
harnessed in addressing conflict challenges (Orjuela, 2003; Lederach, 2005; Joeng, 2005; UN, 
2009). Interestingly, there is increasing recommendations across literature in using both 
approaches as a measure to provide lasting solutions to peace through inclusive means 
(Murithi, 2006; 2007; UN, 2009; Donias, 2014; Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Curtis, 2012).  
 
Hybrid Peace 
 
The concept of hybrid peace became dominant in peacebuilding literature in the 21st century. 
Nadarajah and Rampton (2015) argue that the accentuation of hybrid peacebuilding mechanism 
follows the crisis (consistent failures) of liberal peace mechanisms in addressing conflict 
challenges in most non-western countries. Hybrid peace has been explained as a measure of 
pulling together top-down and bottom-up approaches in addressing conflict challenges 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2011). Thus, scholars of hybrid peace agree that effective and efficient 
peacebuilding engages both top-down and bottom-up approaches as a measure of 
complimenting various opportunities and counteract rising challenges (Mac Ginty, 2010; 
Richmond, 2012; Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012; Dinnen & Kent, 2015).  
 
Hybridity in peacebuilding is argued to provide potential that opens up alternative platforms of 
imagining peacebuilding, development and setting up of resilient peace structures from 
informal practices (Dinnen & Kent, 2015). The concept of hybrid peace has been embraced, it 
is important to take note that it is not easy to replicate in practice (Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 
2012). For instance, the hybrid partnerships between the UN and AU since 2006 have been 
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instrumental in designing measures of approaching and addressing conflict challenges in 
African countries. However, Tim Murithi (2006; 2007) warned of the dangers of these hybrid 
peace engagements as being susceptible to ‘hybrid paternalism’, whereby the UN views and 
mechanisms easily dominates and overshadows the AU. Literature exposes that hybrid peace 
in Africa is still faced with the challenge of ‘hybrid paternalism’ instead of ‘hybrid 
partnerships’. Thus, hybrid peace as a mechanism is valued as an important approach in this 
study, as it helped to illuminate on the various loopholes which are still limiting the 
effectiveness of ASAP.  
 
Inclusive peace 
 
The role of inclusiveness as a mechanism of peace can be traced back to Dag Hammarskjöld’s8 
peace principles. Melber (2015), acknowledges that Hammarskjöld’s principles emphasised 
that sustainable processes of peace can only be achieved by embracing the diversity of interests 
and actors. Therefore, inclusive peace research seeks to ground factors for negotiation, building 
tolerance, establishing reconciliation and forging relationships to quell a resurgence of conflict 
in post-conflict environments.  The importance of inclusive approaches has become much more 
important in the 21st century such that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in their 
Agenda 2030 are driving towards establishing “peaceful, just and inclusive societies” (Gruener, 
2017).  Research consistently established that inclusive societies are often “more stable, 
harmonious and developed” (Paffenholz and Ross, 2015:28).  
 
The inclusive peace mechanism also engages one to address the theoretical debates that exist 
in peace studies. Lederach (1997: xvi) proposed a “long-term commitment to establishing an 
infrastructure across the levels of a society, an infrastructure that empowers the resources for 
reconciliation from within that society and maximizes the contribution from outside”.  As such 
literature on 21st-century conflict and peace has increasingly engaged to support the role of 
inclusive peace approaches in the process of building peace. For instance, engaging top-down 
[liberal peace] approaches or bottom-up [grassroots] approaches as processes of peace 
independent of each is increasingly identified as problematic, as it has resulted in consistent 
failures (Murithi, 2006; 2007; 2008; Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Curtis 2012; 
Zuma, 2012). In 2009, UN Secretary Ban-Ki Moon emphasised the importance of inclusive 
                                                          
8 UN Secretary-General from 1953 to 1961. 
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peace processes as he advocated for the integration of local, traditional authorities, civil 
societies, and marginalised groups in setting a priority for peace and ensuring an inclusive 
ownership of the process of building peace. Thus, if ASAP is to be more effective, 
understanding inclusive peace mechanism is essential. Commenting on African peace, Zaum 
(2012:55) suggests that all top-down initiatives need to be reconciled with the needs and 
conditions of the local people “to resolve some of the tensions between vertical and horizontal 
legitimation efforts”.  
 
Dialogue  
 
The dialogue in peace has been regarded as one of the most crucial mechanisms. Erzurum and 
Eren (2014) conclude that communication is the major driving force of any peace 
process.Dailogue creates necessary platforms for engaging peace initiatives and strategies.  
Since the early 21st-century key international organisations such as World Bank, UN and the 
European Union (EU) have increasingly distanced themselves from diplomatic level 
interventions of conflict towards more constructive thinking which is guided by dialogical and 
communicative strategies (Kievelitz et al, 2003). Ramsbotham et al (2011) further outline, that 
the new interests for constructively engaging sustainable and strategic measures to peace in 
protracted and intractable conflict are guided through dialogical spheres. Henceforth, dialogue 
plays a crucial role in addressing challenges of ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions to peace that are 
dominant in most peace processes (Erzurum and Eren, 2014). Communication and dialogue 
serve as the synthesis for bridging trust amongst top-down and bottom-up approaches 
interactively; bring together local and international perspectives to peace, and sit together 
grassroots and top leadership in deliberating and building sustainable peace. There is still need 
for more communicative and dialogical mechanisms across all societal levels to effectively 
debate and shape the spheres of African peace solutions.  
 
Legitimacy  
 
Legitimacy is derived from a mutual contract between the state and the citizens. Lake (2008:3) 
articulately defines legitimacy as a process derived “from a mutually-beneficial contract in 
which the ruler [state] provides a social order of benefit to the ruled [community or society], 
and the ruled, in turn, comply with the extractions (e.g., taxes) and constraints on their 
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behaviour (e.g., law) that are necessary to the production of that order”. It is important to note 
that most customary and indigenous practices of peace that exist in various local African 
communities are not legitimately recognised by national or international institutions. Zuam 
(2012) notes how important it is for national structures of building peace to be located within 
the normative social structures of the local communities. Baya (2009) believes the indigenous 
peace processes are already legitimised by the societies in which they are practised and the 
state simply needs to recognise and adopt them. There are various African indigenous peace 
processes that have received very little attention in conventional peacebuilding strategies by 
governments, non-governmental organisations and international organisations. Thus, the focus 
on ASAP seeks to posit how legitimacy for indigenous or local peace initiatives can be 
acknowledged and supported effectively. For example, Kibble (2001:18) outlines how peace 
in Somaliland, “is largely due to the bottom-up approach at state building that derives its 
legitimacy from local clan leaders and local ownership of civil institutions, including stable, 
economic, political, security and social welfare institutions”.  
 
State building 
 
State building has been widely acknowledged by various scholars and an effective mechanism 
for ensuring the complete and effective transformation of conflict and sustainability of positive 
peace. Houton (2014:2) establishes that “the state is the primary vehicle through which 
domestic and international peace is sought”. Therefore, establishing strong state apparatus in a 
post-conflict state has been applauded as an effective measure in creating strong institutions 
(Curtis, 2012). However, it should be importantly noted that state-building should not be 
confused with peacebuilding, as the former focuses on strengthening government institutions, 
administrative structures and shaping political values not just preventing and ending the 
conflict as per the latter. According to the OECD (2008:13), “state building is the purposeful 
action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the states in relation to an effective 
political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups. 
Peacebuilding and state building, therefore, constitute a separate process”. State building as a 
mechanism to peace is crucial is setting up security reforms, supporting peacebuilding 
strategies such as reconciliation and rehabilitating societies. Scholars agree that most African 
states are often vulnerable to conflict because they lack strong institutions and suffer from poor 
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governance (Curtis, 2012). Thus, ASAP should also gear towards establishing strong African 
institutions and promote good governing strategies as a measure to curtain conflict challenges.  
 
Peace Education 
 
Peace education is one of the most important tools for building peace which is commonly 
identified in the literature. Various scholars are agreed on the effectiveness of peace education 
in transforming conflict environments. Brantmeier (2013) argues that peace education is 
essential in deconstructing power dynamics that influence and sustain conflict.  Bar-Tal and 
Rosen (2009) conclude that peace education is an effective tool in reconstructing societies 
following the conflict. Lederach (2005) notes that in each post-conflict environment peace 
education is necessary to socialize people towards reconciliation processes.  
 
An example of one the key case studies in this research shows how peace education is important 
and critical for ASAP.  In the case of Somalia, scholars such as Elmi (2010) have undertaken 
research that analyses the merits of employing education as a tool for social change and have 
argued that long-term social transformation can be achieved in Somalia using education. 
Education thus has the potential to play a key determinant role as a means of transforming 
conflict but it is important to note that there are generally insufficient resources available to 
boost the educational system (Elmi, 2010). This dimension further highlights the fact that the 
transformation of any conflict goes beyond the mere ending of hostilities and invokes deeper 
thoughts into the total transformation of the society, in general, using various nonviolent 
mechanisms. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided the definitions of key terms and concepts explored in the research. 
It has thus provided a background to the understanding of the mechanisms of peace. The 
chapter also unpacked the key terms and concepts and highlighted the manner in which they 
will be comprehended in this study. 
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Chapter 3: Review of Related Literature and Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter comprises the literature review and theoretical framework of this study. The 
chapter also provides a comprehensive review of broader African mechanisms in conflict 
transformation. There is a growing need for the evaluation of the notion of African Solutions 
to African Problems (ASAP). The AU’ and its employed mechanisms will be in the spotlight 
as it is the continental body hence it carries the responsibility of ensuring the creation and 
adoption of sustainable means of ending the conflict and enabling peace and security to prevail 
within the continent. There is wide range of literature on the various peace and security 
initiatives highlighting their triumphs and heralding their shortcomings that speak to the maxim 
of African solutions to African problems. However, there is limited literature in outlining the 
relationship between ASAP and peacebuilding. Considering that this study is focusing on 
Somalia, Burundi, and Sudan which are some of Africa’s complex conflict cases, the researcher 
will attempt to locate the case studies against the backdrop of both the available literature as 
well as explore the possibility of providing new insights. The exploration of literature shows 
that much of the literature focuses on the pivotal role played by the AU and other regional 
bodies such as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
in bringing about the ownership of the peace and security process. However, very little 
information speaks to the uniqueness of the mechanisms employed to address the conflict 
resolution dynamic. The principal theories on which the research is underpinned are the conflict 
transformation theory and the positive peace theory. The chapter will explore relevant literature 
in understanding conflict transformation perspective, it will then unpack the African 
perspective on conflict transformation, various mechanisms to peace, the structures that are 
pertinent to African peace, understanding conflict transformation in the African context and 
then unpack the theoretical framework.   
 
Conflict Transformation 
 
Conflict transformation is regarded as a school of thought that values relationship-centred 
approaches in processes of building peace. John Paul Lederach (2003:14) defines conflict 
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transformation as, “to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving 
opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice 
in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human 
relationships”. To further clarify, Paffenholz (2009:4), outlines that this is a process which does 
not only seek to end the conflict but focuses also on establishing communicative platforms that 
are endless for people at all levels, for the purpose of sustainable future peace outcomes.  
 
Conflict transformation is viewed as an interlinked procedure which brings about the successful 
changing of practices, connections, states of mind, perceptions, relationships, and different 
elements to conflict-sensitive settings. More importantly, it likewise addresses hidden 
structures, establishments and cultures that fuel and sustain an environment for violent political 
and social conflict (Galtung, 1995:1). The Berghof Foundation (2012:7) notes that "conflict 
transformation does not see the resolution of conflicts as the most imperative or extreme 
objective of engagement. Rather it expects to set up useful relations among the disputing 
parties, and makes the structures that are required for enduring peace". Conflict transformation 
helps with overseeing brutal conflict in every one of its stages, particularly in post-conflict 
circumstances (Reich, 2002). Conflict transformation fuels procedures of securing peace after 
the lapse of violence and conflict and this ought to be a procedure which ought to trigger a 
change in the relations, conduct, states of mind and structures from a negative state to a more 
positive one. The conflict transformation theory sees peace as focused and established 
connections. This incorporates both eye-to-eye connections and relationships and the ways in 
which the public structures our social, political, financial, and social connections (Lederach, 
2003).  
 
In addition, Diana (2010) highlights that conflict transformation is compactly characterized as 
an unpredictable procedure of valuable evolving connections, dispositions, practices, interests 
and discourses in violence inclined conflict scenarios. Significantly, it further addresses basic 
foundational structures, cultures and organizations that support and condition violent political 
and social conflict (Diana 2010). This implies that the theory centres on the elimination of 
violence but goes further into the hidden structures and investigates the underlying root causes 
of conflict to guarantee that the remedies are created and embodied in the structures and 
institutions and guarantee the sustainability of the process of peace. Therefore, this makes the 
process of conflict transformation to be one that is multi-dimensional, non-linear, and 
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unpredictable and including various actors in the move from inert and latent violence cultural 
and structural peace (Dudouet, 2011).  
 
The context and relationship between the actors of a conflict play a crucial role in the 
transformation process. In a bid to transform conflict, interaction with society and the diverse 
groups within it becomes a major component that is vital in determining the success of the 
transformation process. Poor relationships between clans or groups may represent an incredible 
risk to heightening the contention and will remain a noteworthy obstacle to the peacebuilding 
endeavours even after the ending of violent activities (see Dabiel et al 2009). Any attempt at 
conflict transformation, therefore, should be one that is mindful of this dynamic hence the 
theory of conflict transformation accentuates a cautious thought in considering the necessities 
of all conflicting groups for a fruitful peace-building attempt (Diamond 1994:3).  
 
Mitchelle (2002) contends that conflict transformation happens at different levels such as issue 
transformation, actor transformation and structural transformation. This means transformation 
is not complete if it takes place only on a single level and ignores the other levels. The 
transformation of a certain stage also feeds it onto the other in conflict transformation matrix 
hence making conflict transformation a complex and interlinked, multi-faceted process. Issue 
transformation is mainly concerned with the reformulation of positions maintained by parties 
to a conflict, therefore, it is thus paramount to ensure that the parties involved are assisted to 
redefine or reframe those positions in order to reach a compromise and solutions, (Mitchelle, 
2002). Equally important to consider, are the actors within these parties and the role they play 
in transforming conflict hence the need for actor transformation. Holtzman et al, (1998) thus 
explains and reveals the desirability of actors to change their goals or alter their general 
approach to conflict as and when necessary to support the process of conflict transformation. 
Lastly, there is structural transformation, which addresses the structure of the conflict, the 
paramount actors involved, their issues, contrary objectives and relationships to society, 
economy and the state within which the conflict plays itself out (Mitchelle, 2002). All these 
dimensions are equally important in ensuring that the root causes of conflict are addressed and 
thus pave way for effective peacebuilding and holistic transformation of society. 
 
Conflict transformation differs from conflict management and resolution although they share 
the similar school of thought. What sets apart conflict transformation is that it is a multi-faceted, 
comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach cutting across the minor to the major issues, 
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from the local to the international level, from short-term to long-term as well as engaging with 
grassroots actors, way up to the elites. This means that its end goal is to engage with the conflict 
itself at the core and this usually goes beyond the site of fighting.  
 
Comprehending ASAP & Conflict Transformation perspectives to Peace 
 
ASAP is often referred to as a response by African leaders to promote ownership of 
responsibility by African states in engaging initiatives that gravitates towards development, 
peace and security (Solomon, 2015; Nathan, 2010; Lipman, 2010). Though, the concept of 
ASAP generally reflects to a wide range of factors, widely available literature on the subject 
reflects on matters of peace and security. Peterson (1998:149) argues that “Western 
interventions in Africa have been notoriously unsuccessful, from the white elephant aid 
projects that litter the continent to the disastrous political and military support for dictators such 
as Mobutu Sese Seko, Samuel Doe and Siad Barre.” On this basis he justifies the need for 
engaging African solutions in addressing Africa’s conflict challenges. This relatively feeds into 
the values of conflict transformation that engages phenomenal thinking and practice of 
transforming conflict situations into peace.  
 
Conflict transformation speaks capacitating the ways in which one thinks and understands 
conflict in a particular environment, thus it is not only limited to approaches and techniques of 
addressing conflict (Ramsbotham et al., 2011; Burton, 1996). It is understood to be an evolving 
platform for building peace which is guided through flexible thought processes (Lederach, 
1997). More so, Lederach (1995) regards conflict transformation to be context specific, 
meaning it explores on the potential resources to build capacity for effective peace within a 
specific location. Reflecting on the concept of ASAP, it refers to African conflict context and 
the need for building contextual solutions to the conflict challenges. Solomon (2015) argues 
that the conflict security crisis in Africa is worrying and requires alternative peace frameworks 
that can only be found in Africa. This means there is more demand for context specific solutions 
for transforming conflict societies in Africa.  There is agreement among scholars such as 
Lebokang (2017), Solomon (2015), Lipman (2010) and Murithi (2007), that ASAP  provides 
the platform to not only develop African peace scholarship but to engage contextual thinking 
to develop capacity essential in addressing Africa’s conflict challenges. Thus conflict 
transformation as framework for building peace, provides insight on how ASAP can be 
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effectively utilised in conceptualising Africa peace mechanisms and building capacity for their 
implementation.  
 
Lederach (1997) posits that conflict should not be viewed as a disconnected occasion that can 
be settled or overcome as a necessary piece of society's progressing advancement and 
improvement. This means conflicts cannot be merely resolved in isolation from the context in 
which the society is evolving and developing (Lederach, 1997; 2003). The understanding of 
the crisis will feed into the way the society can advance, and progress cannot be divorced from 
the preceding conflict (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Therefore, this means that the conflict has a 
potential positive that it produces if exploited favourably. Sandole (2010) argues that conflicts 
ought not to be seen exclusively as a characteristically negative and dangerous event but instead 
as a conceivably positive and profitable constraint of progress if bridled in a constructive way. 
In so doing, the process of conflict transformation thus goes past simply looking to contain and 
overcome conflict, it rather tries to change the main actors and major factors that drive the 
conflict from their utmost roots and avoid the conflict from reverting into chaos (Paffenholz, 
2009). This reveals that conflict transformation is not a once off encounter at resolving the 
crisis, but instead, it becomes a long haul continuous and complex process requiring managed 
engagement and collaboration. ASAP still requires development and perfection as a model for 
peace. Henceforth, conflict transformation perspective allows for the engagement of endless 
communication platforms for leaders across all levels of society (top, middle and grassroots), 
to explore and develop capacity for contextual mechanisms that are sustainable towards 
building peace in various countries across the continent (Lederach, 1997; Paffenholz, 2009; 
Ramsbotham et al, 2011).   
 
Korpen et al. (2008), indicates that conflict transformation affects the underlying causes of 
conflict in a manner that reasonable peaceful techniques can triumph. In addition, the idea of 
conflict transformation expands on a systemic and comprehensive way to deal with conflicts 
which assess their associated dimensions, and dynamics in nature. This point of view impacts 
on the way in which, regular faculties are utilized to characterize and depict the phenomena of 
social change and transformation (Korpen et al., 2008). Deliberate endeavours additionally 
support conflict transformation to address the normal increase of human strife through peaceful 
methodologies that address issues and raise comprehension, uniformity, and regard in 
relationships. This means that at the core of conflict transformation is the intentional efforts by 
actors which are not imposed upon. For instance, the constant disintegration of peace in South 
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Sudan, the consistent resurgence of conflict in DRC and Somalia, and the episodic and sporadic 
conflicts emergences in countries such as Burundi, Sudan, Mali and Central African Republic 
demonstrate the loopholes that exist in liberal peace approaches when it comes to sustainably 
build peace and transform conflict in the continent (Zambakari, 2017). Meaning, African 
solutions, should take precedence in accordance to the social, political, economic, cultural and 
traditional methods that are effectively contextual and capacitating in influencing long lasting 
peace (Lederach, 2005). 
 
Johan Galtung (2005) premised his empirical research on conflict transformation theory as a 
viable option for aborting violent conflicts. For Galtung, the goal of conflict transformation is 
peace, accompanied by the creative and nonviolent capacity to handle the outcomes thereof.  
He concluded that the shared vision of a sustainable outcome that is acceptable to all involved 
parties has the potential to transform the conflict way before any agreement. Therefore, this 
means that external actors can withdraw while the local, actual parties commence their own 
conflict transformation capacity building independently and autonomously. Hence, “the goal 
is not any final solution, but to transform the conflict and build the capacity for the parties 
themselves to handle the conflict non-violently and creatively” (Galtung, 2000). There is need 
for a platform for creativity and capacity building through knowledge generation and 
intervening strategies that have decisive political will in establishing African driven 
mechanisms and approaches (Lobakeng, 2017). Meaning ASAP can effectively provide that 
transformative platform in addressing African conflict if it is not only recognised conceptually 
but also provided with autonomous principles and the political will to execute it (Lobakeng, 
2017; Lipman, 2010). Thus, the importance of understanding Galtung (2005) emphasis on 
ensuring the development of capacity to effectively initiate and implement binding peace 
decisions. In this case, African countries and the key regional bodies have demonstrated in 
many occasions’ weaknesses in upholding the interests and values of ASAP (Lobakeng, 2017). 
For instance in the case of Libya where South Africa and Nigeria  circumvented the AU’s 
intentions by voting for western intervention and UNSC decision to forcefully intervene in the 
case. This meant AU’s position became weakened and secondary despite its well-defined 
intentions (Lobakeng, 2017). 
 
It is important to note that the conflict transformation process employs various and dynamic 
strategies to achieve its end goal. In tracing the history of African peace processes, literature is 
highly contested on the failures of most of these processes. Research has repeatedly concluded 
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that the failure of most peace initiatives in Africa is based on liberal peace perspectives 
(Murithi, 2008; Hoffman, 2009; Curtis, 2012; Lederach, 2005). Thus, in engaging ASAP, 
adopting a conflict transformation perspective, can help in ending undesired external peace 
initiatives and building new desired [African] peace initiatives (Paffenholz 2009: 4).  
 
Liberal peace framework and challenges to African conflict solutions 
 
Liberal peacebuilding refers to the approaches and activities of building peace that are set up 
on the emphasis and infrastructures of market oriented economics and democratic institutions 
(Newman et al., 2009). It assumes its theoretical guideline from liberal peace which posit that 
“the idea that certain kinds of (liberally constituted) societies will tend to be more peaceful, 
both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states are” 
(Newman et al., 2009: 11).  Liberal peace is also widely referred as “liberal democratic theory” 
or “democratic peace” (Tziarras, 2012; Newman et al., 2009; Doyce, 2005). Meaning it 
provides peace frameworks that are guided by liberal ideological structures such as democratic 
political systems (competitive political landscape), institutional capacity building and liberal 
economic institutions (privatisation of economic systems of development) (Curtis, 2013). 
Liberal peace framework is the most widely used peacebuilding approach in the international 
spectrum (Tadjbakhsh, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011; Newman et al., 2009). Literature reflects that 
it is dominantly accepted and supported internationally as a viable framework for 
peacebuilding (Lemay-Hébert, 2013; Tadjbakhsh, 2011). 
 
To effectively understand liberal peace and its role in peacebuilding, it is essential to note that 
it focuses more on recreating conflict-torn societies through key targeted components which 
include, “democracy promotion, the rule of law and good governance, promotion of human 
rights, economic reform and privatisation” (Lemay-Hébert, 2013: 242). The framework of 
liberal peace is paternalist and top-down in approach. Meaning it utilizes imposed strategies, 
through institutional hierarchies that are assumed to be necessary for peace (Ramsbotham et 
al., 2011; Hoffman, 2009; Lederach, 1997).  This, however, has turned out to be disastrous in 
most African conflict situations as that approach often misdiagnose the conflict problem hence 
prescribing incompatible solutions (Murithi, 2008). For instance, Solomon (2015) outlines how 
the application of liberal peace approaches in reconstructing the new state of South Sudan was 
met with immediate demise and resurgence of the conflict problem.  
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Mac Ginty (2011) note that most peacemaking initiatives internationally are underpinned on 
the guidelines of liberal peace. In light of this, the review of liberal peace reflects how it has 
been successfully utilised in most western conflict challenges with much success (Ramsbotham 
et al., 2011). However, the application of liberal peace framework in other contexts outside the 
western context has resulted in several critical failures. Scholars such as Hoffman (2009), 
Tziarras (2012), Zambakari (2017) among others, gives several instances of how liberal peace 
has particularly failed to materialise sustainable peacebuilding is African conflict challenges.  
These liberal peace failures to effectively proffer lasting solutions to Africa’s conflicts has 
attracted various critiques and call for African Solutions for African Problems (Zambakari, 
2017). 
 
 It is important to note that this study does not seek to disqualify the impact of liberal peace 
framework in addressing peace, but rather to reflect on its limitations and incompetence in the 
African context. This is because African countries have different cultural, social, political, 
traditional, economic and societal structures from the western countries were the liberal peace 
initiatives have been successfully implemented (Bjorkdahl and Hoglund, 2013). Murithi (2008) 
emphasises that it lacks the value-added elements that ensures the compatibility of the 
framework in addressing African conflict societies. There is huge criticism of peace actors by 
scholars for directly adopting successful western liberal peace approaches into African conflict 
challenges without even considering the contextual differences (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). 
Tom (2017) argues that an attempt to import as set of ideas in addressing conflict challenges 
should not be measured on their success in the other location, since they have different 
histories. As such, to ensure materialisation of sustainable African solutions requires alternative 
platforms for peace which are argued in this study to be found in ASAP. 
 
ASAP is distanced from liberal peace as it is rooted from the ideals of Pan-Africanism which 
sought to provide African driven thinking towards achieving the desired goals (Lipman 2010; 
Murithi, 2007). It values are based on capacitating internal or local initiatives that can yield 
lasting peace than importing external frameworks might be distant to local interest and values 
(Lobakeng, 2017). 
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Synopsis of African Peace Structures 
 
The main object of this research is premised on the African institutions such as the AU, and 
the relative regional bodies like IGAD, SADC and ECOWAS and the role they play in crafting 
and implementing African solution to crises that bedevil the continent. The focus will be 
however on the African Union and its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).  The 
AU is comprised of a greater number of states within its wing and several leaders such as Thabo 
Mbeki the former President of South Africa and the late Libyan president Muammar Gadhaffi 
advocated ASAP within the AU.  Kobbie (2009) notes that the AU as a continental organisation 
is bestowed with an institutional and moral responsibility to promote and enforce peace and 
security in Africa. He further notes that the key determinant role of the AU as a continental 
leader is its capability to resolve conflicts within its authority. It is also important to note that 
the reference to the maxim, African solutions to African problems, is often invoked in tandem 
with the continent-wide attempt at dealing with the continental problems. . This study is 
premised on the notion that any institution that prides itself as championing the values of its 
people should look within its bosom for guiding principles in order to advance mechanisms 
that deal with its challenges, hence the AU needs African principles as a guiding pillar for its 
operations aimed at peace, security and development. 
 
According to Derso’s (2011:116) assessment of the transition of OAU to AU in 2002, the 
process was a transformation that “could be viewed as a regime change in Africa’s regional 
organisation, a normative and institutional change that marked the commitment of African 
leaders to attend to the security challenges that plague the continent.” Therefore, it is imperative 
to focus on the role that is played by the African Union in resolving the conflicts within the 
continent. This research will thus unpack the AU led peace operations in fulfilling its mandate 
as a continental body. The African Union is entrusted with the mandate of ensuring the 
resolution of conflicts by the ASF. It, therefore, fulfils this role and mandate by deploying 
peace operations across the continent as a means of curtailing the destructive conflicts. 
However, this again raises a pertinent question as to whether it constitutes an African way of 
dealing with conflict or whether in its quest for conflict solutions, it does tap into the traditional 
ways of resolving conflict.  
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Sub-regional organisations in Africa have been playing a role in providing African solutions. 
However, their interests are in most cases drawn from a smaller group of states within the 
continent and are difficult to generalise for the entire continent. Even though sub-regional 
organisations have been taking leads in the resolution of disputes in their regions, the robustly 
established AU is expected to spearhead and coordinate the peace and security initiatives in the 
continent in order to champion the interests of Africans and provide a safe and secure 
environment for Africa to materialise its goals (Scanlon, Eziakonwa and Myburgh, 2007; 
Parker and Rukare, 2002; Murithi, 2009; Williams, 2011). 
 
Tracing African Peace Solutions  
 
The continent has had a raging debate on the issue of how best to resolve its conflicts. 
According to Porto and Ngandu (2015) it should be noted that customary, also called 
traditional, African approaches to conflict resolution and peacemaking are often the site of 
heated debate in academic and policy literature. Scholars such as Murithi (2006; 2007; 2008), 
Isike and Uzodike (2011), Uzodike and Moolakkattu (2012), Curtis (2013), have written about 
the desirability and practicality of having solutions for the problems in Africa. The advocacy 
for the adoption of ASAP to find effective solutions to curb African conflict challenges can be 
traced back to Kwame Nkrumah’s desire to set up an African regional security in the 1960s. 
Though the idea failed to materialise then, it remained a critical subject of concern to engage 
African states in providing solutions to peace within the African Continent (May, 2003).  
However, the biggest challenge to the materialisation of effective involvement of African states 
in peace is that of financial constraints (May, 2003; Nathan, 2013).  Despite the financial 
constraints; AU has, however, engaged in joint mission operations with UN and has only 
engaged in an independent mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This amalgamation by the AU and 
UN in addressing African conflict challenges had been assumed to come up with more credible 
and effective conflict resolution mechanism that would change the face of the continent in as 
far as conflict is concerned. Surprisingly, scholars such as Murithi (2006; 2008)    and Curtis 
(2012:15), establishes that African peace processes remain highly captured by external ideas 
resulting in failed peace despite the amalgamation to promote African mechanisms to be 
pushed forward. In his studies, Murithi (2006; 2007; 2008) advocates for partnership rather 
paternalist relationship between the UN and AU.  He reflects on the imbalanced relationship 
that exist when it comes to addressing African conflict challenges, where the interests of the 
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former often take precedence over the latter in matters relating to Africa. This clearly exposes 
the gaps of factors affecting effective materialisation of African solutions to peace.  
 
George Ayittey (2010) writes that the reason why he coined the expression, African solutions 
to African problems, was after a realisation that the post-colonial trajectory in Africa had been 
one that has been characterised by development by imitation in which Africa simply duplicated 
systems, ideologies, and paraphernalia which were alien to the continent.  Consequentially, 
most of them failed dismally and therefore the only salvation for the continent was nowhere 
else besides her very own bosom that is in her own indigenous institutions (Ayittey, 2010). 
Scholars such as Murithi (2008:16) have also advocated for African solutions arguing that 
“externally driven international efforts to resolve conflict in Africa are often faced with the 
limitation that the local partners are sometimes unwilling or unable to relate to such initiatives”. 
He further argues for these afro-centric approaches as they place so much emphasis on 
achieving peace through forgiveness, reconciliation, and restorative justice (Murithi, 2008). In 
the same vein, Albert (2008:31) argues that the wealth of literature has been one that has 
adopted the ‘top-down’ (state-centric and globalizing) discourse. He thus advocates for a 
bottom-up narrative which places focus on how Africans can create peace for themselves 
(Albert, 2008). Similarly, Murithi (2007) also borrows from the wealth and richness of the 
African traditional mechanisms of resolving conflict and illustrates their strength and 
limitations that need to be harnessed for effective resolution of conflicts.  
 
Critique to African Peace Solutions  
 
The literature identifies that concept of African solutions to African problems has been treated 
by a grain of salt by various scholars. Vraalson (1997:6) argues that research should not seek 
the ultimate “wholesale importation of the traditional conflict resolutions in Africa nor a total 
repudiation of the western models and values, but rather a revitalization and subsequent 
inclusion of the African traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in the management of the 
‘modern conflicts’ on the continent”. Scholars such as Ferim (2013) have also sought to 
problematize the notion of African solutions to African problems and have written on the 
feasibility of the concept. He argued that the adoption of such a framework should thus go hand 
in glove with the capacity of the institutions in the continent otherwise it remains a fallacy.  
 
 
41 
 
However, scholars such as Williams (2008) have refuted the African solutions to African 
problems approach by arguing that “this approach does not offer a sound basis on which to 
maintain international peace and security in Africa or, indeed, beyond the continent.” He argues 
that some of the problems are not entirely African hence to place the sole responsibility of 
resolving the problem on the African leaders does not really seem to alleviate the problem 
rather it exacerbates it. Herbst (2007) also argues that the notion of African solutions to African 
problems is futile since it assumes that the continent is monolithic and that the leaders will be 
in consensus in terms of responding to the conflicts on the continent.  
 
Despite this wealth of literature available on the discourse, focus on the implemented peace 
mechanisms on the continent that utilised the African solutions approach still requires detailed 
exploration to promote debate towards shaping African peacebuilding theories. This helps to 
highlight the practical limitations of existing approaches through providing critical engagement 
and analysis through case studies highlighting successes, failures and opportunities for the 
future. Moreover, the literature that is available has not been focused on the recent and 
changing dynamics of the conflicts in Africa hence it is not reflective of the actual 
implementation challenges that the case-by-case conflicts face. This research will thus seek to 
critic and identify relevant opportunities by looking at selected case studies that vary in terms 
of the problems and evaluate the feasibility of applying the ASAP approach. It is premised on 
the understanding that, the problems in Africa are not uniform hence their solutions are also 
equally dissimilar. 
 
Indigenous peace: The role of African values in conflict transformation. 
 
Indigenous peace mechanisms are dominantly gaining momentum as solution bearing 
strategies across different practices and scholars of peace. In times past, indigenous, traditional 
and customary strategies of peace had been dismissed and castigated as opaque, contradictory 
and unaccountable as compared to enlightened standards of liberal peace (Fanthorpe, 2005: 
27–49). Hence peace reconstruction efforts which could not adhere to liberal peace standards 
where never seen fit to be funded by international standards (Kievelitz et al, 2003; Fanthorpe, 
2005; Curtis, 2012).  Mac Ginty (2008: 189) argues that peace mechanisms that adhere to 
indigenous approaches are often supported to be “participatory and relationship-focused, and 
that peaceful outcome have a higher chance of community adherence than template style 
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international peace interventions effected through the ‘liberal peace”. Murithi (2006; 2008) 
vehemently posits that consideration of indigenous peace mechanisms is crucial if sustainable 
peace practices are to be established in African conflict environments since some effective and 
alternative strategies to African peace are beyond the reach of liberal peace. This understanding 
feeds well to ASAP and can help develop the theoretical and philosophical standards of African 
peace mechanisms.  
 
It is imperative to note that there are research materials that consider traditional or indigenous  
dispute resolutions approaches in Africa. Adegoju (2009) for example considered the role of 
Yoruba proverbs in settling social disputes. Isike and Uzodike (2011) examined the traditional 
role  played by African women in conflict transformation which could be helpful for the current 
dispute settling in Africa.. Utilizing the eastern and the horn of Africa as a contextual 
investigation of cases, Mutisi (2012) inspects how customary and contemporary conflict 
transformation approaches could be coordinated. Reflecting on the eastern Hararghe zone of 
Oromiya a province of Ethiopia, Angessa (2013) considers the part played by traditional 
conflict transformation approaches in settling disputes and in reintegrating disputing parties 
into society.  
 
Furthermore, Lacroix and Neufeldt (2010), analyse how West African dance serves as an 
innovative method for conflict transformation. Exploring the Baganda in Uganda, Sentongo 
and Bartoli (2012) look at the Ekika mechanism of conflict transformation and dispute 
resolution. Miti, Abatan and Minou (2013) consider whether sharing power is the answer for 
African disputes given that it is constantly recommended as a component for accommodating 
the interests of conflicting parties competing for political and economic power. Considering 
the instance of Abunzi mediators, Mutisi (2012) applauds the viability of local dispute 
resolution in Rwanda. To avoid redundancy the research avows the presence of materials that 
look at some indigenous practices for conflict transformation in Africa. In any case, these 
materials concentrate to a great extent on specific conventional transformation approaches of 
an ethnic group in Africa. The greater part of these materials does not emphasize the probability 
of determining a purely African conflict transformation methodologies or standards to manage 
and sustain the peace operations of the AU. 
Ubuntu  
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The basic definition of Ubuntu can be simply translated in English as ‘humanness’. This simple 
translation maybe derived as the basic definition of Ubuntu, however, it limits the various 
social interpretation the concept carries and represents across various African societies and 
cultures (Metz, 2011). Thus Ubuntu is widely captured across literature with the understanding 
that human value manifests when one ultimately show commitments towards the development 
of the other and vice-versa (Murithi, 2006; Metz, 2011; Akinola and Uzodike, 2018).  Africa’s 
contemporary history is dominated by violent conflict, which has prompted many war-torn 
nations to embrace different conflict resolution and peace-building approaches (Akinola and 
Uzodike 2018:92). Scholars have explored the concept of Ubuntu and its contribution towards 
conflict transformation. The African socio-political landscape has been characterised by 
violence and as such there has been a growing need for viable indigenous responses to conflict 
and Ubuntu is recognised as a viable tool for transformation (Mangaliso, 2001; Dandala, 1996). 
Nyathu (2004) regards ubuntu as the pillar of most African societies as it is an embodiment of 
the African value system, justice, fairness and humanness. Though it is conceptualised as more 
of a cultural ideology, Olinger, Britz, & Olivier (2007) argue that it can be applied to 
management, business and even politics. Some scholars concur with this view and establish 
the relationship between Ubuntu and positive peace by acknowledging that: “Africa’s quest for 
sustainable peace needs to be built on reconciliation and coexistence based on human rights, 
and social, economic, and political justice, all of which lie at the heart of Ubuntu” (Murithi, 
2006). By looking at the conflict transformation in South Africa, Murithi (2006) investigates 
how clashes could be settled through the use of Ubuntu which stresses solidarity of mankind, 
participation, sharing and compassion. Furthermore, scholars agree that there is growing belief 
within the continent that societal conflict may be aborted through abiding to the principles of 
Ubuntu. Therefore, there has been emerging literature which explores and investigates this 
belief and seeks to ascertain how the principles embodied in Ubuntu could be effectively 
harnessed as a tool for transforming violent conflict in Africa (Akinola and Uzodike, 2018). 
 
African wisdom and elders 
 
African states have thus far failed to find lasting methods of conflict prevention or solutions to 
end conflicts (Jegede, 2008). It can be argued that the failure may be attributed to the fact that 
African leaders have relied on external actors or the international community to resolve African 
conflicts, although this has proven not successful in many instances.This has thus prompted 
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scholarly research to explore on the possibility of utilizing African traditional systems to 
resolve conflict in a quest to find lasting solutions. Scholarly insight into the use of wisdom 
and values of distinguished personalities have been explored. Mazrui (1967) provides insight 
into the use of African resources towards conflict transformation. His work is premised on four 
key African resources namely; values of the elders, Africa’s ecumenical spirit, Africa’s limited 
memory of animosity and African women as avenues for effective creation African 
mechanisms for peace (Mazrui 1967). This study is further echoed by Malan who focuses on 
the role of elders and understanding the origins and nature of the conflict and social 
environment as crucial to the process of transforming violent conflicts (Malan, 1997). 
Furthermore, Tuso (2000) also explores the role of elders in conflict transformation by 
investigating the system of Gada within the Oromo society as a typical exemple of how african 
societies respond to conflict resolution. Jegede (2008) also explores the wealth of African 
proverbs which shows much reverence to the roles of the elderly wisdom in society.  The 
underlying factor in these studies is the significance and role played by the elders in traditional 
African conflict resolution.  
 
AU Peace Operations 
 
The ultimate lessons are drawn from the past and present operations have indicated that the AU 
led peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Sudan, and Burundi (the scope of this study), all face 
financial and logistical challenges which have thus dented their operational success. Gelot et 
al (2012:11) establishes that “The AU’s ability to finance its own peace operations is limited”. 
This, therefore, presents a challenge for the AU to unilaterally conduct its missions on the 
continent, as a result the operations in themselves have led to the continued conflicts as they 
fail to fund and function in effective containment and resolution of conflicts (May, 2003; 
Nathan, 2013). More so, Nathan (2013:55) precisely concludes that “the bottom line is that the 
more financially independent the AU’s peace-making becomes, the more politically 
independent it will be.” Therefore, the literature clearly exposes that African led peace 
operations still fail to dominantly forward African oriented solutions as they lack the resources 
to finance the resources to finance their own solutions into effective results (May, 2003; 
Murithi, 2007; Curtis, 2012; Gelot et al, 2013; Nathan, 2013).  
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The AU also faces critical challenges such as post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding as 
envisaged by the Brahimi report in 2002 (Okumu and Jaye 2010:19). The AU took the lead in 
peace operations in Darfur, Somalia, and Burundi. It is important to note that, the success of 
the AU Peace Operations in these operations remains argued to be dependent on co-operation 
with the UN as the mother body that is responsible for ensuring world peace and security 
(Murithi, 2006; 2007). However, this cooperation does not amount to the co-optation of the 
African solutions into the wider UN international remedies. As such, co-operation and 
harmonisation of best practices is effective for all AU peace operations (Boutellis and Williams 
2013:2). This means that African solutions are not divorced from international contributions as 
the latter plays a crucial role in ensuring the success of the mechanisms, and the latter should 
always remain a support structure for Africans and only that. AMISOM just like every other 
mission under the AU has a heavily militaristic nature embedded in its concept of operations. 
This therefore also questions its originality as an African means to a solution but other scholars 
have argued that it qualifies as African since the military troops are entirely African. This 
literature, therefore, feeds into the research to zoom into these operations and evaluate their 
successes and challenges in as far as quelling the conflict is concerned as well as its contribution 
to the realisation of the mantra on African solutions to African problems. 
 
Conflict Transformation Theory 
 
The conflict transformation theory is premised on the need to resolve the root causes of the 
conflict to achieve long-lasting peace and avoid the conflict syndrome of reverting into violent 
conflict. This means that any mechanism to address violent conflict should be premised on the 
notion of avoiding a further relapse into conflict thus curbing further unnecessary loss of 
resources in fighting and trying to bring stability. 
 
Positive Peace Theory 
 
Positive Peace Theory will also inform the research as a theoretical framework. The positive 
peace hypothesis is credited to Galtung (1969). The theory expresses that peace concerns the 
structural associations of numerous people who intentionally and voluntarily seek after 
cooperative participation for the advantage of humankind (Galtung 1981; Reich 2002). It 
embodies the inquiry of positive conditions, which can resolve the fundamental foundations of 
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conflict, which results in violence and seeks to undo structural violence. Naidu (1986), states 
that structural violence is authorized human suffering without immediate, direct and clear 
utilization of force or violence. Human life can be obliterated through the absence of access to 
sustenance, healthcare, healthy environment, social insurance, human conditions, or food 
(Naidu 1986). The theory on positive peace will be paramount in this research as it goes past 
simply advancing the lack of violence into investigating the underlying root causes of the 
contention. In this regard, it thus plays a crucial role in the formation and design of peaceful 
(nonviolent) methodologies for responding to conflict and advance the components that grasp 
these in the paradigm of conflict transformation in Africa. 
 
In most cases, the process of building peace has not yielded the creation of positive peace in 
the end due to its insurmountable goal and expectation of transforming the entire odds of a 
society at one go. This transformation attempt took centuries for other continents to achieve, 
hence African peace builders need also to be wary of the fact that the transformation is a lengthy 
process which requires complex strategies and collective effort if it were to be achieved. For 
example, Chesterman (2004:5) identifies the lack of local support structures, and the 
devastating effects of continued armed conflict as detriments that affects the success of 
peacekeeping operations and they are to be taken into consideration in AMISOM operations. 
Thus, the use of positive peace theory is to help engage alternative thinking to peace approaches 
that does not only rely on a single mechanism (Lederach, 1997).  The state building efforts in 
Somalia will be explored and compared to the Somaliland example in order to draw effective 
conclusions on some of the best practices that may be drawn from the relatively successful 
experience of the latter into the greater Somali conflict. 
 
The significance and applicability of the theories to the study 
 
The theories are both interlinked and relevant to the study. One might argue that the end goal 
of the conflict transformation process is the ultimate attainment of positive peace. Therefore, 
the pillars sustaining both these theories are of utmost importance to the realisation of the 
objectives of the study and provide an in-depth interrogation of the issues relating to the 
conflict. Both these theories suggest the need for local ownership of the peace process as a vital 
component to the success of the attempts at transforming conflict and building sustainable 
peace. Based on this view, the research thus advocates for a bottom-up approach which has the 
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intention to transform and build relationships, institutions, civil society, political parties and 
leadership as a possible strategy that could work in the resolution of disputes in the African 
continent. 
 
In the case of Somalia, it may be un-ideal to resolve conflicts between the warring factions 
utilising diplomacy for example when issues identifying with the conflict have much to do with 
the basic asymmetries that usually relate to the majority predominance over minorities or 
comparative power relations between groups stratified by class ethnicity or beliefs (Miall, 
2004). In the African setup, which is volatile and susceptible to disregard of the rule of law, 
sustainable outcomes of negotiations in this context are never guaranteed hence it becomes 
more problematic to employ any other approach to resolving dispute due to the unpredictability 
of the situation hence conflict transformation becomes a viable option due to its nature in 
addressing conflict. Conflict transformation expands further from mere conflict resolution as it 
recognises that conflicts emerge not solely through structures which are not equal in nature or 
goals that cannot be compatible and unequal structures, but that they are an outcome of 
historical processes which define the identities of the entangled parties, and which calls for 
more considerable social change (Reimann, 2004:13) 
 
In light of the Somali experience, it is imperative to note that, at the point when the extremist 
parties turn to the utilization of insubordination and armed violence as a method for passing on 
a message then the contention can be extremely disastrous. As indicated by Galtung, this 
disastrous confrontation is sustained through a flawed form of administration and militarization 
of the politics, which thus results in the continuation to the further starvation of fundamental 
needs. This has perpetuated an extended cycle of institutional distortion and disastrous 
contentions (Galtung 1996:90). Therefore, there is a need for adequate capacity in governance 
and society and a supportive international community which will, in turn, promote the gradual 
access to basic needs. Conflict transformation theory provides a comprehensive peace process 
which should address all the aspects of a conflict. It is a lengthy process motivated by peace, 
truth and justice (Lederach, 1997). The theories are thus applicable to the study as the study 
seeks to highlight the African mechanisms to lasting conflict transformation. It will unpack 
how these mechanisms go beyond ending violence into addressing the root causes of the 
conflict holistically. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has engaged literature on conflict and peace as a measure to give a detailed 
understanding of the factors that guide the practice of peace. It then further explored details on 
African peace in order to give understanding on why African solutions to African problems 
requires solid consideration. Thus, the review of literature above has provided an understanding 
of concepts and background on African peace so as to set a platform for the development of 
the study. Moreover, the chapter has outlined the theories and their importance in 
understanding the research. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology & Design of the Study 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter comprises the research methodology applied by the research in order to collect, 
analyse and present the findings of the research. The research utilised the qualitative research 
methodology and utilised the methods ascribed to this type of research as will be highlighted 
in this chapter. The research adopts the theoretical framework of conflict transformation and 
positive peace in order to put into context the African solutions discussions. 
 
Research methodology embodies the research designs, data collection processes, samples, 
population, procedures of data analysis and the measurement of variables. The study employed 
a qualitative research methodology. It utilised a qualitative research methodology as it seeks to 
gain a deeper understanding of certain organizations or events, rather than a mere surface 
description of a large sample of a population (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). In this case, the study 
seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the conflict transformation dynamics within the context 
of the African continent under the mantra of African solutions to African problems and explore 
the challenges in employing indigenous African mechanisms to this end. 
 
Unlike quantitative research which seeks to answer the ‘how many’ and ‘how much’ of a 
phenomenon, the qualitative research methods aim to answer the, “what” “how’ or ‘why’. 
Qualitative research methods are therefore aimed at understanding the experiences and 
attitudes of individuals and groups in a setting which cannot be merely quantified and reduced 
to numerical values (Hancock, 2002). Therefore, the qualitative research is characterized by 
methods that produce words rather than numbers as data for analysis. 
 
In contending with the above notions, this research thus seeks to answer the why and how 
questions relating to the understanding of ASAP concept as well as the role, success, and 
challenges of the AU in reaching this end. It is also imperative to note that the research intends 
to answer and understand what ‘African solutions’ embody in relation to the conflict problem 
and its transformation into sustainable peace.  This is done through exploring three case studies 
within the continent and drawing out findings based on the successes and challenges of the 
mechanisms employed in the transformation of conflict. Qualitative analysis is utilised by 
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conducting an extensive review of the existing dearth of literature on the histories of Somalia, 
Burundi and Sudan, the diverse natures of the conflicts, the root causes, history of the previous 
attempts in stabilizing and resolving the conflicts, and the theories that provide the premise for 
the research. This is also done in order to highlight the dominant scholarly views and identify 
the existing gaps in the implementation of African solutions in as far as conflict resolution is 
concerned. 
 
Qualitative Methodology 
 
The study largely made use of qualitative research approach in answering the main research 
questions or research problems. Qualitative research is a non-numerical, descriptive way of 
collecting and interpreting information. 
Qualitative research methods include the use of “methods such as participant observation or 
case studies which result in a narrative, descriptive account of a setting or practice and focuses 
on reports of experience or on data which cannot be adequately expressed numerically” 
(Kumar, 2000). The study has the explanatory nature compared to a more statistical research 
hence it employed the qualitative methods in answering its main questions. Scholars have 
underscored the need for such methods by noting that, the research design which is descriptive 
is mainly adopted in preliminary and explanatory studies to enable the researcher to gather 
information, summarize it, present it and interpret it for classification purposes so as to reach 
the intended goals of the research (Luck and Rueben, 1992) 
 
Qualitative research is employed as it “strives to create a coherent story as it is seen through 
the eyes of those who are part of that story, to understand and represent their experiences and 
actions as they encounter, engage with and live through situations,” (Nieuwenhuis and Smit 
cited in Wagner and Kawulich, 2012: 124). This kind of research (qualitative) was appropriate 
for the research as it made possible the analysis of different variables thus enabling the 
researcher to evaluate the extent to which African mechanisms have been effective in 
transforming the conflict in the continent. 
The research further utilized the qualitative techniques since qualitative research as a research 
methodology is concerned with understanding the process and the social and cultural contexts 
which underlie various behavioural patterns and is mostly concerned with exploring the why 
questions of research (Niewenhuis, 2010). The research seeks to understand the dynamics that 
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are anchored around the successes and challenges of the mantra on African solutions to African 
problems. It achieves this by navigating through the specific context in which the conflict 
occurs and the perceptions and behaviours of the actors. However, this cannot be quantified 
and explicitly explained in numbers hence qualitative analysis becomes a useful resource for 
the research.  
 
Furthermore, in order to explicate and analyse the data obtained from primary and secondary 
sources, this study made use of the qualitative methodology. According to Patton and Cochran 
(2002:2), “this kind of research (qualitative) entails the understanding of social life using words 
as currency for analysis.” The understanding of the meanings embedded in these words 
becomes the object of the research. As such, the attempt to unpack the meaning of African 
solutions to African problems and generate ideas around this maxim unleashes responses and 
judgements that cannot be limited to numbers and cannot be quantified hence meaning that the 
appropriate methodology in this regard is the qualitative one. 
 
Research Design  
 
This study utilizes case study design and descriptive design building up the research. Research 
design involves the collection, measurement, and analysis of data. Kumar (2005) notes that 
research design is key in research in that it outlines the plan, structure, and strategy that the 
study will adapt to collect, interpret and analyse research data. 
 
Case Study Design 
 
Case study research is a qualitative design study. It provides a basis through which a thorough 
investigation of the aspects that the research seeks to find out. A case study according to 
Grinnell (1981:302) “is characterized by a very flexible and open-ended technique of data 
collection and analysis”. This is further emphasized by scholars as the systematic inquiry into 
an event or a set of related events with the aim of describing and explaining the phenomenon 
of interest (Bromley, 1990:302) 
 
The research is also based on a case study analysis approach. According to Gilbert (2008:3), 
the case study approach, is an approach “in which a particular instance or a few carefully 
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selected cases are studied intensively”. The approach was utilised in this research to allow the 
research to be more context and content specific, practical, and focused. In this regard, this 
research utilised three cases as it considered the pan African institution, the AU’s role in 
Somalia, Burundi and the Sudan. In selecting the cases, the researcher used purposive, 
judgmental, or information-oriented sampling techniques. This was achieved through the 
combination of primary and secondary materials to this effect.  
 
The three cases are selected purposefully due to their uniqueness. The focus on Somalia is 
fuelled by the notion that the AU has played a leading role in the attempt to resolve the 
protracted social conflict in Somalia hence it has employed vast approaches thus enriching the 
scope of the research into the African oriented mechanisms and their success and challenges. 
This makes the intervention to be a long one compared to the others like Central African 
Republic (CAR) and Mali. The Burundi case study is also employed as it is one that depicts 
the challenges surrounding the AU’s intervention mechanisms and its capacity to effectively 
deal with conflict on the continent. Lastly, the Sudan case presents the research with a more 
recent case study and the only case in which the AU has worked collaboratively as an equal 
partner with another organisation in the hybrid UNAMID mission.  
 
This provides the insight on the challenges and successes of hybrid missions and whether they 
work better than solitary missions do. It is also befitting to note that the AU continues to 
spearhead the state building and peace building agenda in the Somali case hence making the 
case a credible interventionist case study that involves the AU in the continent. The enduring 
efforts of the AU in bringing about peace in the Somali as well as Burundi and Sudan are also 
presented hence providing a scope into the solutions or mechanisms employed and the 
dynamics thereof. 
 
Relevance of the case study approach to the research 
 
Africa is a diverse continent which has witnessed multiple cases of conflict and has responded 
to them in a multiple of ways. The research is therefore cognizant of these dynamics hence it 
utilized case studies to investigate the dynamics within the conflict discourses. This design is 
of immerse relevance when the focus of a study is on extensively exploring and understanding 
rather than confirming and quantifying. It provides an overview and in-depth understanding of 
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a case(s), process and interactional dynamics within a unit of study but cannot claim to make 
any generalizations to a population beyond cases like the one studied (Kumar, 2011) 
 
Case studies are a favourable methodology for analysis as they provide the researcher with an 
unlimited and a multi-perspective analysis. This multiplicity of perspectives enables the 
researcher to not merely focus on a couple of viewpoints and insights but also allows them to 
consider the views of other relevant groups of actors and the interaction between them (Maree, 
2010). However, the major merit of utilizing the approach on case studies is that it also provides 
the researcher with a choice to frame their study on one or more instances of study in which 
they are then able to comprehend with the subtleties of complex social situations. It enables the 
researcher to grapple with relationships and social processes in a way that is denied to the 
survey approach (Maree, 2010). The form of analysis is of paramount importance and relevance 
to such a study as it not based on isolated factors but instead, offers holistic analysis into the 
issues.  
 
Interpretive Design 
 
The interpretive research design is also referred to as phenomenology or exploratory study. It 
is a philosophical approach utilised in engaging a research investigation with the purpose of 
understanding the experiences, everyday happenings and the social structures the surrounds us 
(Collis & Hussey, 2009; Babbie, 2010). According to Babbie and Mouton (2008), the 
interpretive study does not only seek to explore but to give interpretation and provide meaning 
to the experiences of people. It seeks to provide a detailed understanding of the various social 
complexities that exist within societies. Thus, in understanding that this research explores the 
subject of African solutions to African problems, an interpretive approach helps in extensively 
deliberating facts and considering deeper social perspectives that are often neglected in 
providing solutions to the African conflict challenges. This study seeks to enrich African 
approaches to peace; thus, the interpretive design allows the researcher to explore beyond the 
scientific hold of knowledge (Rubin & Babbie, 2010).  
 
Data collection 
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The research made use of both primary and secondary sources of data to reach to its end. The 
primary sources of data through which the information was elicited are the primary documents 
of the AU which were interrogated in depth. Other documents that the research utilised include 
communiqués, resolutions, reports, press releases and publications on the AU initiatives on 
peace and security on the continent. The research was a purely a desktop research. The research 
was favourable in that it is financially well-informed and less tedious method of gathering data. 
The abundance of data was attained from sources of information like reports, government 
policies and documents on conflict, published interviews, journals, textbooks, and reports by 
organisations dealing with disputes in the continent. These multiple sources of data were then 
analysed using the qualitative methods. The next section explores how this data was analysed. 
 
Data analysis 
 
In terms of data analysis and presentation, the study made effective utilization of discourse 
analysis and qualitative content analysis as the approaches. Das and Bhaskaran (2008:23) 
characterize content analysis as "the investigation of the substance or content with reference to 
the implications, contextual settings and expectations contained in messages". More so, it 
articulates that the substance of the message shapes the foundation for making derivations and 
determinations about the content (Das and Bhaskaran, 2008).  Given the qualitative nature of 
the research, the appropriate method of analysis to be employed is the content analysis. 
However, Hsiu-Fang, Hsieh, and Shannon (2005) define qualitative content analysis as one of 
various research techniques used to break down content information within texts. 
On the other hand, another important tool for analysis in this research is discourse. Discourses 
are used in everyday texts for building power and knowledge, for regulation, normalization, 
for the development of new knowledge and power relations. Discourse analysis is thus 
concerned with studying and analysing written texts and spoken words to reveal the discursive 
sources are initiated, maintained, reproduced, and transformed within the specific social, 
economic, political and historical contexts (Nieuwenhuis, 2010). This research made use of the 
discourse analysis in its attempt to solicit findings. 
 
The benefit of utilizing the research techniques which are qualitative in nature is that it presents 
a translated and thorough comprehension and interrogation of the social research world 
participants by finding out their material and social conditions, dissecting through their 
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viewpoints, histories and encounters (Moriaty 2011). Patton in Zhang and Wildemuth (2009), 
indicate that qualitative content analysis alludes to any qualitative data diminishment and 
sense-production efforts using qualitative material and endeavours to distinguish the core 
meanings and consistencies embedded within them. Furthermore, the upside of utilizing such 
a research investigation is that the narratives and documentary materials are more effectively 
accessible for examination, yields information that can be evaluated and gives insurmountable 
social experiences over a period by navigating through the contained texts (Mayring 2000). 
 
In this research, the information gathered from the essential primary and secondary sources 
was broken down through an interpretive type of qualitative data analysis. This kind of 
examination guarantees the extraction of meaning out of social phenomena, building an 
interpretation about the gathered information from the sources (both primary and secondary) 
(Cassidy, 2013, Elliot and Timulk 2005, Schutt, 2010).  In the same light, the use of the 
interpretive qualitative data analysis was crucial to this study as it allows the researcher to be 
able to access and make deductions on the views that are related to the African mechanisms to 
the problem of conflict as well as the kind of responses spearheaded by the African Union in 
transforming the conflict or at least attempting to reach this end. However, Hammersley (1992) 
challenged and problematized this kind of analysis suggesting that backgrounds of the analysts 
may influence their understanding of the reality thus affecting the reliability of such a process. 
This may pave way for biased and subjective analysis of the data since the interpretations from 
different people are usually filtered by their respective assumptions, different socio-economic, 
geopolitical and cultural backgrounds. 
 
This shortcoming can be remedied using the principle of inter-subjectivity.  Neuman (2011) 
defines inter-subjectivity as a principle which claims that different people can agree on 
empirical evidence. Therefore, employing this principle in the research, the researcher could 
consider a legion of arguments and perspectives from the sources of data (primary and 
secondary) which are available on the discourse to validate the interpretive presentation of the 
perspectives on the research topic. As a result, the product of the research is an account that 
has critical engagements with both secondary and primary insight sources on the concept of an 
African solution to African problems in light with the endogenous mechanisms to conflict and 
the challenges of implementing these with the AU’s role under scrutiny. 
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Authenticity & Validity of the Study  
 
This review will be subjective in nature hence making it a qualitative research. To guarantee 
the authenticity of the study findings, validity will be ensured in the study. Hammersley (1992) 
contended that an account is valid, substantial, or genuine if it precisely speaks to those 
elements of the phenomena that it is expected to portray, clarify and theorize. Therefore in 
order for this kind of validity to be ensured within this study, credible sources of data, minimal 
errors and attempts to verify proofs where applicable, are the methods to be employed in this 
research. In terms of reliability, Joppe in Golafshani (2003) characterized it as “the extent to 
which results remain consistent over time and an accurate representation of the total population 
under study is referred to as reliability and if the results of a study can be reproduced under a 
similar methodology, then the research instrument is considered to be reliable.” In this research 
study, consistency, credibility dependability and validity will be assured by the verification and  
comparison of data sources 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This is a desktop research study; thus, this chapter has engaged the methodology that is relevant and the 
key to this study. It engaged on the key components of what makes up an effective research study. Thus, 
it outlined the research methodology, design, data collection, and data analysis instruments. It clearly 
explains these key research processes to ensure that the research was credibly conducted. 
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Chapter 5: The AU Mechanisms for Conflict Transformation  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to unpack and provide an in-depth analysis to the concept of African 
solutions to African problems. The chapter delves into identifying and defining what 
constitutes an African solution in response to what is defined as an African problem. It also 
explores the African mechanisms that have been instituted by the African institutions, 
governments and practitioners in bringing about peace.  
 
It is important to begin, firstly, by asking whether Africa is a homogenous entity. This question 
poses the need to rethink the idea of an African solution. With over 50 countries making up the 
continent, could it be that any solution that is birthed anywhere on the continent then becomes 
entirely a continental solution or that it remains context specific to the part in which it 
originated? It is also equally important to note that the powerful states within the continent 
would also seek to advance their own solutions ‘coercively’ over the less powerful states all in 
the name of African solidarity. The idea of the ASAP agenda also becomes problematic 
especially when the African neighbours tasked with advancing the African solutions begin to 
also seek to impose and further pursue their narrow interests. All this is arguably done all in 
the name of ‘doing it the African way, the right way’. For example, the Kenya and Ethiopia 
infiltration of Somali affairs under the guise of the AMISOM mission will be further explored 
in this section as an example of coercively imposed African solutions. 
 
The AU mechanisms for Conflict Transformation 
 
The study focuses on the mechanisms for conflict transformation that have been implemented 
by the African Union as the regional body on the continent. It will also look at the nature of the 
interventions and how that has shaped the results of such interventions. It is important to note 
that as an organisation, the AU is more centred on the need to meet human security as compared 
to its predecessor, the OAU that was concerned with state issues. Therefore, it can be noted 
that the formation of the AU and its transition from the OAU was informed by the emerging 
human security concerns more than anything else. According to Tieku (2007), the AU’s 
normative stance for intervention leans more on human security which has to do with the 
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security of individuals and groups, unlike the state-centric disposition which focuses on 
state/regime survival. This can be traced to the principles embedded in the AU key declarations 
and policy documents (amongst them, the right to intervene in conflict settings). Article 4 (h) 
of the Constitutive Act mandates the AU to respond to war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order (Kioku, 2003:807; Tieku, 2007:29). It 
is therefore paramount to note at this stage the philosophical shift at the continental level as the 
African Union adopted a change in attitude towards conflict and thus culminated in an approach 
which is more interventionist in nature. 
 
Since its formation, the AU has been at the forefront in advancing its interventionist stance for 
the protection of ordinary civilians and responding to crimes of war, attempts at genocide, and 
mass crimes against humanity with or without the state’s permission in the crisis as stipulated 
in article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of 2001 (Tieku, 2007). It is also critical to note that the 
AU is vested with the power to authorize the humanitarian intervention in a crisis and it does 
so, with or without the consent of the states involved. Therefore in so doing, Bizos (2011:2) 
and Murithi (2009:93) argue that the African Union is thus probably the sole regional entity in 
the world which practically institutionalised the ideas contained in the doctrine of the 
responsibility to protect prior to the popularization of the doctrine during the 2005 UN Summit. 
However, how that has practically evolved into the implementation is another separate concern. 
Therefore, this directly points to the level of commitment and effort that has been exuded by 
the African leaders at the helm of the continent in as far as mitigating the challenges that the 
continent is faced with is concerned. 
 
African Union establishments for conflict transformation. 
 
The continued shortcomings of the UN efforts to effectively deal with the daunting security 
challenges on the continent, (namely in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, civil wars in Liberia and 
Sierra Leonne, the waging crisis in Somalia and the dire economic and social challenges 
punctuating the continent), reflect on the need for the continent and its leaders to pay urgent 
attention to these challenges. However, since the formation of the African Union in 2002, it 
has employed a number of initiative towards the transformation of conflict to date. The African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has punctuated these initiatives. Through APSA, AU 
has adopted a leading stance in the resolution and management of conflicts in the continent. 
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This framework is embedded with several avenues through which conflict can be transformed 
holistically within the continent. According to, Williams (2011:6) “APSA denotes a complex 
set of interrelated institutions and mechanisms that function at the continental, regional and 
national level.” It is clear that the framework on APSA is constructed upon the political will 
by the leaders of the African continent in seeking to deal decisively with the dire and worsening 
security dilemma in the continent. The will from the African leaders is aimed at modelling 
mechanisms which will enforce the end to conflicts (reactive), rebuild conflicted states (post-
conflict reconstruction) as well as prevent new conflicts from emerging (preventative). This 
line of reactive to preventative thinking which fuels the framework is a testament to the fact 
that there is a considerable will from the leaders to engage with the conflict in multiple numbers 
of ways and ensure that it is addressed holistically. 
 
The confinements of the UN and the expanded ability of African regional entities to react to 
security challenges in Africa provides a promising feature for the future of local peace 
operations in Africa (Frank, 2006). The quest for tranquillity as reflected on the AU's 
peacekeeping missions mirrors the desire by the continent to be self-reliant and its commitment 
to taking responsibility for its missions within the continent (National Model United Nations, 
2008:20). The following sections will unpack the instruments embedded in the APSA 
framework. 
 
Peace and Security Council 
 
The AU Peace and Security Council are at the core of the APSA. It is expected to coordinate 
peace and security initiatives on the continent. The PSC is a 15 member states body which 
primarily tackles the day to day conflict management business on the continent and coordinates 
the peace and security agenda of the APSA (Murithi 2009:92, Poku et al 2007:1164, Williams 
2011:7). The 15 member states are just like the UNSC however, the only difference is that for 
the PSC there are no permanent members with veto powers but all members are elected onto 
the forum. Regional representation is an emphasised principle in the PSC and thus the members 
are drawn equally to represent the five regions of the continent, north, east, west, south and 
central. Assessments are weighed on the potential candidates on measures that define their 
ability to uphold the responsibility of the PSC members and these assessments are weighed 
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upon the respect for the rule of law, advancement of good governance, and commitments to its 
dues. 
 
This is the body that replaced the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict prevention, management and 
resolution that was created in 1993. It was birthed in December 2003 and launched into full 
effect in May 2004 through the PSC Protocol in order to facilitate and implement the African 
Union peace and security measures. Through its mandate it can be deduced that there is a 
growing sense of commitment by the African leaders (at the time of its inception) in 
envisioning and creating a peaceful and prosperous continent.  
 
Success and challenges of the PSC 
 
With its leadership and visibility on the continent, the PSC has amassed a lot of engagements 
within the continent as the champion of peace and security issues. It has been bombarded with 
massive conflicts, which it has responded to through various means thereby making it the 
bearer of the coordination role for the transformation and advancement of peace issues in 
Africa. Such efforts have led to its contribution to the abortion of conflicts in countries such as 
Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Madagascar, Burundi and 
Somalia (Williams, 2011). However, it is important to note that the PSC, has not monopolised 
its role towards peace and security in Africa but it has also engaged other actors within the 
continent which have resulted in successful efforts at addressing threats and conflicts within 
regions. In so doing, the PSC has engaged the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and 
collaborated their efforts in bringing about peace, for example, in Sudan and South Sudan, 
Central African Republic, Guinea and Guinea Bissau, Kenya and Mauritania amongst others.  
 
However, the success rate of the PSC leaves a lot to be desired. According to the APSA 
Roadmap (2016-20); 
“What remains to be addressed is the absence of an enforcement and compliance 
mechanisms with regard to the implementation of decisions made; the low level of 
interaction between the PSC and similar structures at the REC level; interaction 
between the PSC, the Panel of the Wise and the Chairperson’s Special Envoys, 
Representatives and Mediators needs to be structured; and the increasing 
workload of the PSC Secretariat needs to be addressed” (African Union, 2015). 
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This point to the fact that, in as much as the architecture for peace in Africa has been developed 
at the policy level as well as the creation of structures to enable it to function, there are still 
challenges in as far as implementation is concerned. In many instances, the PSC lacks the 
enforcement agent to allow for the adherence to the decisions made on the ground level, and 
this has been a stumbling block for the PSC as those involved in the conflicts have many times 
defied its calls for peace. It is also equally important to note that the PSC secretariat and its 
subsequent structures are understaffed and function below par due to the excessive workload 
and very little resources to counter the balance. The PSC is supplemented by its subsidiary 
bodies which are discussed in the sections below. 
 
The Panel of the Wise 
 
The African Union Panel of the Wise was launched in December 2007 and has since become 
such a critical component of the APSA. It has developed into a major African instrument of 
conflict prevention and subsequent transformation and has through various means contributed 
to the strengthening of the African union’s capacity to provide solutions to the conflict crises 
that bedevil the continent.  
 
Background to the Panel of the Wise. 
 
For Astill-Brown and Behabtu (2010:1) cited in Porto and Ngandu (2015:10), the origins of 
the AU PW are located in two distinct realms: the cultural and philosophical and the legal and 
institutional. In this light, it is important to note that, “in the traditional African context, the 
concept ‘wise’ refers to how age and experience relate to the ingredients of wisdom and 
counselling ... wise connotes a high sense of maturity often attributed to the elderly … needed 
to bond conflicting parties.… Such age old practice explains the confidence bestowed on the 
elderly in Africa, illustrating the motivation for the establishment of the Panel” (Porto and 
Ngandu, 2015:10). Jegede (2008) locates the existence of the panel in African proverbs on the 
concept of the wise. He investigates different practices from various African societies which 
exemplify the wisdom of the elderly as relevant to conflict prevention, maintenance of peace 
and security in indigenous African settings (Jegede, 2008:12). 
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In this regard, Murithi and Mwaura (2010:79) note: “The insights drawn from indigenous 
African culture provided a philosophical inspiration for the creation of the Panel of the Wise. 
Specifically, the wise council of leaders within the typical traditional African community was 
vital in intervening, resolving and sustaining peace.…” The Panel of the Wise can thus be 
considered as a contemporary rendition of the traditional institution of the council of elders 
(Porto and Ngandu, 2015).Given this instrumental role (played by the elders), it is essential to 
note that in the typical traditional council the influence of these elders  is not just passive but 
rather an active one in influencing the key decisions that pertains to the decisions of the day 
thus it is key to note that in as much as the panel represents a unique feature in the AU structure, 
it thus has the capacity to transform conflicts hence its  full potential needs to be exploited. The 
panel of the wise has an authentic African representation that can be harnessed to facilitate 
African peace mechanisms. 
 
Furthermore, Porto and Ngandu acknowledge that;  “the AU’s inception of the Panel of the 
Wise was a recognition of the utmost importance of the indigenous conflict resolution strategies 
and roles, and the continuing relevance of these mechanisms in contemporary Africa, including 
the continued significance that councils of elders have in many African societies in mediation 
of disputes and conflicts.” (Porto and Ngandu, 2015:29). Therefore this means that the panel 
presents a unique avenue through which the research seeks to explore in as far as African 
solutions are envisioned and conceptualized within the African union framework. 
 
According to Moller (2009;13), “the  Panel of the wise is made up of renowned and seasoned 
dignitaries with massive moral influence to assist in preventing and resolving conflicts in crisis 
regions.” The panel is made up of five members appointed by the AU general assembly and  
representing the five regions within the continent namely, North Africa, East Africa, West 
Africa, Southern Africa and Central Africa (AU PSC, 2016). The panel is mandated to a three 
year term. Up until December 2017, there has been 3 panels (as shown in the table below.) The 
very first members of the panel (2007-2010) were: the late President of Algeria, His Excellency 
Ahmed Ben Bella; former São Tomé e Príncipe President, His Excellency Miguel Trovoada; 
former Secretary General of the OAU Dr Salim Ahmed Salim; Dr Brigalia Bam, then 
Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa and Mme Elizabeth 
Pognon, former President of the Benin Constitutional Court.  
 
 
 
63 
 
As the term of the first panel came to end in 2010, African leaders meeting at the AU summit 
in Uganda, resolved to reappoint two members of the first panel (former President Ahmed Ben 
Bella representing North Africa and Dr Salim Ahmed Salim representing East Africa) for a 
further and final mandate. These reappointments were meant to facilitate a smooth transition 
to a second one while also ensuring continuity of the work done by the first panel (Jegede, 
2008). The second panel was made up of Ahmed Ben Bella, Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, former 
President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia (Southern Africa), Mme Marie Madeleine Kalala-Ngoy 
(Central Africa) and Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse (West Africa).  
 
At the end of the year 2017, the panel elected a new team comprising of:  Dr Lakhdar 
Brahimi,  a former Foreign Minister of Algeria and former Arab League and United Nations 
Special Envoy for Syria (representing North Africa); Mr Edem Kodjo, a former Prime Minister 
of Togo and a former Secretary-General of the OAU (representing West Africa); Dr Albina 
Faria de Assis Pereira Africano, former Angolan minister and Special Advisor to the President 
of Angola (representing Central Africa); Dr Luísa Diogo former Prime Minister of 
Mozambique (representing southern Africa); and Dr Specioza Naigaga Wandira Kazibwe 
a former Vice President of Uganda (representing East Africa). 
 
El-Abdellaoui (2009:8) posits that, “the advantage of a Panel, which is composed of 
distinguished African personalities with a wealth of experience and who are not representing 
their countries, is that it can first and foremost undertake activities towards anticipating and 
preventing conflict.” These wise persons are expected to use their expert knowledge and moral 
influence to resolve conflicts peacefully via diplomacy and mediation as well as provide advice 
to the PSC. The five candidates must have an incredible record of accomplishment and profiles 
of previous contributions to peace, development and security. The chairperson of the AU 
Commission makes recommendations to the AU general assembly which then, in turn, makes 
the official appointments. The members of the Panel of the Wise bring their wealth of 
knowledge and experience coupled with their social and moral influence to assist the PSC in 
facilitating, mediating and diplomatic resolution of conflicts. This kind of network builds on 
the traditional African values in responding to conflict through indigenous mechanisms. 
 
In most African traditions there is great respect for elders hence they usually take a leading role 
in the intervention to disputes through mediation. The elders are generally regarded with high 
esteem and considered to be effective mediators due to the belief that they have amassed great 
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levels of wisdom and experience which might be useful in bringing warring or conflicting 
parties into the table for peaceful negotiations. According to Singh (2004) the AU has proven 
its metier in terms of mediation and diplomacy. As evidenced by the work of the AU Panel of 
the Wise (Singh, 2004). To support negotiated agreements, the AU has sent peacekeeping 
missions to Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, Comoro Islands, Mali and CAR (Ndubuisi, 2015). 
 
The conceptualization of the panel had an inclusive approach which recognizes the effective 
role of women in building the contemporary society. Thus it distances itself from the paternal 
traditional structures which idolized men as the sole sources of wisdom and direction in the 
traditional African societies. The very first panel consisted of two prominent women (Brigalia 
Bam  and Mme Elizabeth Pognon) whose appointments signified to ‘African societies that 
there are women of all backgrounds and levels of expertise playing a vital role in the promotion 
of peace’ (Murithi and Mwaura, 2010:81). Furthermore, Mazrui (1995) poses that African 
women and values of the elders as are two of the four key African resources that can be tapped 
into for lasting conflict transformation. Therefore for the Panel to include women in the 
prestigious panel of elders is testament of the important role they play in resolving conflict.  
 
It is important also to note that the Panel of the Wise is conceptualised in a manner that realises 
the fact that wisdom doesn’t expire and that it is important to create a pool of wisdom through 
elders. The AUC took a noble decision in 2010 to create the Friends of the Panel as part of its 
continued efforts towards strengthening its capacity towards preventing conflict (Porto and 
Ngandu, 2015). This collective of the ‘friends’ embodies all former Panel members who 
provide support to the initiatives of the panel and it has since proven to be invaluable towards 
assisting the panel in achieving its mandate. This is a noble creation by the AU and offers a 
unique African approach to valuing elders and the continued role that they play in shaping and 
transforming society.  
 
As a preventive diplomacy structure, the Panel of the Wise was constituted under Article 11 of 
the PSC Protocol to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the AUC Chairperson, 
particularly in the area of conflict prevention (AU PSC, 2016). The Panel is an integral part of 
the AU preventive diplomatic framework. The Panel has over the years focused on preventive 
diplomacy missions, in particular to countries undergoing election processes. In these missions, 
Panel members provide advice, open channels of communication, carry out fact-finding 
missions, undertake shuttle diplomacy and promote the adoption of confidence-building 
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measures, among others. In addition, the Panel has included a thematic approach to its work 
and published a series of documents relating to election-related violence, women and children 
in armed conflict, non-impunity, truth, justice, and reconciliation, and strengthening 
governance for peace, security and stability (AU PSC, 2016).  
 
There has been a number of politically motivated violence cases in Africa which have been 
resolved through the use of mediation. These cases include, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Burundi and 
Sudan. Therefore the use of mediation as an effective approach to resolving conflict can 
therefore not be emphasized enough (Mutisi and Khamis, 2013). As such, this prompts the need 
to recognize mediation as both an art and a science and thus requiring both tact and commitment 
in its practice. Lamamra cited in Mutisi and Khamis (2013) explained that in Africa, mediation 
is rooted in centuries of interaction of social categories and years of cultural practices of dispute 
resolution thus in many societies in Africa, the influence of elders and wise people in dispute 
resolution at all levels has been highlighted (Mutisi and Khamis, 2013). Scholars such as Malan 
therefore situates the role of mediation (in most African societies) in the sphere of elders, 
arguing that: “elders can be very instrumental in guiding talks toward an agreement which 
would reflect as inclusively as possible the consensus of disputants on issues capable of 
escalating into threat to peace” (Malan, 1997). Considering therefore the above, it is believed 
that  African elders play an important role in maintaining security, managing and preventing 
conflict at least, in most indigenous African settings, hence the panel (Jegede 2008:14). 
 
It is interesting to note that RECs/RMs have mechanisms similar to the AU PW. The Council 
of the Wise of ECOWAS was formed in 1999; COMESA’s Committee of Elders was launched 
in 2008; SADC’s Panel of Elders was established in August 2010; and IGAD put in place a 
Mediation Contact Group, with similar responsibilities to those of the AU Panel of the Wise 
(Porto and Ngandu 2015). As a result, in 2013, the AU and the RECs established the Pan-
African Network of the Wise (PanWise) that aims to bring together relevant mediation actors 
of the Union, the RECs and African civil societies in order to enhance collaboration between 
the structures and harmonise approaches of the AU and RECs through workshops, joint 
missions and research (Jegede, 2008). The establishment of PanWise represents a great 
opportunity for developing and improving cooperation in the context of the African peace and 
security framework. According to Porto and Ngandu (2015) “the AU and regional panels of 
the wise and similar mechanisms are tasked with parallel responsibilities: to prevent and 
manage conflict, monitor elections, and mediate disputes.” The AUC Chairperson is expected 
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to work closely with RMs to ensure effective partnership, harmonisation and coordination so 
that the activities of the RMs correspond with the objectives and principles of the AU (AU 
2002: art. 10 (1, 2 and 3)). 
 
Thus as a result, collaboration between the Panel of the Wise and the RECs has been tentative, 
but effective. ECOWAS and the Panel have been engaged in a number of preventive 
diplomacies and good offices missions, paying particular attention to election-related issues. . 
In the 2015 crisis in Burundi, COMESA and EAC collaborated closely on mediation (Porto 
and Ngandu, 2015).The level of collaboration with the COMESA Committee of Elders is also 
very high. The Panel has progressively and effectively established links with all the RECs and 
has initiated several consultations with RECs to explore modalities of strengthening national 
capacities and establishing linkages between the national, regional and continental efforts in 
this regard. Coordination and collaboration efforts being undertaken should be encouraged and 
further institutionalised to avoid duplication of efforts, overlapping preventive diplomatic 
processes. The increased operationalization of PanWise is absolutely necessary, especially in 
the spirit of Agenda 2063. 
 
The AU Panel of the Wise has been a key source of providing solutions to the conflict 
challenges facing the continent. Porto and Ngandu (2015:113) note that the Panel of the Wise 
has added immense value to conflict transformation efforts in the continent through various 
avenues such as “providing advice, opening channels of communication, carrying out fact-
finding missions, undertaking shuttle diplomacy, promoting the adoption of confidence-
building measures and providing advice on reconciliation. The missions to the DRC, Kenya 
and Senegal, for instance, are testament to this.” 
 
However, challenges remain with regard to inadequate levels of interaction between the Panel 
of the Wise, the PSC and the Chairperson. There is need for interaction between these structures 
of the AU to avoid duplication of roles and redundancy of efforts.  There is also the inadequate 
involvement of members of the Panel of the Wise in AU-led structured mediation engagements 
(with AU special envoys, representatives and mediators). The Panel thus needs to play a critical 
role in as far as engaging via dialogue is concerned. Furthermore, there is the slow process of 
the operationalization of PanWise. Lastly, the challenge of the insufficient capacity of the Panel 
of the Wise Secretariat at AU remains crucial. There is need for the Panel to have enough funds 
to be able to function effectively and carry out its missions adequately. 
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The African Standby Force  
 
The African Standby Force (ASF) is a standby force composed of forces from member states, 
prepared and readied for deployment by the RECs/RMs (Darkwa, 2017). The ASF framework 
consists of five brigades at each of the sub-regions in Africa, (Derso, 2010). These 
arrangements are namely the North African States Brigade (NASBRIG), East African Standby 
Force (EASF), Force multinational de Afrique Centrale (FOMAC), ECOWAS Standby 
Brigade (ECOBRIG) and Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG). These ought to be 
composed of a military, police and civilian component in their countries of origin and ready 
for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. 
 
 
Fig 1: African standby forces ‘Source: Author’ 
 
 
 
Darkwa and Attuquayefio (2014) regard that the African Standby Force (ASF) “is one of the 
self-help tools of the AU which was birthed as a result of the sheer determination by African 
leaders to prevent the conflict situations of the late 1980s and 1990s.” The situation in the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the subsequent failure by the international community to 
intervene timeously prompted the African leaders to re-think their structures hence the 
transformation from the OAU to the inception of the AU. Suffice to note is the fact that the 
creation of the ASF is a realisation that Africa needs to provide its own solutions to the conflict 
challenges that it faces. However, Batware (2011) argues that the proper development of the 
ASF may not only aid in effectively attending to the security challenges in Africa but will also 
be a model to the UN in terms of responding to conflicts. Given this, more that needs to be 
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done to enhance the feasibility of the ASF concept and make it a reality. The success of which 
providse a global model for institutions such as the UN to remedy on a global scale. It is also 
crucial to note that Africa has taken a leading role in as far as conceptualising the desired 
mechanisms to remedy its crises relating to the conflict. 
 
According to Derso (2010) as envisaged in the APSA framework, the ASF comes into force in 
instances where violent conflict is imminent or has already erupted and the ASF is also 
mandated to intervene in respect of grave circumstances. This therefore means that with 
everything being normal, ASF functions at the end of the APSA spectrum of components and 
processes. One may argue that it is to be used as a last resort after peaceful processes and 
interventions have failed to produce the desired peace. However, this depends on the nature of 
the conflict, hence ASF may be deployed concurrently with other proponents of the APSA 
structure who are deployed for peace-making  
 
The African Standby Force was created in May 2003 and mandated to serve as the operational 
arm of the AU which is poised to be deployed to crisis regions across the continent. Its creation 
was in line with Article 13 of the PSC protocol. The ASF is regarded as the most crucial 
subsidiary of the PSC and it is expected to conduct a rapid response to crisis situations from 
within 30days of the announcement of the AU stance. It is essentially the only standby force in 
the world, at least on paper, highlighting further the commitment by the continent in addressing 
its challenges, effectively and timeously. Article 13.1 of the PSC protocol positions the role of 
the ASF as a body established, to enable the peace and security council to perform its 
responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention 
pursuant to article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act (Derso, 2010). 
 
The Policy Framework of the ASF initially recommended the development of the ASF in two 
phases. The first phase (ending June 30, 2005) focused on the establishment of full capacity of 
the strategic Planning Elements at the AUC to be able to provide military advice to a political 
mission under the banner of the AU or co-deploy with the United Nations (UN) as an observer 
mission. The second phase (ending June 30, 2010) was to develop the capacities at the AUC to 
be able to manage complex peacekeeping operations. At the end of the second phase in 2010, 
the expectation was that the ASF would be functional, however, this was not the case and thus 
it prompted the African leaders to develop of a third road map (2011–2015), which sought to 
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ensure that ASF would be fully functional by 2015.se aim was to ensure the full 
operationalization of the ASF by 2015 (Darkwa, 2017). 
 
It ought to be recognised as underlined in the ASF Roadmap III that an incredible amount of 
progress has been accomplished to this end in the advancement of the ASF. These 
accomplishments incorporate a set of uniform policy documents, a yearly meeting on 
coordinating, implementing and training initiatives on the continent, inclusive standards of 
training and yearly training guidelines that give direction to the member states and Regional 
Economic Communities. Also, there has been considerable efforts in ensuring that these efforts 
are utilised collectively within the continent in a bid to collectively deal with the issues of 
conflict within the continent.  
 
Additionally, it is imperative to note the developments towards the idea of the Rapid 
Deployment Capability. There are significant advances similarly in the improvement of the 
Civilian and Police Components of the ASF, specifically in the formulation of policy and the 
foundation of administrative capacity at the continental body level and its subsequent 
operational or implementation REC level, hence in January 2016, the ASF was declared to 
have attained full operational status (AU, 2016).  
 
The Burundi crisis in 2015, (a subject investigation in this study) presented the prime 
opportunity for the ASF to be deployed as a means to mitigate the escalation of post-election 
violence. The AU made an initial threat to deploy the ASF to intervene in the crisis whether 
consented by the Burundi government or not. However, the AU eventually backtracked on its 
threat and did not deploy ASF. The Burundi case highlights major issues that affect the 
deployment of the ASF and needs urgent rectification if the ASF is to be operationalised 
(Darkwa, 2017). The PSC exercising its mandate recommended the deployment of ASF in 
Burundi to avoid the repeat of the genocide disaster, but this decision was overturned by a 
subsequent PSC meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government who argued that there 
was need for a more political (negotiated) rather than militaristic intervention. This 
contradiction within the AU and its structures poses a threat to the functionality of the ASF.  
 
At this point, it is also important to note that the idea of the ASF as a mechanism should not be 
conflated to mean a solution but it acts as a means through which a solution may be achieved.  
Therefore, it is a crucial institutional tool for the transformation of conflicts in the continent. 
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The militaristic nature of the ASF also raises pertinent questions for this study in as far as it 
equates to an “African solution.” Although African actors increasingly emphasise the value of 
negotiated solutions to the crisis, African organisations have adopted military stances to seek 
the stability of states on the continent. The AU interventions in Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, Mali 
and CAR are indicative of the military nature of some African responses to conflict. However, 
it is also crucial to understand whether this does contravene the so-called African value for 
sustained negotiation. 
 
Nonetheless, the eminent challenge remains the lack of appropriate structural framework and 
sustainable system to enable the on-going planning, management, deployment and viability of 
the AU PSOs. Therefore, there is still need for the continued search for answers through applied 
peace research which draws from innovation and indigenous knowledge systems within Africa. 
 
The Continental Early Warning System  
 
The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is a subsidiary of the PSC which is mandated 
to collate and receive data from the various Regional Early Warning Systems (REWS) and 
other independent means in order to enable the AU to engage in early warning action to arrest 
security threats within the continent. The Early Warning systems are functional on two levels, 
the continental and the regional level (as highlighted in the table below).This subsidiary of the 
PSC was formed under the article 12 of the PSC protocol. It houses a central observation and 
monitoring centre, named the ‘situation room’ which is situated in Addis Ababa Ethiopia at the 
Conflict Management Directorate of the AU. Its main responsibility is to collect and analyse 
data with the aim of feeding the PSC with indicators of risks, threats and vulnerabilities (PSC 
Protocol 2002: Article 12.2). The role of the early warning system at continental level is also 
to provide timely information, analysis and response alternatives to the continental decision 
makers while the regional warning systems to the regional decision makers. 
The CEWS has grown in recent years with appropriate technology, infrastructure and well-
trained analysts to exert efficiency in support of conflict prevention and management in Africa 
(Komey et al, 2013:73). 
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Fig 2: Continental early warning system ‘Source: Author’ 
*The SADC early warning system functions as an intelligence-based system 
KEY 
Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD: CEWARN),  
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS: ECOWARN),  
East African Community (EAC: EACWARN),  
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA: COMWARN),  
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS: MARAC).  
Southern African Development Community (SADC).  
 
The CEWS and RECs have made considerable progress in terms of putting the necessary 
infrastructure, methodology and systems in place (Noryes and Yarwood, 2013). CEWS 
continuously monitors and gathers information through its Situation Room, producing various 
reports, including early warning reports, situation updates, flash reports and weekly updates. 
The CEWS is making efforts to enhance coordination with AUC Peace and Security 
Department (AU PSD) Divisions and programmes. An Inter-Departmental Task Force on 
Conflict Prevention (IDTFCP) has been set up to facilitate dialogue among AUC Departments 
working on conflict prevention, more specifically structural conflict prevention. CEWARN, 
COMWARN and ECOWARN, too, have started disseminating EWS to decision-makers. 
Coordination between CEWS and the Early Warning Systems (EWS) of the RECs continues 
through regular technical meetings, which are held twice a year.  
 
Meetings have been held which discussed and reviewed, among other things, the customisation 
and sharing of CEWS tools as well as joint training on Strategic Conflict Assessments. Staff 
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exchange visits and technical support programmes have also been carried out. CEWS continued 
to provide support for the establishment and strengthening of the EWS of AU Member States 
to enhance collaboration (Noryes and Yarwood, 2013). Engagement with Civil Society 
Organisation (CSOs) has been initiated through a workshop at the Union and the elaboration 
of modalities for collaboration. Collaboration with the UN (Cluster on conflict prevention), EU 
(Joint Research Centre) and the World Bank have also been established.  
 
Improving connectivity between CEWS and the REC EWS is in progress, three RECs have 
been connected and the others are in the process of being connected to the Union’s VSAT (very 
small aperture terminal) network or other alternative means. CEWS and the RECs are in 
constant communication through other means including the CEWS online portal. Progress has 
also been made in the REC-to-REC cooperation, particularly between CEWARN, EACWARN 
and COMWARN. The EWS of the Union and the RECs have developed methodological 
systems of monitoring to help establish a baseline for conflict analysis. The level of 
harmonisation and coordination between the AU and RMs has made tremendous progress and 
would be maintained and strengthened. The individual EWS of most RECs have made major 
advances. 
 
However, some challenges remain to be vigorously addressed, including the weak linkage be-
tween early warning and early response by decision-makers; the gathering of non-adequate 
data due to the ever-changing conflict dynamics; the low connectivity between the CEWS and 
the EWS of the RECs; the lack of connectivity between National Early Warning Systems 
(NEWS) and REC EWS; and the variation of levels of operationalization of various EWS at 
the level of the RECs. 
 
The CEWS also needs to enhance its working relationship with the African Union Panel of the 
wise. Where conflicts are envisaged to be forthcoming, the CEWS needs to develop a structure 
through which it feeds into the work of the panel which then initiates the desired and 
appropriate mechanism of engaging in the conflict. This will boost the efforts in preventing 
violent conflicts in Africa. 
 
The AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development 
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The AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development framework was developed 
at the 7th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Libya in July 2005 to drive the regional 
body’s responsibility to rebuild and to avoid the resurgence of conflict. The framework was 
then adopted during the 2006 AU Summit in Banjul in the Gambia. The Policy on Post Conflict 
Reconstruction and Development structure provides the AU with a platform to engage in peace 
building and post-conflict reconstruction to avoid the relapse back into conflict (Addo, 
2011:91). 
 
In its 10th Anniversary Declaration of May 2014, the PSC called for a stronger and more 
sustained support to countries emerging from the conflict with regard to reconciliation and 
PCRD. The Declaration stresses the importance of consolidating the peace and security gains 
in the post-conflict phase to prevent relapse into conflict. The importance of post-conflict 
reconstruction has also been underlined in the Solemn Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of 
the OAU/AU. The need to support sustainable peace, stability and development in countries 
that have emerged or emerging from conflict through the APSA is of paramount importance.  
 
The focus of the AUC has been on developing the partnerships to operationalize the PCRD 
Policy (2006) and put into place the necessary mechanisms and consultative platforms for its 
implementation. At the AUC-level, there has been a notable increase in joint activities with 
various Departments of the Commission, particularly with the Department of Political Affairs 
and of Social Affairs with a view to leveraging the comparative advantage of the various 
Departments on PCRD. In that regard, in September 2014, the AUC held a joint meeting in 
Bangui, CAR, on the Union’s support to the transition plan prepared by the CAR authorities. 
At the national level, the PCRD provided the African Union Liaison Offices (AULOs) with 
timely support through the funding of Peace Strengthening Projects (PSPs) aimed at addressing 
early recovery through support to reconciliation processes, peacebuilding and 
rehabilitation/construction of small infrastructure projects at community level.  
 
The heightened pace of awareness towards the mobilization of alternative resources for Afri-
ca’s development as epitomised in the convening of an African Solidarity Conference at level 
of Heads of State and Government held on 1 February 2014, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as part 
of activities marking 50th anniversary of the OAU/AU was a major achievement. A total of 
USD 3 million was pledged, however, the pledges still need to materialize.  
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AUC is currently establishing a funding mechanism for the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI). 
“Champion countries” are being mobilized to steer the process of further resource mobilization 
from within Africa. The PCRD is assessing its support to the African Union Youth Volunteer 
(AUYV) programme with a view to enhancing the collaboration to respond to PCRD strategy 
and priorities in countries emerging from conflict. Discussions on the location of the AU Centre 
for PCRD have reached final stages. At the regional level, the RECs as building blocks for 
peace and security in Africa must be able to articulate clear regional positions on relevant 
PCRD efforts. However, most of the RECs lack the capacity to undertake this critical role. The 
AUC is contributing to the establishment of PCRD units and formulation of policies, strategies 
and programmes at REC level. 
 
Much work has been done with respect to Security Sector Reform (SSR). The AU Security 
Sector Policy Framework provides a framework for the Member States and the RECs in the 
formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SSR processes. The AUC has 
conducted series of SSR orientation, sensitisation and training at various levels throughout the 
continent. The AUC undertook assessment missions to Madagascar and CAR and deployed 
experts to Comoros, CAR and South Sudan. Most RECs are also promoting governance 
through SSRs and taking initiatives in their various Member States with the active collaboration 
with internal partners. The joint AU, ECOWAS, EU, and UN Security Assessment Mission to 
Guinea Bissau conducted in March 2015 stands as a good example.  
 
In addition, the AU has developed an AU Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Capacity Programme (AU DDRCP). The objective of the AU DDRCP is to strengthen 
capacities within the AUC, its Member States, RECs and RMs. The AU DDRCP was officially 
launched in 2013. The AUC is already aiding national DDR processes pursuant to requests 
made by member states. It collaborates closely with international partners. The capacity of the 
AU and RECs would continue to be enhanced in order to address specific request from Member 
States.  
 
Remaining challenges in this regard, include the complex nature of post-conflict issues and the 
level of resources PCRD requires. There is also lack of coordination to align PCRD efforts 
with other peace and security programs both at the AU and RECs level. Moreover, the 
understaffed Unit at the level of the AUC and limited financial resources is an evident 
challenge. Critical to note is the low level of capacity at the RECs levels and lack of shared 
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learning between the RECs. Finally, aligning regional peacebuilding objectives to national 
stabilization plans needs to be emphasised.  
 
The AU Peace Fund 
 
Under the Peace Support Commission, the AU Peace Fund makes funds available for peace 
and security operations according to Article 21 of the PSC protocol. According to Mathiasen 
(2006:6), the peace fund is meant to generate funds for the AU peace missions and these funds 
are received from member states and external actors. However, it is interesting to note that the 
major contributors towards the peace funds are not local states but rather external actors. This 
thus raises questions as to the influence which is exerted by the external actors in relation to 
the contributions that they make towards the fund. There is a greater possibility that the external 
actors will have external agendas that they end up advancing through conditions they attach to 
their giving hence contaminating the African agenda of the AU PF. 
 
The Military Staff Committee  
 
The Military Staff Committee is a subsidiary body of the PSC that is supposed to serve as an 
advisory body to the PSC on military matters. The African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) has been the defining project of the African Union (AU). The architecture, a set of 
diverse yet harmonious mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, as 
well as post-conflict reconstruction and development, has taken up most of the AU’s resources, 
energy and time in the past decade. With the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) at the heart 
of the project, APSA encompasses a comprehensive set of tools that allow for Africa’s security 
concerns to be addressed by actors from the continent. Certain elements of the architecture are 
fully operative. These include mechanisms such as the Continental Early Warning System, 
some of the regional brigades – which are the foundation of the African Standby Force (ASF) 
– and the conflict-prevention body, the Panel of the Wise. 
 
The AU Military Staff Committee (MSC) is a vital element of the architecture. Decisions and 
recommendations made by the Council might lack technical depth and relevance without 
proper support at the conflict-prevention, management, and intervention levels, which is 
provided by the MSC. Inspired by the same structure at the United Nations (UN), the AU MSC 
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aims to advise and assist the PSC on issues with military and security requirements. Composed 
of senior military officers from PSC member countries, the MSC is mandated to submit 
relevant recommendations to the PSC chairperson on how Africa’s peace support capacities 
can be enhanced (Murithi, 2011). It is also mandated to advise and assist the PSC to ensure that 
policies and actions in the fields of conflict prevention, management and resolution are 
consistent with sub-regional mechanisms. 
 
Such engagements have rarely been translated into action, however. This is partly due to the 
underperformance of the MSC, which is largely linked to understaffing. Thus far, the AU MSC 
has attained very little visibility in terms of continental peace and security affairs. Its working 
relation with the PSC is far from what it should be, and the intended exchange of information 
and expertise is minimal. The policy framework for the establishment of the ASF and the MSC, 
which was adopted on 15-16 May 2003 in Addis Ababa, also urges for strong working relations 
between the Council and the committee. It further requires that the MSC meet prior to all 
meetings of the PSC at the level of the senior military officers, and stipulates that MSC 
members should attend meetings of the Council to provide necessary clarifications and advice 
when invited to do so. 
 
The major challenge of the committee is that it barely meets, it is reported to have gone for 
over eighteen months without a formal meeting (Ndubuisi, 2016). Therefore, it cannot be side-
lined the fact that when meetings take place after such a long break, they are less likely to 
meaningfully contribute to the work of the PSC and the AU in general. Another problem is 
that, in recent years, most of the meetings focused on the internal working procedures and 
regulations of the committee, rather than on improving the quality of decisions by the PSC on 
military issues. It is also reported that in many of the previous MSC meetings, attendance was 
below 50% (Ndubuisi, 2016).  
There is confusion about the mandate and responsibilities of the MSC. Following some of these 
meetings, the MSC called on the PSC to obtain input on issues regarding the pre-deployment 
or deployment of troops and major military equipment to field missions, as outlined in the PSC 
Protocol. These calls have been met with little success. When the PSC subsequently deployed 
an African-led military intervention in Mali, the Council did not request expert advice from the 
MSC. Members of the committee complain that they were not given the chance to look at or 
comment on the concept of the operation. No MSC input was requested or included. The lack 
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of informal platforms also frustrates the committee to influence or contribute to the work of 
the PSC and the Peace Support Operation Division of the AU. 
 
Despite the various documents and procedures, there is still little clarity on how the MSC 
should function and actively contribute on issues, including visiting AU and other missions on 
the continent, advising the PSC and examining relevant concept notes of the PSC meetings. 
There is also confusion about its mandate and responsibilities, and how it relates to and 
complements the work of the PSC. The draft rules of procedures are yet to be adopted. 
Questions are further being raised on the overlap of responsibilities and mandates between the 
MSC and PSC committees of experts. Some members of the MSC have questioned whether 
some of these committees are replacing the role of the MSC in advising the PSC.  
 
The AU MSC was influenced by a similar structure at the UN, yet there has not been a 
meaningful or consistent relationship between the two committees. Though improving, a 
classic challenge has been for all members of the PSC to have military attachés on the MSC. 
Repeated calls are still made to members of the PSC to delegate relevant members of their 
missions to the MSC (Tlakla, 2016). There are also cases where military attachés are not 
immediately replaced after their departure. Reasons for understaffing vary from a lack of 
political will to financial and military personnel constraints of the Council members. 
 
Some see the poor relations between the PSC and MSC as a reflection of relations between 
diplomats/politicians and the military at the national level. They say it could show mistrust, a 
lack of proper communication and the lack of a clear mandate between governments and the 
military at the national level. Observers say that the tension between the ambassadors and 
defence attachés could be one reason for poor working relations between the PSC and the MSC 
(Tlalka, 2016). It is high time that the PSC seek the vital contribution of the MSC for effective 
peace support missions, and urge its members to be represented properly and consistently in 
the activities of the MSC. The Council should also work to improve relations between the two 
bodies through informing the MSC about its activities and using the military and security 
expertise of the Committee. 
 
As APSA cannot be productive without the proper functioning of its sub-components, 
including the MSC, the Council has to stress that according to the PSC protocol, members must 
sufficiently staff and equip their permanent missions at the Headquarters of the Union. 
 
 
78 
 
Challenges of the AU mechanisms 
 
Regardless of the multiple instruments that have been propagated by the AU in order to realise 
the ASAP agenda, there is still a long way to go in terms of meeting the ultimate goal. At the 
core of this setback, is the fact that, these mechanisms are still at an infancy stage. One striking 
example is the fact that “the Military Staff Committee has barely met and it has so far been 
unproductive. Yet it is supposed to be the pillar in advising the AU PSC on military matters, 
(Williams, 2011:13). Such challenges thus make these attempts futile at realising the desired 
goal and the implementation of the mechanism become nothing to rely on currently. 
 
Williams (2001) concludes that despite the impressive but grandiose normative and 
institutional frameworks of the African Union, the regional body is faced with incapacitating 
challenges such as poor resources, a small number of bureaucrats and the divide between 
member states on how to respond to conflict. Therefore, it can be noted that there remains a 
huge gap between the ambitions and the accomplishments of the African Union. 
 
Furthermore, although the ASF was declared operationally ready in 2016, it still has not been 
effectively utilised.  Therefore, one might argue that the objectives of the ASF are too ambitious 
regarding the resource base of the AU and the logistical challenges around the deployments. 
Moreover, the framework is void of clarity on a number of issues pertaining to its 
implementation. Batware captures this by highlighting the absence of clarity in as far as the 
manner in which the AU and the RECs are to authorize the use of brigades located in the 5 
regions of Africa (Batware, 2011).This challenge was evidenced in 2015,when ASF failed to 
be deployed to respond to the Burundi crisis. The lack of clarity in terms of the functioning of 
the PSC and its functions led to the initial decision being overturned eventually. There is need 
for clearly stipulated guidelines in as far as the interventions are concerned to avoid future 
challenges of the similar nature. 
 
Within the APSA’s regional mechanism, there is a greater imbalance factor which cannot be 
ignored. This imbalance makes the realisation of the AU peace and security agenda, 
impossible. The RECs across the continent lack mechanisms and security instruments that are 
well established and standardised across the continent. It is against this background that there 
is an imbalance between those that have well-established instruments, namely in the South and 
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the West, and on the other hand, the ones that have weaker and feeble peace instruments and 
lack a regional power base, the North, Central and Eastern RECs (de Coning et al, 2016). This 
is a great challenge and stumbling block for APSA as its expected that the RECs play a vital 
role in ensuring peace and security within their sub-regional jurisdictions (De Carvalho et al, 
2010;16). It is thus challenging for APSA to coordinate the efforts of the RECs into an effective 
system for conflict transformation and peace. 
 
In regions where there are stronger RECs, the conflict can be dealt with using the sub-regional 
mechanisms. For example, in the Mali conflict outbreak, the AU PSC authorised ECOWAS ( 
a sub-regional body) to guarantee the security of Mali’s transitional government, reorganise 
the security forces, restore the Malian state’s authority over the northern part of the country 
and combat terrorist and criminal networks, (Vorrath, 2012). This enabled the deployment of 
forces from ECOWAS into Mali. The mission was later transformed into an AU mission, but 
its forces were mainly drawn from the West African region through ECOWAS. This presents 
an ideal structure through which the AU instruments can be materialised. Where RECs are 
weaker, they are thus unable to adequately respond to the conflicts in their regions and so does 
the AU as it relies heavily on the regional organisations for its interventions (Vorrath, 2012). 
The premium example is the case of Libya where the AU failed to make a successful 
intervention due to the absence of a strong REC. The Arab Maghreb Union as a sub-regional 
organisation lacked effective means to respond to conflict in its bosom. This hindered the AU 
from making an effective response and thus it paved room for other actors, to intervene. The 
Arab League thus ended up playing an active role in the crisis. 
 
The lack of effective RECs does not only pave room for outside organisations to intervene but 
also for some neighbouring states to become actively involved in the resolution of crises. 
However, these actions and interventions have proven to be uncoordinated, inappropriate and 
unsuccessful. In more cases than not, the neighbouring states seek to protect their own national 
interests above everything else. In the Central and Eastern African case, in Somalia for 
example, Ethiopia and Kenya have been at the forefront of the crisis but their efforts are 
inappropriate and geared towards the protection of their own interest hence prolonging the 
conflict rather than ending it. Rwanda was also involved in the DRC conflict as a neighbouring 
state.  It is also important to note the effect that the weak RECs have on the implementation of 
the ASF regional brigade. The RECs are also not committed to fulfilling their mandate in as 
far as providing the funds, resources and troops for the ASF hence “there will be no effective 
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continental peace and security structure without the cooperation of the RECs,” (Vines, 
2013:104). 
 
Resource capabilities. 
 
Sessay and Omotosho (2011:1), Nathan (2013) concur that the most significant disadvantage 
of the African Union to accomplish its goals regarding conflict transformation has been the 
issue of resource limitations. In terms of peacekeeping, 'the normal cost of supporting 
peacekeepers is assessed at US$ 130/day, barring mandate, ordinance, equipment and 
transportation' (Kioko, 2013:822).Along these lines, there are more financial resources 
required in conducting peace operations viable, a resource which the AU doesn't have.  
 
Evan (2006:720) notes that in 2006, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was staffed by just 
7000 deficiently trained, inadequately mobile, and general military incapacitated workforce on 
the ground. Besides not being able to adequately protect the civilians, AMIS troops and 
personnel fell under deplorable assaults from belligerents (Luqman and Omede 2012:61). With 
constrained resources, AMIS was hamstrung in controlling the turmoil and preventing Darfur 
warring parties from battling and it conceded sixty troops (Moller 2009:15). This incited the 
call for a more grounded UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. Towards the end of 2007, AMIS 
was subsumed into the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur, a mission 
financed by the UN (Luqman and Omede 2012, Murithi 2009). In this manner, the AU is keen 
on making grandiose or rather goal-oriented tasks that go past the limits of its abilities 
(Williams 2001:1)  
 
The AU needs to invest in resource capacity such as armoured helicopters, stream controlled 
aeroplanes, turboprop flying machines, drones, and so on. This will boost its military capacity 
of the ASF and thus can deploy it timeously as and when required. The lack of these restricts 
the AU from transporting troops and gear in a convenient way to operation areas and this 
exposes troops to the danger of ambushes by warring factions (Diop and McConville, 2012). 
 
The greater part of the AU missions is planned as adjustment operations designed for 
stabilization only and meant to be supplanted by a UN peace operation from between 90 to 120 
days. These measures are based on the limited resource capacity of the AU (De Carvalho et al 
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2010:41). The dependence on contributors has crippling ramifications for the AU's plan to 
provide genuine African solutions. The greater part of the AU subsidy for peace operations are 
dependent on the generosity and support of outside bodies, for example, the UN, EU, G8 US-
China and Canada (Mathiasen, 2006:7).  
 
Sharamao and Ayangafac (2011:5) note that in spite of the advances and the experience gained 
by African troops amid peace operations, despite everything, they require ongoing training and 
specialized support from external bodies. There is still far more to go for the AU in order for it 
to be more capable to manage, oversee and tackle the conflict challenges in the continent 
without the support of external actors (Kobbie, 2009). The over-dependence and severe 
reliance on outside budgetary, military and expert help run in opposition to the AU's rhetoric 
and responsibility to funding ASAP (Williams 2011:15). Africa ought to be self-reliant and 
have minimal reliance on external support. Other scholars, however, advocate for the active 
engagement of the international community in resolving conflicts in Africa. 
 
Political Will 
 
Sharamao and Ayangafac (2011:5) posit that the AU’s capacity to conduct any conflict 
transformation project relies on the capacity and willingness of its member states to provide 
necessary influence and commitment. Seemingly, strong African states on their own are facing 
internal weaknesses and challenges themselves and thus are unable to stand tall and drive the 
African agenda on conflicts. On the other hand, the weaker states are already at the risk of state 
failure, rebellion, wars, drought and instabilities hence presenting more challenges than 
solutions to the continent. Howard (2010), observes that ‘Africa is undoubtedly plagued by 
systematic state failure in that the region lacks strong governance, comprehensive economic 
development, and fails to provide security to its citizens and order in its territories.’ 
 
The African Union as a constituency of weak states and marred with instability thus hinders 
the regional body from achieving its expectations. It is crystal clear that a weak state is equally 
struggling to secure resources for its own domestic challenges hence it is impossible for the 
very same state to pursue a bigger goal of generating resources to meet the larger continental 
goals. Tieku (2007:33) notes that governments that are infamous for human rights violations 
in Africa would be hesitant in advancing human security and would exhibit poor political will 
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in AU's preventative and reactive measures or activities towards maintaining peace and 
effective conflict transformation. Hence, there is a need for good governance and legitimate 
authorities for the developmental and security objectives in Africa to be realized.  
 
There are a handful of states that have shown a considerable deal of commitment with regards 
to sending troops to support the AU missions. This has left the organisation to be dependent on 
a few pillars for contribution such as South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Egypt, Nigeria and 
Senegal for its peace operations. For Coleman (2011) African states like to send their troops to 
take part in very much supported, prestigious and secure UN peace operations unlike on 
account of regional peace operations where they as member states need to make contributions 
towards the upkeep of their troops. In such cases, the dedication and political will of African 
leaders to take care of their own challenges is by all accounts a pipedream. 
 
It is also important to note that African states tend to prefer short-term peacekeeping missions 
while avoiding long-term commitments through missions. This scenario is to a greater extent 
unavoidable considering the financial and resource incapacity of the AU compared to a stronger 
UN operation. However, the AU must be on the forefront and ready to take up responsibility 
towards addressing its own conflicts with long-term operations which it may not fund entirely 
but at least there needs to be a real commitment by leaders for such missions. The AU is faced 
with such a complex nature of conflicts at its doorstep which makes it difficult for the Union 
to contain them single-handedly and its attempts at resolving these conflicts have always been 
dealt a severe blow further crippling its ability to deal with conflict within its jurisdiction. The 
AU is still an infant organisation compared to other regional organisations hence there is a lot 
that it needs to gain in terms of expertise, resources, capacity and knowledge to deal with the 
complex and numerous challenges that it faces. 
 
The great question is, however, does a simple response to African problems qualify as a 
solution and if so, does it only entail a solution that is implemented by Africans alone? Can the 
solutions to African problems all be reduced to who executes them and does this mean that 
every African with a response to a conflict then provides the ultimate solution? Komey et al 
(2013:1), aptly notes that one can learn that African solutions are usually based on either 
ownership that is African led or of being ‘working’ solutions rooted in African identity 
manifested in its cultural values and realities of societies. This area remains under-explored 
and under-researched. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter gave a deep understanding of the AU mechanisms and structures of peace. These 
are important mechanisms that are key in highlighting the implementation and processes of 
peace in addressing conflict challenges on the continent. The chapter outlines the challenges of 
AU in addressing conflict on the continent. Thus, with this insight, it becomes clear in 
understanding the factors that enhance or limit the implementation of ASAP.  
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Chapter 6: Case studies of Peacekeeping interventions on the African 
continent 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the key cases that are peculiar to this research study. It is important to 
note that the contents of these cases that are put together in this study are only drawn from a 
time period of 2007-2016. Understanding the facts of these studies is essential in understanding 
the opportunities and challenges of implementing to African indigenous peace mechanisms in 
addressing conflict challenges. All these three case studies present various unique challenges 
and attract some elements of top-down, inclusive and hybrid peace mechanisms. The case of 
Somalia is the first AU Mission but thus depends more on external financial support. The case 
of Darfur is a hybrid mission between the UN and AU in which they share personnel 
responsibilities. The case of Burundi presents a more political situation rather than military 
intervention in which the AU has mandated the regional bloc the East African Community 
(EAC) to address the challenge. This chapter provides an adequate background for each case 
study, illuminates on the mechanisms and challenges that have been encountered in addressing 
peace. It then outlines the opportunities and recommendations identified in each case studies 
in accentuating African indigenous peace mechanisms. Therefore, it starts with Somalia, then 
Darfur and lastly Burundi.  
Case study 1, Somalia: African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)  
 
Somalia history and conflict background 
 
The AU intervention in Somalia can be traced from Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) to African Union Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM). The case of Somalia is the first AU mission in which all the security 
personnel are from the AU member states under AMISOM. The mission started operating with 
the approval of the UN. The funds for AMISOM come from different sources, which include 
AU member state, AU peace fund, International donors and UN Trust fund for AMISOM. 
Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN authorized IGAD and the AU to establish 
IGASOM – a protection and training mission with the mandate to monitor the progress of the 
Transitional Federal Government, ensure security and training of the Somali security apparatus 
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on 6 December 2006. These mandates were drawn from the relevant elements of the mandate 
and concept of operations specified in the deployment plan for IGASOM (UN Security Council 
Resolution 1725:2). Despite the strong support IGASOM had from the AU, it could not 
establish a strong security hold for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), because 
member states were not willing to support the mission openly (Mays, 2009:16). The challenges 
faced by IGASOM have a direct link to the role played by regional countries. Ethiopia’s interest 
at some point prevented Somalia to be free from certain warlords. Elmi (2010) noted that in 
2006, the Islamic Courts Union (a rival group to the TFG administration) emerged and defeated 
most of the Somali warlords. The greater part of Somalia was pacified, for example, the Lower 
Shabelle, Hiran and Middle Shabelle region. These achievements gained by the ICU made 
them very famous in Somalia. Ethiopia, on the other hand, perceived the move by the ICU as 
a threat to national security and sent thousands of Ethiopian troops to capture Mogadishu (Elmi, 
2010: 95). Elmi also noted that Ethiopia had been actively involved militarily and politically 
in Somalia’s internal affairs since 1991 and should there be an interim government formed in 
Somalia, Ethiopia would support warlords leading to destabilization during the transition 
(Elmi, 2010:96). Similarly, Kenya, on the other hand, sided with Ethiopia in 1964 and 1967 
against Somalia over the Ogaden region. Kenya saw Somalia as an aggressor state when it 
signed a mutual defence pact with Ethiopia against Somalia in the 1960s.  
 
The focus on member state’s interest rather than on alleviating violent conflict in Somalia 
resulted in a number of casualties. In February 2007, the UN Security Council Resolution 8960 
authorized the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission in support of Somalia’s TFIs. A few 
months later, AMISOM was deployed in Mogadishu. AMISOM is an active peacekeeping 
mission operated by the AU with the approval of the UN. It was created by the AU’s PSC on 
the 19th January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate. AMISOM is mandated to conduct 
PSOs in Somalia and to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for 
the conduct of humanitarian activities, and an immediate take over by the UN. The mission 
was expected to support dialogue and reconciliation by working with all relevant stakeholders 
and protect key infrastructure and TFIs. The mission was also to assist Somalia in the 
implementation of its NSSP, provide security, and facilitate humanitarian assistance 
(Communique of the AU, 2007) 
At the time of the deployment of the mission, there were roughly 6000 peacekeepers deployed 
under AMISOM out of a total authorized strength of 8000 (UN Security Council, 2007). As a 
result of the low troop allocation, Al Shabaab exploited the opportunity and gained military 
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victories by taking control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia 
throughout 2007 and 2008. At the end of 2008, the rebels had captured Baidoa, but not 
Mogadishu. AMISOM further noted that in January 2009, the Ethiopian troops withdrew from 
the country, leaving behind AU peacekeeping force as the only protector for the TFG 
(AMISOM, 2015). However AMISOM has transformed, expanded and evolved to a force of 
over 22 000 forces drawn from mostly African states with its neighbouring states providing 
half of these troops (Williams, 2016). 
 
AMISOM mandate: Addressing the root causes of the Somali conflict 
 
AMISOM (2013) notes that the mission, as a multidimensional Peace Support Operation is 
mandated to: 
1. Take all necessary measures as appropriate, and in coordination with the Somalia 
National Defence and Public Safety Institutions, to reduce the threat posed by Al 
Shabaab and other armed opposition groups,  
2. Assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the FGS over its national territory, 
3. Assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across 
Somalia, through support, as appropriate, in the areas of security, including protection 
of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law and delivery of 
basic services, 
4. Provide within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support for the 
enhancement of the capacity of the Somalia State institutions, particularly the National 
Defence, Public Safety AND Public Service Institutions, 
5. Support the FGS in establishing the required institutions and conducive conditions for 
the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by 2016, in accordance with the 
Provisional Constitution, 
6. Liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within its 
capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somali, as well as the resettlement of internally 
displaced persons and the return of refugees, 
7. Facilitate coordinated support by relevant AU institutions and structures towards the 
stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, and 
8. Provide protection to AU and UN personnel, installations and equipment, including the 
right of self-defence. (AMISOM, 2013) 
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Challenges to AMISOM  
 
The mandate for AMISOM required it to support the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) 
but the mission had to function in an environment characterised by the absence of an 
overarching political settlement, which stipulated the good governance of Somalia. It was not 
clear on who and how Somalia had to be governed (Williams, 2016). As a result, AMISOM 
found itself entangled in a crisis in terms of creating a federal state in Somalia and this process 
became a driver of conflict in itself through tensions between subsequent centres of power 
involved in the process, rather than a vehicle of peace.    
AMISOM operated mainly in the south central of Somalia and was thus focused on the relations 
between the federal government in Mogadishu and the new Interim Regional Administrations 
(IRAs). The process through which these IRAs were established brewed intense conflict among 
the actors and presented AMISOM with further challenges beyond its mandate and capacity. 
On the other hand, the government itself faced a legitimacy challenge, as some external actors 
did not recognise it as a legitimate authority thereby crippling its ability to enforce its preferred 
political outcomes (Williams, 2016). This therefore presents a serious obstacle to the 
attainment of African solutions to African problem especially when the African actors fail to 
speak with one voice and cooperate towards finding lasting and peaceful solutions. This lack 
of a comprehensive political settlement and elite consensus made it impossible for both local 
and external actors to build an effective SNA for the federal government and thus deprived 
AMISOM of a credible partner to fight Al Shabaab and deal decisively with the local conflicts 
generated by the IRAs. Again, AMISOM faced a new challenge of having to extend its mandate 
towards providing extra logistical and security assistance to the regional conferences, which 
were part of the processes in establishing the IRAs in south-central Somalia. This meant that 
the mission had to divert its resources from the offensives against Al Shabaab.  
AMISOM’s offensive operations have made life more uncomfortable for Al-Shabaab.  Al-
Shabaab has lost the political significance and numerous settlements it once held in Somalia. 
Al Shabaab lost many of its leaders too, however, it remains a deadly foe, able to conduct 
operations cheaply and effectively – in part because of its ability to infiltrate government 
forces, and in part, because its freedom of movement enabled it to choose the time and place 
of its attacks against overstretched AMISOM and SNA forces (Williams, 2016).  In most cases, 
the insurgents did not put up a fight but simply surrendered these settlements but used 
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destructive tactics upon their exit. The tactics included destroying wells and gutting down 
hospitals, which left these settlements in dire state and in serious need for humanitarian 
intervention, which the mission was not ready to cater for. To make matters worse, the 
insurgents would camp nearby the towns and frequently retained for raids hence threatening 
the security of these communities even further. The Al Shabaab also conducted ambushes, raids 
and attacks on AMISOM itself, particularly along AMISOM’s main supply routes which 
further weakened the capacity of AMISOM to deal effectively with Al Shabaab.  
 
The issue of regional interference has presented a challenge to the resolution of the Somali 
conflict and affected the functioning of AMISOM. There has been a collision of interests 
between the FGS and forces from the neighbouring states which have generated more conflict 
than resolved it. For example, in October 2012, Kenyan forces seized the town of Ras Kaboni 
and this intervention was perceived as being in support of the Ogadeni clan, which put Kenya 
at loggerheads with Ethiopia, and some Somali locals who offered stiff resistance to this 
intervention. On the other hand, Ethiopia also viewed Kenyan Intervention as a lucrative move 
to assist the Ogadeni clan to regain its hold on the port of Kisimayo (Bruton and Williams, 
2014). The Ethiopian government had always been engaged in a low-intensity armed conflict 
against the Ogaden National Liberation Front.  
 
The Somali people believe that Kenya and Ethiopia prefer to keep Somalia weak and divided, 
and will for economic and national security reasons seek to undermine the creation of a strong 
central government in Mogadishu. This has  presented further challenges for AMISOM.  It has 
fuelled a perception of AMISOM as a vehicle within which neighbouring states can legitimize 
their narrow national agendas, which limit the mission’s ability to achieve its objectives, hobble 
its attempts to wage an effective public diplomacy campaign, and send hugely unhelpful signals 
about the wider ability of the AU to effectively steer its peace operations.  (Bruton and Williams 
2014:70). Kenyan soldiers in AMISOM have been accused of supporting Ahmed Madobe (a 
former ally of Al Shabaab) and the FGS has called on for Kenyan soldiers in AMISOM 
contingent to be replaced with different forces who will uphold the AMISOM’s mandate above 
their narrow national interests. 
 
AMISOM has serious and wide-ranging internal challenges, which has thwarted its capacity to 
carry out its mandate. Williams (2016) notes that the AMISOM that exists on paper in the UN 
Security Council resolutions and AU communiqués is not the same AMISOM that exists in 
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reality. He diagnosed that the real AMISOM is threatened by the unavailability of key enablers, 
a lack of effective command-and-control structures, failure to carry out effective stabilisation 
programmes and indiscipline amongst its troops (Williams, 2016).  
 
The AMISOM that exists on paper is not the same as that in reality. AMISOM lacks the 
resources and military enablers for it to fulfil its mandate. African states and external donors 
have made commitments towards contributing to the mission but they have failed to honour 
their commitments and deliver the resources. This is a major blow to the success of the mission 
as it cripples the implementation of its mandate. As a result, the mission has had to launch its 
offensives using the available resources at its disposal. AMISOM lacks sufficient armoured 
vehicles, helicopters, intelligence which however has been authorised through the UNSC 
resolutions. The AU member states have failed to deliver these essentials to the field 
commanders (Williams, 2016). This challenge thus questions the sincerity of the AU member 
states and their commitment to providing African solutions to African problems. The failure 
by the AU member states to fulfil their commitments on paper has crippled the mission’s 
effectiveness on the ground. Without the required resources, it is difficult for the mission to 
secure its retained territories.   
 
Furthermore, AMISOM lacks adequate cooperation among the troop contributing countries 
themselves and the force headquarters in Mogadishu. As a result, the operations of the mission 
become fractured and lack cohesion and thus it has allowed Al Shabaab to capitalise on these 
fragmentations and attack AMISOM.  
 
In addition to the shortage of military personnel, AMISOM also lacks a civil-military 
component, police and relevant civilian experts. This comes from the fact that AMISOM is a 
military operation and hence it cannot effectively conduct effective stabilisation programmes 
in the retained settlements (Williams, 2016). The inability of AMISOM to spearhead 
stabilisation initiatives has become a major challenge towards achieving peace in Somalia. The 
retained settlements are not fully secured and the mission lacks the necessary personnel to 
effect these stabilisation projects effectively.  
Furthermore, within the AMISOM structure itself, there are rogue elements. AMISOM 
personnel has been accused of misconduct. This has come in several forms, but arguably the 
most damaging have been the killing of local civilians and allegations of sexual exploitation 
and abuse, which have not only tarnished AMISOM’s relations with the local population but 
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also provided Al-Shabaab with material for its recruitment propaganda (Williams, 2016). 
According to the Human Rights Watch Report (2014) it is alleged that AMISOM troops were 
involved in sexual exploitation and abuse of local civilians. Such misconducts by personnel 
strains the relations of the locals and the mission and thus hinders any chances of effective 
collaboration and building of strong relationship. Without a relationship with the local 
population, it is impossible for any peace building and transformation to occur. 
 
Lessons from AMISOM towards conflict transformation.  
 
It is imperative to note that the AU (through its stabilization operations such as AMISOM) 
should not be misunderstood as an attempt to prescribe a military solution as a panacea to 
conflict situations. Smith (2007) notes that “AU stabilization operations are part of a larger 
political intervention where the function of the peace initiatives is to contain violence and 
generate stability in order to create an environment through which political solutions can be 
pursued.” In the case of Somalia, AMISOM is engaged in stabilization, counterinsurgency, and 
counterterrorism operations, and the AU recognises that, though it is possible to provide 
temporary stability through gaining control over lost territories, the ultimate defeat over Al 
Shabaab cannot solely be achieved militarily (de Coning, 2016). This means that Al Shabaab 
and the threat it poses, can be successfully eliminated through long-term strategies, which 
revolve around the ultimate capacity of the Government of Somalia to provide better 
governance, security and socio-economic opportunities than what the Al Shabaab can offer.  It 
can temporarily stabilize a situation by winning selected battles and by controlling territory, 
but that it cannot ultimately defeat Al Shabaab militarily. This thus represents a transformation 
of the conflict crisis by dealing with the root causes of the conflict and going beyond the ending 
of hostilities. According to Berdal & Ucko, (2014) “AMISOM has thus learned that it needs a 
comprehensive approach to help the mission ensure that its stabilization efforts are directed 
toward achieving sustainable political and governance objectives.” This is a fundamental 
lesson for the AU and its structures in as far as seeking and providing lasting peace solutions 
is concerned. 
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Developing local capacity to improve security 
 
AMISOM continues to offer advice, mentor and monitor the Somali Police, transforming it 
into a credible organization. The troops have been trained in standard military training and this 
has proven to be a very effective initiative in as far as building local capacity is concerned thus 
allowing them to enforce law and order in the country. The Somali security sector is now 
comprised of the well-trained police force and the military forces that are capable enough to 
own the peace process (Frearer and de Coning, 2013). Conflict transformation seeks to address 
the root causes of conflict hence it is a finding of this research that AMISOM, an African 
solution is geared towards tackling the root causes of conflict, in the case of Somalia, military 
repression. Therefore, AMISOM seeks to develop the capacity of the security sector to 
empower it to be able to deal with the crisis through undergoing training in international 
standard operations based on integrity and the vitality to safeguard the wellbeing of ordinary 
Somalis (AMISOM, 2013). 
 
The contribution of AMISOM to Somalia’s Security 
 
The AU’s mission in Somalia has been characterized by mixed results that evoke negativities 
and/or hope for the stability of the country. With the limited resources and personnel as well 
as the complex and unpredictable nature of Somali, AMISOM was constrained in its ability to 
attain its envisaged mandate (Cilliers, Boshoff and Aboagye, 2010). AMISOM was particularly 
constrained from affecting its mandate in terms of disarmament, stabilization and humanitarian 
operation due to the limited number of peacekeeping forces on the ground. Much of its mission 
revolved around protective key government buildings and officials (Bruton and Williams 
2014).  
 
One of the major reasons for its restricted scope of work is that the mission lacked the personnel 
to stabilize Somalia, facilitate disarmament, mitigate the humanitarian crisis or look towards 
repatriation and resettlement (Agada, 2008:51). As at March 2008 over 13 months after it was 
mandated in January 2007, the strength of the mission stood at 2 614 troops (two Ugandan 
battalions and one Burundian battalion), which is about 30 percent of the authorized total 
strength of 8000 troops (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on state and prospects 
of the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, June 2008). With this force strength, 
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AMISOM was mainly on the defensive. AMISOM forces increasingly came under direct attack 
from better-armed militant movements like Al Shabaab. For instance, soon after its 
deployment, four Ugandan Peacekeepers were attacked in May 2007. In October 2008, 
Burundian forces were attacked soon after their arrival. Between 2009 and 2012, the AU lost 
over 500 troops in Somalia (Crisis Group Africa Briefing, 2012). 
 
The numbers of AMISOM however gradually grew to about 6300 troops by 2010 about 3 years 
after the authorization of the mission. During the AU summit in Kampala in July 2010, the AU 
Commission chairperson Jean Ping called for the urgent reinforcement of AMISOM following 
the terrorist attack in Kampala few days before the summit. For Cilliers, Boshoff and Aboagye 
(2010:2), the complex, unstable and violent nature of the Somali crisis deterred African states 
and UN members from making effective commitments of troops to Somalia. On 22 December 
2010 however, the UNSC adopted resolution 1964 (2010) that authorized AMISOM to increase 
its force strength from 8000 to 12000 troops to enable the mission to attain its objectives. By 
April 2011, the force strength of AMISOM stood at 9595 (Report of the Chairperson of the 
Commission on the Situation in Somalia, September 2011). 
 
With the increment of troops, AMISOM began to make bolder attempts at making significant 
security gains and extending state authority to regions controlled by militia groups. To 
AMISOM’s advantage, the devastating famine that hit Somalia in 2011 weakened the Al 
Shabaab movement and created an opportunity for AMISOM to extend the state’s authority 
(Pham, 2011:184). The popularity of Al Shabaab waned as thousands of people in the regions 
they controlled lost because, in the wake of the famine, Al Shabaab had reportedly expelled 
and banned all international aid agencies; including the UN World Food Program from the 
southern part of the country where they held sway (Democracy Now, 2011). International aid 
workers were captured and held for ransom by the militants and Somalis who volunteered for 
aid workers were threatened and/or murdered (Menkhaus, 2008). 
 
For Al Shabaab, the hunger crisis was an exaggerated ploy to infiltrate external forces into 
Somalia to oppose them (Pham, 2011:182). They also contended that humanitarian assistance 
only dulls people from working to sustain themselves. Through force or threat, Al Shabaab 
prevented the people within its territory from leaving to other regions like Lower Shabelle, 
Gedo and Bay regions to gain humanitarian assistance. With the limited interaction of the 
region under their jurisdiction with the international aid agencies, the food scarcity in Al 
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Shabaab controlled areas worsened. When the famine in Somalia aggravated, Al Shabaab 
relaxed its principles but extorted huge security fees and taxes from the NGOs willing to offer 
humanitarian assistance (Pham, 2011:182). At times, Al Shabaab militants attacked 
humanitarian basis and appropriated food donations for themselves. 
 
Through “Operation Panua-Eneo (meaning, “expand space” in Swahili), AMISOM by early 
2011, began a robust offensive campaign together with the TFG to bring many regions in 
Mogadishu under the control of the state. With the weakening of the group’s political and 
financial strands, Al Shabaab withdrew from many of its key hold areas in Mogadishu on 6 
August 2011 with the impending offensive by AMISOM forces. Seizing its opportunity, the 
UNSC IN February 2012 approved the boosting of AMISOM forces to 17000 troops to 
consolidate recovered areas and extend the state’s power (AU PSC, February 2013). While the 
security condition of Somalia remained volatile due to the insurgencies of the militant groups, 
the security gains of AMISOM engendered hope for the stabilization of Somalia since state 
collapse in 1991 (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia of 
16 October 2014) 
 
Most significantly, AMISOM oversaw the inauguration of the new National Constituent 
Assembly as well as a new Constitution which was adopted on 1 August 2012 and the 
inauguration of the new Federal Parliament on 20 August 2012 thereby paving way for the 
elections in September. The widely acclaimed elections in September 2012 led to the election 
of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, one of ICU’s former leaders as President by the 275-member 
parliament. This ended the 8-year transition process in the country. On its part, AMISOM 
continued the quest to provide security and support the government. The security gains by 
AMISOM led to the deployment of the police component of AMISOM in 2012 to enforce the 
public order, protect vulnerable groups as well as monitor, prevent and arrest criminal elements 
in the country (Bruton and Williams 2014:45). By 2013, AMISOM was further authorized to 
increase its force strength from 17 731 troops to over 22 000 troops. Having originally began 
the mission with mainly Ugandan and Burundian troops, AMISOM currently has the following 
major troop-contributing countries; Uganda since March 2007; Burundi since December 2007; 
Djibouti since December 2011; Kenya since June 2012; Sierra Leone since April 2013; 
Ethiopia from January 2014 (Bruton and Williams 2014:45). 
 
 
 
94 
 
Despite the boosting of AMISOM forces, the security context of Somalia remains volatile and 
fragile (Report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union 
mission in Somalia AMISOM, February 2013). As noted by the  Report of the African Union 
Commission on the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia AMISOM, 
February 2013, ‘a significant portion of Somalia remains under the control of Al Shabaab and 
the recovery of the entire territory still requires a significant sustained effort. While the security 
context has improved, the threat posed by Al Shabaab remains menacing. The group has 
continually engaged in asymmetrical warfare with the Somali government and AU ‘with 
increasing efficiency and lethality (AU PSC Communiqué, 18 September 2015). 
 
AMISOM donated equipment to the Somali government as part of their effort to help 
authorities re-establish functioning state institutions and deliver services to the people of 
Somalia (Frearer and de Coning, 2013). State institutions need further support to be able to 
deliver essential health, education and infrastructural amenities to areas recovered from Al 
Shabaab. This is one key aspect that has proved to bring stability in many of the areas under 
AMISOM control (Bruton and Williams, 2014). The approach of AMISOM support to the FGS 
to be able to provide basic social amenities to the civilians under the regions controlled by the 
government should continue because without the contributions of AMISOM, the TFG will not 
exist. 
 
In examining the root causes of the conflict the research finds that AMISOM’s approach to 
building governance structures and reconciling political elites or entities within Somalia is an 
approach that directly addresses issues of clan differences. The dialogue and reconciliation 
initiatives foster social cohesion and inter-clan dialogue that has helped many regions within 
South and Central Somali to be unified. AMISOM support to Somalia’s major governance 
transformation is an attempt to establish a functioning state in Somalia. AMISOM does not 
only support Somalia in the establishment of a strong government by providing security, it also 
provides support in terms of providing political guidance, monitoring, training, and advising 
the Somalia civil service sector. This approach has so far enhanced inter-clan dialogue and 
reconciliation in many of the areas recovered from Al Shabaab. Since conflict transformation 
suggests a pattern of satisfying the needs of all actors (Lederach, 1997), the mission has at the 
strategic political level worked towards this. AMISOM has and continues dialogue and 
reconciliation efforts at all levels in the country (AMISOM,2016). These include local and 
regional levels as well as areas recovered from Al Shabaab. 
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Strengthening conditions and structures conducive to sustainable peace  
In its bid to strengthen conditions and structures to sustainable peace, AMISOM has 
specifically established a Civil Affairs Unit within AMISOM in 2008 to support reconciliation 
efforts in Somalia, and extend the authority of the state. AMISOM constructed primary schools 
to support school enrolment of youth and children in the Wadajir District of Mogadishu 
(Williams, 2012). The AMISOM Civil Affairs Unit is working closely with the local authorities 
in the recovered areas (Afgoye, Johwar and Marka). AMISOM also meets elders and leaders 
in these areas to map out ways to enhance restoration of local administration. It is important to 
note that support for the local population through quick impact projects has been very 
beneficial to both AMISOM and the Somali people in terms of fostering conflict transformation 
(Bruton and Williams, 2014). Likewise, the absence of essential services within key regions in 
Somalia escalated the conflict in many areas.  Therefore, the approach of the mission to support 
the population through the provision of basic needs in the regions is addressing the root causes 
of the conflict and serves as a deterrent to future violence. 
 
 
Support to National Security Forces of Somalia 
 
Based on the findings from the literature on the root causes of the Somali conflict, it was found 
that military repression and division on clan-based affiliation was among the causes (Frearer 
and de Coning, 2016). In an effort to transform this root cause, AMISOM has and continues to 
support the SNSF in building their capacity through training, mentoring and operational 
guidance. The mission has trained forces drawn mainly from the regular members of the SNSF 
thus leaving knowledge gaps in junior and middle leadership positions. In order to fill these 
gaps, AMISOM has begun working with the FGS and other partners to undertake the training 
of a new corps of junior officers to assume platoon and company command positions in the 
SNSF (AMISOM, 2014). 
 
Recognising the importance of mitigating security challenges as well as the need for skills 
transfer in managing police operations to the Somalia Police Force (SPF), the AMISOM police 
component, established and equipped joint police operations and coordination centre (JPOCC) 
to effectively co-locate AMISOM police and the SPF. The co-location has enhanced the 
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conduct and coordination of police operations in Mogadishu and its environs (Bruton and 
Williams, 2014). These actions have contributed to preventing possible attacks from Al 
Shabaab and other criminal activities, thereby building the confidence of the population in the 
ability of the FGS to ensure the security of lives and property. AMISOM FPUs have also started 
the 24-hour joint confidence building and public reassurance joint patrols with the SPF in 
Mogadishu, which has contributed significantly to the improved security situation in the city. 
Equally important, AMISOM equipped all police stations and directorates in Mogadishu with 
computers, furniture and police registers which have served to enhance the daily workings of 
the SPF with regard to training support. 
 
Creation of an enabling environment for humanitarian support 
 
It cannot be argued that poverty, illiteracy and youth unemployment are amongst the root 
causes of the conflict in Somalia (Williams, 2012). In response to this, AMISOM continues to 
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia by coordinating humanitarian 
activities and cooperating with UN humanitarian agencies and other actors working to ensure 
greater access. The mission secured humanitarian entry points, enabling humanitarian actors to 
address the needs of the Somali population in areas under government control. 
 
Support to the public and civil service of Somalia 
 
Whilst building relationships between antagonist groups are one part of solving the problem 
according to the theory of conflict transformation, building state institutions through the 
support of international actors represents another. In contributing to Somalia’s existing state-
building process, AMISOM has supported the public and civil service institutions of Somalia 
by facilitating basic and refresher training of at least 120 civil servants comprised of secretaries, 
administrative officers and protocol officers (AMISOM, 2014). These efforts have helped to 
improve the working conditions of the civil service sector and facilitated an increase in public 
service delivery. 
 
Conclusions 
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The AMISOM mission’s activities are largely focused on counterinsurgency strategies; the 
expansion of the FGS state authority; capacity building of security forces, civil service and the 
protection of the FGS. Thus whereas the mission also works with local authorities and civil 
society in reconciliation processes, its engagements in this regard are minimal. With the 
dynamic political, social and cultural strata of Somalia, the mission would need to engage in 
conflict transformation on a larger scale with the varying administration of Somalia, in order 
to build trust and reach a mutually beneficial decision of how Somalia would be governed. It 
is also concluded that the mission’s focus is not ideally addressing the root causes of the conflict 
even though it engages with it to some extent. Therefore, the mission’s CONOPs or mandate 
should be revised to include a specific task to support the transformation of potential conflict 
relationships that build trust, and address relevant concerns aimed at building a unified 
Somalia. The mission needs to have a holistic approach to addressing the conflict which 
embodies all the relevant stakeholders and encompasses the traditional methods of resolving 
conflict from the grassroots level. As such, the mission’s mandate and CONOPs should also 
create an opportunity for activities that address the root causes of the conflict. The AU 
intervention in Somalia remains a vital mechanism for providing African solutions to the 
Somalia security context. AMISOM is 100% led by African forces and it is currently no longer 
a peacekeeping operation but a military operation to counter the intransigence of Al Shabaab. 
The mission faced challenges both internally and externally. The challenges affected its 
operational capacity. Resource availability and allocation continues to threaten the mission and 
member states have failed to honour their commitments despite having made resolutions to this 
end. The scope of the mission has been widened and in so doing, this has further strained its 
resources thereby remaining more vulnerable to attacks from Al Shabaab. AMISOM personnel 
have presented a challenge in the form of indiscipline and misconduct which has further 
affected the missions efforts to work with the local population in building lasting solutions for 
Somalia. 
 
Case Study 2: Sudan -  United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID) 
 
United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur : Mandate and Composition 
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The external military intervention in Darfur is currently under the auspices of United Nations–
African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) which was agreed upon as a result of a 
compromise between the AU and the UN. UNAMID’s establishment was driven by a fierce 
objection from Sudan and its allies to the deployment of UN-sponsored international military 
force in Darfur that could include combat troops from Western European countries (Jibril, 
2010). In fact, UNAMID came into existence following mounting concerns about the inability 
and ineffectiveness of AMIS in addressing the situation in Darfur (Luqman and Omede, 2012). 
These concerns were translated into the decision of the UN Department for Peacekeeping 
Operations to develop a three-phased approach to augment AMIS when it has recommended – 
for the first time in the history of the UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations – the 
establishment of a joint UN/AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur. This recommendation was 
endorsed by the AU/UN High-Level Consultative Meeting held in Addis Ababa in November 
2006 thus paving the way for the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) 
which authorized the deployment of UNAMID. 
 
The UN through the Security Council made this resolution, which mandated the AU/UN 
Hybrid mission to address the Darfur crisis. The mission was authorized on 31 July 2007 by 
the UN Security Council Resolution 1769. The unique hybrid mission was framed as UNAMID 
and was initially earmarked to be operational for a 12-month period. At its core, UNAMID,   
‘shall incorporate AMIS personnel and the UN Heavy and Light Support Packages to AMIS, 
and shall consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and 
liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel 
and 19 formed police units comprising of up to 140 personnel each’ (UN Security Council 
2007:3). 
However, concerns were raised in as far as the nature of relations between the AU and the UN 
in terms of the operational strategies and whether or not this mission would continue to 
perpetuate the asymmetrical relationships that marred the UN.  
 
The mandate of UNAMID is so broad and comprehensive that it has the effects of 
overstretching the peacekeeping effort beyond its operational capacity. UNAMID’s mandate 
was designed in a manner that dilutes and diminishes the peacekeepers’ presumed basic role 
and the primary objective of providing physical protection to the civilian victims of violence 
and military action in Darfur such as the IDPs (African Union, 2008). The mandate includes, 
inter alia, the protection of civilians in addition to contributing to security for humanitarian 
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operations. It also entails, monitoring and verifying the implementation of ceasefire agreements 
and assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and 
the rule of law. Moreover, it embodies, helping to secure environment for economic 
reconstruction and development, monitoring and reporting on the situation along Sudan’s 
borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. Furthermore, UNAMID was required – 
as the main task – to support the mediation efforts for peace in Darfur and to monitor and 
prevent non-disruption of the implementation of the DPA and subsequent peace agreements. 
 
Murithi, (2008:78) noted that “there are efforts to reassure observers that this is not an effort to 
re-establish the asymmetrical relationship that prevailed in the early decades of the UN, but 
rather an effort to create something new – a hybrid partnership.” The success of such a 
partnership thus lies on the ability of the actors to integrate their techniques, expertise and 
human capacity. This meant that the partnership had to incorporate the collocation of the staff 
from the United Nations in Addis Ababa where the AU Commission is located. This kind of 
integration became a unique kind of approach which embeds UN personnel into the existing 
structures established by the regional bodies and thus propels them to operate as a unitary 
structure. Murithi (2008:79) notes that; “there is an emphasis on the fact that this is not an 
asymmetrical partnership, but an entirely new arrangement established through the mutual 
consent of both parties.” 
 
Even though the UN-AU partnership is taking a new direction, it is important to determine 
what the new kind of relationship ultimately represents. The major questions that need to be 
answered are therefore ones that pertain to the idea of the hybrid partnership as being in effect 
a hybrid form of paternalism in that AU troops and personnel will do the basic and dangerous 
work on the ground guided by the all-wise and ‘fatherly’ coterie of UN advisors and whether 
this evolution in the UN-AU partnership represents a paradigm shift in relations between both 
organisations, or is it a case of old wine in new bottles (Luqman and Omede, 2012). Certainly, 
it remains an asymmetric relationship due to the fact that the UN is a much older institution 
with more resources and experience than the AU. Therefore, in this relationship advice and 
resources are more likely to be unidirectional – flowing from the UN to the AU (Jibril, 2010). 
Naturally, as the regional organisation, the AU has an important role to play in orienting efforts 
in a way that respects local sensibilities. However, it is not clear to what extent the AU can 
declare total ownership of the conceptualisation, design, planning and implementation of its 
peace operations, when ‘collocated’ UN personnel maintain a dominant presence in its affairs. 
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This judgement on the hybrid partnership has proven to be true as reflected by its failed efforts 
over the last decade to bring lasting peace into war-torn Somali in Darfur. The AU succumbed 
to the influence of the UN through its lack of vigilance and as such it allowed the relationship 
to descend into a relationship of hybrid paternalism. In particular, the AU failed to guard 
against UN’s historical paternalism and thus allowed such paternalism to re-manifest under a 
new guise, with UN brand being used to direct African troops on the ground. Therefore, this 
raises questions about the authenticity of the partnership in advancing the African quest for 
African solutions. As such, the desirability for partnerships with other unions presents 
challenges to the continent in mitigating conflict. There is a need for the continent to ensure 
that it strikes a balance between partnering with other stakeholders without compromising its 
integrity and values. 
 
Violent clashes between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Darfur insurgent movements 
as well as military build-up and aggression, including aerial bombardment of civilian targets 
and the Janjaweed attacks against civilian populations, are on the increase in Darfur. Inter-clan 
fighting between the pastoralist clans in which the Janjaweed took the active role was also 
reported. As a direct result of the ongoing clashes, civilians have been killed and displaced and 
humanitarian operations and aid workers continue to face mounting challenges and attacks, 
with devastating effects on the victims of the armed conflict in Darfur that are dependent on 
humanitarian relief assistance (Jibril, 2010). 
 
Humanitarian operations and aid workers in Darfur also face serious obstacles because of 
mounting criminality, carjacking, and the restriction of movements due to security concerns. 
However, one of the most important impediments remains the government’s policy to hinder 
delivery of relief material to the needy people in Darfur, either through restrictive 
administrative measures or by the expulsion of relief agencies from the country. In this respect, 
UNAMID could do very little to protect humanitarian operations and aid workers or to 
persuade GoS to lift the bureaucratic obstacles it has purposely imposed on relief agencies 
(Lynch, 2014). 
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Challenges faced by UNAMID 
 
In addition to its broad mandate, UNAMID faced a myriad set of operational, logistical and 
administrative difficulties which severely hindered its efforts and rendered it practically 
ineffective. Obstacles placed by the GoS and delaying tactics caused UNAMID to lose precious 
time, enthusiasm and momentum during the early stage of its deployment. Sudan’s rejection of 
the deployment of Western European and Latin American troops in Darfur is behind the 
reluctance of some states to provide UNAMID with the necessary technical expertise and 
crucial equipment including means of transport, communication, logistics and combat 
helicopters, which is the equipment necessary for an effective military operation. 
 
Lack of competent troops to meet the required numbers of soldiers is another difficulty that 
UNAMID continues to face to the extent that by mid-2010,  UNAMID, had not been able to 
deploy its full authorized strength of 26,000 military officers and civilian personnel. By April 
2010, UNAMID had only been able to deploy 17,157 troops and 1,812 police units (Lynch, 
2014). These troops were mainly contributed by Sudan’s friends and allies from carefully 
selected countries in Asia and Africa. There are no convincing reasons or acceptable 
justification why GoS assumed a selective approach in accepting troops from some countries 
and rejecting others. 
 
Regarding UNAMID’s administrative officials, some serious discrepancies were also reported. 
For example, the top UNAMID field offices in the three States of Darfur known as Sectors 
Headquarters are headed by officials from one African country (Mickler, 2013). There are also 
growing allegations about the lack of impartiality, neutrality, and independence of some senior 
UNAMID Officials. UNAMID’s Deputy Joint AU/UN Special Representative for Operations 
and Management (DJSR) and head of Northern Darfur State Sector is accused of being very 
close to GoS and an advocate of its political position on issues of peace and security in Darfur 
(Luqman and Omede, 2012). Treatment of UNAMID’s staff, the national staff, is poor which 
affected their morale and performance. In June 2010, a UNAMID national staff member was 
arrested and detained by the security forces in El-Geneina. He was interrogated about internal 
matters related to his work within UNAMID. He was held for two days before being released. 
UNAMID did not intervene with the security forces and ensure his immediate release as a 
protected UN staff member (Luqman and Omede, 2012). 
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One of the problematic areas that severely affected the performance of UNAMID is that all the 
aspects regarding its composition, provisions, movement, and work in Darfur are negotiated 
with unwilling partners (Mickler, 2013). UNAMID is currently under the effective control of 
GoS which is also responsible for the protection of its soldiers and assets. On several occasions, 
GoS prevented UNAMID from visiting certain areas in Darfur, especially when they planned 
to investigate reports about military activities or Janjaweed attacks. A ban on UNAMID flights 
was reported on repeated occasions including a total ban on helicopter flights for two weeks in 
May – June 2010, which severely hindered UNAMID’s ability to provide some basic services 
(de Coning et al, 2011). 
 
There was an increase in the number and frequency of incidents of aggression against 
UNAMID soldiers and personnel. This aggression including, killings, armed attacks and stone-
throwing indicate that UNAMID is disdained, resented and mistrusted by all the stakeholders 
in Darfur including the IDPs and the war-affected civilian populations as well as the Darfur 
insurgent groups and the GoS whose soldiers had launched the first ever armed attack against 
UNAMID in January 2008 (Jibril, 2010). 
 
It appears that the warring parties in Darfur, especially GoS are using their position in control 
of the situation and the work of UNAMID to send warning signals to the international 
community and to certain troop-contributing countries through the killings and intimidation of 
their soldiers (Coning et al, 2011). It is also believed that the effect of such a strategy is to force 
some of UNAMID’s troop-contributing countries to change their positions or soften their 
stands on legal and political issues confronting GoS such as the arrest warrants issued by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) against government officials, including the President of 
Sudan, or to silence calls from such countries for a just and viable political solution at the 
Darfur peace negotiations (Luqman and Omede, 2012). 
 
Lessons for AU from the UNAMID experience 
 
Resource mobilisation for African Union peace operations 
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African leaders need to commit money to back the institutions of the African Union. The AU 
should strive to take a stronger stand and mobilise the necessary resources where required. To 
confront its peacekeeping challenges, the AU will need to address issues of financial and 
logistical weakness and the lack of political consensus among African leaders on collective 
security norms and practices. Due to the limited availability of resources to implement peace 
operations, the AU should explore how it can demarcate a division of labour amongst Africa’s 
security actors and sub-regional organisations, as envisaged in the establishment of the ASF. 
The adequate availability of resources within the continent is a necessary and vital component 
in the conflict transformation equation and thus it allows the continent to be subsumed into 
dancing to the tune of the project financiers. UNAMID is one such example where there is a 
lack of adequate resource capacity thereby thwarting the process of bringing lasting peace in 
Darfur as envisaged. 
 
Donor support 
 
In terms of the Tenth European Development Fund (EDF) the EU pledged support for the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and provided €300 million towards the 
facility for an initial three-year period, from 2008 to 2010 (Luqman and Omede, 2012). The 
EU sought to support long-term capacity building, including military and civilian crisis 
management, to enable Africa’s ability to prevent, manage and resolve the conflict. This 
provides the African leaders with an opportunity to engage the international community in 
sourcing resources and funds to support its operations. The leaders should thus further be able 
to mitigate the challenges arousing from the donors wanting to take charge of the peace 
processes their own way by repudiating the African mechanisms. Africa needs to have genuine 
donor sources to fund its peace operations.  
 
Conclusively, it is, however, understood, that the AU’s peace and security architecture remains 
a vital component of Africa’s strategy to consolidate order and stability on the continent. The 
AU will need to seriously orient the political leadership of the continent and take decisive and 
necessary action, without which the challenges of ensuring successful peace operations will 
not be met. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
The armed conflict and associated humanitarian crisis in Darfur has been ongoing for years 
without hope that this will end in the near future. Because of this conflict, several million 
people, mainly civilians including women and children, were totally uprooted and forced to 
languish as IDPs in miserable camps in Darfur and other parts of Sudan or to seek refuge across 
Sudan’s international borders. The number of IDPs and war-affected communities in Darfur is 
increasing because of renewed fighting. IDPs live on meagre provisions of life-saving relief 
material, shelter, clean water and sanitation while some vital services in some localities have 
ceased to exist after GoS expelled major humanitarian aid agencies from the country. The 
continuing expulsion of relief agencies and inability of those groups remained in the region to 
do their work effectively is an indication that a large scale humanitarian crisis could be building 
up in many parts of Darfur. 
 
The overall security situation in Darfur is so dangerous and so fragile that it could further 
degenerate into anarchy unless genuine efforts for a negotiated political resolution to the armed 
conflict are accelerated. The armed conflict in Darfur threatens stability and peace in other 
parts of Sudan and represents a potential menace to security in the African sub-region (Jibril, 
2010). Genuine political settlement of the conflict in Darfur that addresses its root causes 
should, therefore, be considered a top priority. Protection of civilian populations in Darfur and 
the creation of conditions conducive to the return of IDPs and refugees to their areas of origin, 
including disarmament of the Janjaweed, creating humanitarian corridors and no-fly zones, 
should be the top priority in the short term. 
 
Ongoing efforts of the international community to regain peace and security in Darfur are 
unlikely to succeed as most of the key recommendations made by the UN Security Council and 
the AU Peace and Security Council, including those concerned with political, diplomatic, 
military, humanitarian, human rights and legal matters, have been sabotaged by GoS. Some 
crucial recommendations concerning an end to all types of military operations in Darfur, 
disarmament of the Janjaweed and protection of the civilian populations have been 
systematically ignored by the warring parties and GoS (Human Rights Council). 
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The deployment of UNAMID in Darfur has played a positive role in creating relatively 
improved living conditions in areas of their presence. Yet the effect of UNAMID’s presence 
on the overall situation in Darfur is very limited and the situation in many parts remains 
precarious because of UNAMID’s weak capabilities and inability to cover the whole region. 
By all accounts, UNAMID’s “level of effort” either calculated on the basis of soldiers per 
square km or per 1000 inhabitants is below the accepted universal average (de Coning et al, 
2011). 
 
The greatest responsibility to ensure the physical protection of UNAMID’s soldiers and to 
enable them to carry out their mission effectively is the shared duty of the AU, UN and GoS. 
AU member States should not accept that their soldiers and police forces in Darfur are 
assassinated, betrayed and humiliated in this intolerable manner. They should send a decisive 
signal to the warring parties in Darfur by withdrawing any diplomatic and political support so 
far generously offered to them. 
 
The UN member States should mobilize their efforts and determination to put an end to the 
ongoing tragic humanitarian situation in Darfur with or without the approval of the warring 
parties in the region. The warring parties in Darfur, and in particular GoS, should make a choice 
and take a decision to end all military operations in Darfur, withdraw its security forces from 
the region, disarm the Janjaweed and end obstruction of relief efforts as a confidence-building 
measure until a final peace agreement is reached. 
 
The deteriorating security situation, military activities, violence and criminal acts committed 
against humanitarian workers in Darfur and the premeditated targeting of UNAMID soldiers 
were compelling reasons for the UN Security Council to reconsider a thorough review of the 
mandate of UNAMID before its renewal at the end of July 2010 (de Coning et al, 2011). 
Though UNAMID mandate was again renewed in June 2017, since the 2010 renewal UNAMID 
had faced serious challenges in protecting IDPs and war-affected communities although its 
primary mandate had been to protect civilians. The reports by BBC (2014) explains how the 
UN failed not only to protect civilians from attacks 106 times from the Sudanese government 
in 2012 but also to mention the occurrence of such attacks. This incident also implicated the 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and was been regarded by journalists as the ‘conspiracy 
of silence’ (BBC, 2014). More incidents occurred in 2014 in which the Janjaweed abducted 
and abused Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) whilst the UN and AU security forces were 
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watching (Lynch, 2014). All other important tasks that UNAMID currently required to 
undertake should be entrusted to other specialized bodies. These tasks include the support to 
economic development and reconstruction projects, monitoring and reporting on the situation 
along Sudan’s borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. Above all UNAMID 
should be freed from the responsibility to follow up implementation of practically non-existent 
peace agreements or ceasefire arrangements, in particular, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). 
 
Case Study 3: Burundi 
 
History and foundation of the Burundi crisis.  
 
On the 24th April 2015, the Burundian ruling party, Conseil national pour la défense de la 
démocratie – Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) assigned President Pierre 
Nkurunziza as its possible man to run for the inevitable presidential race, in spite of the fact 
that he had effectively finished two consecutive presidential terms in office. The declaration 
that Nkurunziza wanted to go for a third attempt for office set off an uncommon series of 
protests in the capital city of Burundi- Bujumbura (Vandeginste, 2015). After two months, the 
nation encountered a series of vicious showdowns between the police and essentially youthful 
urban protesters, an attempted and failed attempt to overthrow the government, and continued 
delays for the elections. Close to seventy individuals were murdered in the pre-election 
brutality and approximately 100,000 individuals migrated over to other neighbouring countries 
(Rwanda and Tanzania) as they fled the violence (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2015). Regardless 
of global pressure and intervention, no bona fide political dialogue amongst supporters and 
rivals of President Nkurunziza's third term occurred.  
 
The Burundi conflict was started by President Pierre Nkurunziza’s 2015 bid to run for the third 
time for the presidency. This decision exploded into violent protests which culminated in a 
series of clashes which led to at least more than 1000 fatalities recorded as noted by the Armed 
Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) project. The showdown descended into low-
intensity warfare, marked by killings, assassinations, and severe tortures. More than 300,000 
have fled to neighbouring nations, and there are a further 108,000 IDPs. An expected 4.6 
million of the eleven million populaces require humanitarian assistance (ACLED Report, 
2016).  
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For a long time, Burundi was viewed as an example of successful conflict resolution which 
was achieved through the employment of the power-sharing mechanism in the settling of its 
interior violent conflict. This negotiated settlement from war to peace depended on two facets 
of power sharing. From one viewpoint, it included a great deal to share political and military 
positions amongst current officeholders and guerrillas. On the other, and to a more prominent 
degree than any other place in Africa, consociational systems were utilized to re-design state 
institutions on the premise of ethnic power-sharing (Vandeginste, 2015:624).  
 
The underlying forces beneath the crisis.  
 
The crisis in 2015 could be traced to a decade back when Burundi was engaged in its first post-
conflict plebiscite. This was held in 2005 and it was generally considered as having been free 
and fair. In 2005, Pierre Nkurunziza's appointment as Burundi's President was seen as the 
typical end of a 12-year civil war. The CNDD-FDD, established in 1994, was a Hutu-driven 
resistance party, with Nkurunziza's faction breaking out in 2001, and marking a truce with 
Burundi's Transitional Government in 2002. At the point when the political wing (CNDD) and 
military wing (FDD) converged into an acknowledged political entity in 2005, it designated 
Nkurunziza to the administration. The CNDD-FDD emerged victorious in these elections, it 
did so on the background of having just set out its arms one year prior. It is important to note 
that the CNDD-FDD was a former Hutu-dominated rebel movement. Its leader, incumbent 
Pierre Nkurunziza, a Hutu whose father was murdered amid 1972 slaughters, was enthroned as 
the President of the Republic by the two councils of Parliament. He served his first five year 
term and was eligible to run for the second time, which he eventually did in the second elections 
which took place in 2010 (Curtis, 2015). However, the first round of elections did not produce 
an outright winner initially which paved way for a second round. Most opposition parties 
decided to boycott the rest of the election race (as was the case in Zimbabwe, 2008 harmonised 
elections where the MDC boycotted the re-run after a disputed first round). This boycott thus 
landed the landslide victory to the ruling CNDD-FDD and President Nkurunziza. From 
numerous points of view, these elections fed into the 2015 crisis. On 25 April 2015, CNDD-
FDD declared that Nkurunziza would keep running for a third term, in spite of a constitutional 
two-term restrain. On 26 April 2015, riots broke out over the Burundian capital of Bujumbura. 
Since Nkurunziza was indirectly chosen by a majority CNDD-FDD parliament in 2005 (and 
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was re-chosen in 2010 with 92% of the vote in an exceedingly boycotted decision), the CNDD-
FDD considered him qualified for a third term. CNDD-FDD's dominance permitted it to do 
away with any opposition from parliament (Gebrehiwot and de Waal, 2016). It also allowed it 
to divide and rule over the opposition movements, to set up a bogus electoral commission 
which lacked authenticity to oversee the 2015 polls, and eventually shrink the democratic 
environment to the Burundi civil society and independent media as evidenced by the 
crackdown on anti-government media outlets (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2015). 
 
The fall of Blaise Compaoré in October 2014, which was prompted by the successful civilian 
protests, further propelled the demonstrators in Bujumbura to emulate in their quest to 
overthrow President Nkurunziza. According to the ACLED Report (2016), Burundi's 
underlying protests and riots beginning in April 2015, mirrored those of the other African 
nations where long-standing presidents have endeavoured to resist or unavoidably remove term 
limits. General Godefroid Niyombare, the leader of the Burundi Intelligence Service known as 
Services de renseignements burundais (SNR), was promptly dismissed. In March, around 
seventeen senior cadres of the CNDD-FDD, including Nkurunziza’s spokesperson, circulated 
an open letter dismissing Nkurunziza's bid for a third term. They were subsequently suspended 
from the party and a few of them, including a prominent senator, were expelled. The drama 
within the CNDD-FDD continued to unfold. The former SNR boss Niyombare arranged and 
staged an overthrow attempt to oust President Nkurunziza while he was in Burundi, as an 
attendee to a special summit whose agenda was premised on the situation in Bujumbura, 
Burundi. The attempted coup d’état took place on the 13th of May, after 15 days of active 
protests. As has been mentioned earlier, it cannot be missed that the events that unfolded in 
Bujumbura appeared to be an imitation of the previous successes in Ouagadougou in late 2014. 
 
While a few, yet not all, political parties acknowledged the coup d’état, civil society actors had 
some trouble in finding the correct harmony between, from one perspective, condemning the 
utilization of illegal means to usurp power, on the other hand, its eagerness at celebrating the 
fruits of the anti-third-term challenges (Vandeginste, 2015). Whatever the underlying 
manoeuvres that were embedded within the overthrow, eventually the coup did not have the 
proper coordination and control important for it to succeed. The coup lasted for a single day. 
On 15 May, various plotters of the coup, including Ndayirukiye, were captured, while others, 
including General Niyombare, got away and left the country suspiciously (Curtis, 2015). 
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A fatal day in the Burundi crisis happened on 11 December 2015, when coordinated armed 
groups orchestrated gruesome attacks on military bases in Ngagara, Musaga, and Mujejuru. 
Approximately 87 people were killed and 49 were held hostage. Police responded with counter 
pursuits, attacks, and arrests all through Bujumbura (Vandeginste, 2015). Many civilian bodies 
were found in mass graves in the following days and weeks after the attacks. In any case, mass 
graves may not exclusively be a tactic of government forces (ACLED Report, 2016). This 
stems from the fact that even the armed groups that were orchestrating the attacks cannot be 
spared as they also employed such tactics in their operations as well. What stands 
unquestionably is the fact that the situation was catastrophic with several fatalities as a result. 
International associations were propelled to raise concerns with the United Nations (UN) 
Human Rights Council collectively backing an investigation into the nation's growing state of 
emergency. The African Union (AU) acknowledged the sending of five thousand troops 
through the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), which was 
not deployed as a result of the Burundi Government resistance (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2015). 
In February 2016, the Nkurunziza administration only consented to permit 100 military 
observers and a further 100 human rights spectators into the nation. 
 
Challenges to the Burundi crisis 
 
Lack of cooperation by the Burundian government 
 
The EAC convened another extraordinary summit on 31 May, which the Burundian president 
did not go to, while President Kikwete of Tanzania supported Nkurunziza, much to the 
disappointment of President Kagame of Rwanda, who boycotted the meeting (ACLED, 2016). 
This points out to the lack of consensus amongst the African Union member states. This trend 
deals a severe blow to any attempt by the African peoples to bring about solutions to the 
political and leadership crises that bedevil the continent. Burundi's crisis uncovers the best and 
the most noticeably worst of power-sharing as a conflict resolution mechanism. In as far as the 
dark side is concerned, it became more apparent in the midst of the electoral crisis that the 
continued use of the power-sharing mechanism as a conflict transformation tool gave rise to a 
new mentality within the political spectrum in Burundi (Curtis, 2015).  
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The African Union's 5,000 strong African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi 
(MAPROBU) failed to be deployed into Bujumbura due to the resistance from the Burundi 
Government. This highlights the challenges that mar the AU conflict transformation processes 
and the obstacles they are faced with especially with regards to the fact that the AU ought to 
seek consent from the concerned government for its interventions otherwise it would be 
regarded as a complete disregard of the principle of sovereignty which the organisation 
upholds. However, the challenge arises when the consent is not granted which then hinders the 
deployment of missions by the African Union. 
 
Lack of consensus from the AU 
 
The choice by the African leaders, not to endorse the 5,000 troop African Prevention and 
Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), as the African Union (AU) Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) prescribed, uncovered a wide fracture between member states and the AU 
Commission (AUC) on the best way to resolve the crisis (Vandeginste, 2015). The debate truly 
tarnished the credibility of the AU and it demonstrated that its aspiration to avert, abort, avoid 
and transform conflict does not tally with its abilities, to some extent because of the uncertainty 
surrounding the function of the AUC. It furthermore uncovered procedural defects within the 
PSC's basic process of decision making. The incomprehensible reaction delineates the limits 
of AUC and PSC opportunity to act without the full support of leaders and the need for effective 
coordination between the AU headquarters and the African UN Security Council members 
(ICG). There is no way that the AU will be able to partake in its responsibility of ‘silencing the 
guns’ without having the AUC and member states collaborating and coordinating their efforts 
in transforming these African conflicts. 
 
The AU institutional challenges. 
 
The AU also strives to promote constitutional democracies as well as the erosion of mass 
atrocities on the continent. The Burundi situation was peculiar as it challenged both standards, 
thus uncovering the AU’s irregularity in deciphering and implementing the Constitutive Act. 
The continental paradigm shifts from despotic one-party states to more democratic states 
characterised by multi-party systems in the 1990s led to the basis of Article 4(p) which 
prohibits unconstitutional and illegal changes of government. It ultimately became the main 
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establishing rule upheld by a particular punishment: suspension from involvement in AU 
activities (Derso, 2016; Gebrehiwot and de Waal, 2016). The AU normally has denounced and, 
if asked, deployed military support, when confronted with regime overthrows, as in Mali and 
Guinea Bissau (2012) and the Central African Republic and Egypt (2013).  
 
Notwithstanding this, what constitutes the unlawful change of government is not clearly 
stipulated. It incorporates a sitting president's refusal to give up power after a free and fair 
election, however, it is not clear if that also incorporates the manipulation and/or changes to 
the constitution to avoid regime change as was the case in Burundi. The AU also maintains 
Article 4(h), "right of the Union to intercede in a Member State … in regard to grave conditions, 
to be specific: war atrocities, genocide and wrongdoings against mankind". African states are 
generally hesitant to support military or other activity against a government, regardless of the 
possibility that mass crimes are clearly being perpetuated, as in Darfur (2004-2005) or South 
Sudan (2013-2014). The extraordinary PSC choice to conjure 4(h) for MAPROBU can thus be 
viewed as a trial of the AU's graduation from the rule of non-interference, the bedrock of the 
AU's forerunner, the Organization of African Unity, to that of non-indifference (Williams, 
2016). 
 
The AUC phenomenally declined to deploy an observer mission group since conditions for a 
free and fair plebiscite were non-existent. Many precaution tactics and mechanisms such as 
high powered delegations, military observers and human rights observers, as well as sanctions 
were used, yet to little impact, to some extent in light of the fact that without states' full political 
endorsement they were not wholeheartedly sent. The Burundi government exhibited a great 
deal of defiance and made concessions which it then stalled and/or reneged on in terms of the 
effective execution.  
 
In line with subsidiarity principle which mostly administers the AU’s engagement with RECs, 
the AU surrendered essential responsibility regarding the Burundi crisis to the EAC. At first, 
they worked progressively: Zuma went to EAC summits, and the PSC embraced EAC 
resolutions, including President Museveni's placement as the main mediator in July 2016 
(Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2015). Entangled in his own disputed vote, he appointed his Defence 
Minister Crispus Kiyonga to carry out the mandate. As the conflict progressed in Burundi, it 
became evident that the EAC led negotiations were not making any progress. Be that as it may, 
without Museveni’s consent or the other EAC leaders, the AU was not able to embed itself into 
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the negotiation procedures and needed to settle for communicating its concerns about the 
moderate pace and supporting the EAC's desolate efforts.  
 
On 17 December 2015, the PSC released a communiqué approving 5,000 troops African 
Prevention and Protection Mission (MAPROBU) to avert the deteriorating security situation 
and ensure the protection of civilians (ACLED Report, 2016). It gave the Nkurunziza 
administration 96 hours to accept. In the event that it repelled, the PSC concurred, it would 
prescribe that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government conjure Article 4(h) of the 
Constitutive Act, which permits intervention in instances of war atrocities, genocide and crimes 
against humanity (AU PSC, 2015). This ground-breaking decision was paramount in two ways: 
initially, an ultimatum to an incumbent; and the invoking of Article 4(h). The Nkurunziza 
administration immediately declined to admit the deployment of foreign troops. 
 
Almost a week before the PSC issued the communique, the clashes in Bujumbura escalated 
altogether. More than 87 fatalities were recorded, in serious battling started by organised 
explosives (grenade) assaults by armed groups executed on army bases on the 11th of December 
2015 (Vandeginste, 2015). Findings from a fact-finding mission of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), AU human rights observers’ reports and social and 
customary media accounts specifically affected the PSC resolutions (ACLED Report, 2016). 
There was solid faith in Addis Ababa, spearheaded by the AUC however endorsed by a handful 
of PSC members, that the continued depreciation of security and safety, as well as the gross 
violations of human rights, justified unequivocal intervention.  
 
The PSC wanted the communique to solidify the crisis and compel the administration to 
negotiate. While it ostensibly managed to garner the international limelight, and prodding 
Museveni to stir on the slowed down EAC negotiations, it could not draw in Nkurunziza into 
a comprehensive political engagement with the opposition. His administration rejected 
MAPROBU as an "occupation force ", surprising some in the AUC, who had been persuaded 
it would grudgingly acknowledge the mission. Burundi observers said the AU needed sound 
situational interrogation and misread Nkurunziza’s character (Curtis, 2015).  AU, UN and 
Western authorities labelled the PSC's final proposal an oversight and an insult. 
 
For those states with a questionable record on democracy and human rights, Article 4(h) 
touched a nerve. They dreaded the fact that if a precedent was set in this instance, the same 
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might be applied to them in future. Invoking Article 4(h), which raises a high standard – 
interrogation of war atrocities, crimes against humankind – further escalated the standard, and 
the PSC left itself no other means with which to exert more pressure on the Nkurunziza 
administration.  
 
Operational limits of the PSC 
 
In its operations, the PSC releases communique with practically no contribution from the 
concerned members. On the other hand, the UN SC (which it mirrors) allows its member states 
to draft resolutions, led by one in consultations. For the PSC, its meetings regularly leave 
insufficient room to talk about substance; frequently there is zero chance to work the results of 
deliberations into the output in the end. Furthermore, the substantial PSC workload wearies the 
under-staffed Addis Ababa missions. The missions in the headquarters in Ethiopia lack 
sufficient staffing to allow for the proper handling of the crises. The lack of adequate staff also 
stems from the fact there is lack of financial resource to finance the operations and hire 
technical manpower. 
 
The AUC did not expect to send MAPROBU promptly. Notwithstanding official statements, 
the East African Standby Force (EASF), anticipated that it would deploy troops, was not 
prepared, and without consent from Burundi, the AU thus required the Security Council 
approval. At last, the AUC recognized that MAPROBU was in need of an insurmountable 
injection of foreign support, both logistically and financially.   
 
It further made apparent the contradictions by member states. South African President Jacob 
Zuma, who led the delegation, set the tone and the agenda of the entire process due to his 
influence. Pretoria was critical in brokering negotiations and peacekeeping amid the civil war, 
and close ties between the African National Congress and Burundian National Council for the 
Défense of Democracy-Forces for the Défense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), implied the 
president was more considerate towards Nkurunziza (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2015).  
 
Conclusions 
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The credibility of the AU was dealt a severe blow by the failure of its leaders to approve the 
deployment of MAPROBU. This questioned the sincerity of the Afrcan leaders in the quest for 
African solutions to African problems. This further illustrates the fact that in as much as the 
African institutions may have set ambitions towards resolving conflict, they still lack the 
capacity to conduct these mechanisms. The 17 December release was seen as detached from 
the reality and lacking strategy. Invoking Article 4(h) partitioned the African Union. Some 
maintained that the principle of sovereignty far outweighed the one on human rights while on 
the other end others questioned the AUC’s assessment of the Burundi situation as a dire 
situation which needed such kind of an intervention. The AUC apparently had gone way 
beyond its limits, over-ventured: one of its senior authorities was on record as having stated, 
"we have humiliated the continent" (Curtis, 2015). Disappointed by the futility of MAPROBU 
and other political endeavours and confronted with members impassion, the AUC and PSC 
seem to have lost their driving force. Neglecting to act unequivocally, the AU yielded its moral 
authority to judge incumbents on erasing constitutional term limits (Curtis, 2015).  
 
The AU reaction has been baffling, none amongst the local forces and the United Nations 
responded better. The United Nations failed to ensure an end to the crisis through intervening 
under the Security Council. This failure can, however, be shared equally with the African 
Union. On the other hand, the regional body, EAC also failed to subsequently curb the crisis 
for various reasons and this further curtailed the AU from taking decisive action as it acted 
upon the principle of subsidiarity which gave authority to the regional body to execute the task 
of bringing a solution to the Burundi crisis.  
 
Institutional contentions, combined with the lack of a common understanding of the crisis, 
hindered the implementation of an organised plot. The Nkurunziza administration capitalised 
on these mishaps and conveniently managed to place the three disunited parties (UN, AU and 
EAC) at loggerheads (Vandeginste, 2015).  The precedence in the continent has been set on 
the primacy of the incumbent and this draws its backbone from the belief by leaders of the 
longstanding liberation movements who feel that the people owe them for the gains of 
liberation and hence they should remain untouched. This has somewhat created a bond of 
brotherhood in which incumbents look out for one another, even at the expense of innocent 
people. To curb this challenge, the African Union should have utilised the African Union Panel 
of the Wise to mediate and facilitate negotiations as the members of the panel have no vested 
interests and are less conflicted than the incumbents who feel the need to protect each other.  
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Recommendations  
 
The AU itself is fragmented. In order to reinforce the AU’s capacity to react to conflict; 
1. Member states ought to meet their monetary commitments so the AUC can be sufficiently 
staffed to complete its orders.  
2. The PSC ought to develop active involvement in the search for political settlements, meeting 
a monthly on Burundi, for instance, to assess the security circumstances and engage with 
reports from the observer missions.  States ought to engage thoroughly on reports and guarantee 
their full responsibility for these. Satisfactory staffing is required of embassies in Addis Ababa 
and ensuring clear correspondence channels with them.  
3. AUC, PSC and A3 (the collective name for the three rotating African members of the UN 
Security Council) ought to strengthen their relations and work all the more firmly together – 
including PSC observer status for the A3 – to guarantee proper analysis and more cognizant 
reactions.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
This chapter sheds more light in understanding the challenges facing most African conflicts. It 
is important to note that each conflict country and situation is unique. Though some similarities 
can be drawn in some conflict situations, their experiences are never the same. The chapter 
outlines the challenges faced and experienced in the case studies in question. Some of the key 
challenges experienced by peace missions discussed include: lack of adequate resources to 
carry out the mandate; lack of commitment from internal and external actors in providing 
troops and the relevant military resources for the missions; lack of consensus on the AU 
member states and troop contributing states; the affected governments themselves also pose a 
threat towards the mission achieving peace through bureaucracy; lack of cooperation and 
political will to support the missions. It highlighted the various factors that are key in 
facilitating effective African peace mechanisms. It is important to note that various challenges 
to the functioning of some indigenous peace mechanisms are affected by external peace 
structures and lack of political will to implement or build on the opportunities presented. 
Therefore, these case studies clearly presented the various impediments to ASAP and provided 
recommendations on how the mechanism can be made more effective. 
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Chapter Seven: Research Findings  
Introduction 
 
This research has utilized sources (primary and secondary) to attempt to better understand what 
constitutes African mechanisms and further unpacked the complexities encompassing the use 
of African mechanisms as solutions in conflict transformation. This chapter unpacks the 
findings and discusses them in detail. The collected and analyzed data in this research is 
comprehensively given meaning through the guidelines of the key questions articulated at the 
beginning of the study.   
 
Mouton (2001) outlines that the presentation of study results may depend on the objectives that 
guide a particular study. The key objectives of this dissertation are, firstly to identify the 
mechanisms that have been employed in transforming conflict on the African continent (2007 
to 2016) and how they have assisted in aborting violent conflict as well as building peace in 
Africa. Secondly, to establish the extent to which the African institutions, (the AU, regional 
bodies, governments etc.) have worked collectively and independently towards transforming 
conflict in Africa and ascertain the successes and challenges that they have faced in 
transforming prolonged violent conflict in Africa. Finally, to identify the policy 
recommendations, which can be adopted by the African institutions and governments with 
regards to transforming conflict on the continent. The acknowledgement of the first objective 
was accomplished in chapter 4 which dealt with the mechanisms implemented in conflict 
transformation within the continent and explored their opportunities and challenges. The 
second objective was achieved in Chapter 5 where the discussion around the collaboration 
between the AU and both regional (RECs) and international organizations (for example, the 
UN) was explored.  
 
This chapter outlines the findings and discusses them through engaging four thematic issues 
drawn from the key questions of this research study. Thus, these themes focus firstly, on the 
challenges of the AU in policy and implementation and how peace mechanisms have been 
engaged in addressing African conflict challenges. Thirdly, assess the impact of indigenous 
peace in African peace process. Fourthly, it engages the challenges faced by AU and other 
regional bodies in addressing African conflict. And finally, this chapter explores the lessons 
learnt and the need for capacity building in addressing African conflict challenges.  
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Challenges of the AU: Policy versus implementation 
 
The AU has been progressively dynamic in counteracting and settling disputes in Africa, due 
to partially an increased acknowledgement that the UN cannot oversee conflicts alone and to 
some degree, to the AU's desire to lead. The AU's Constitutive Act was premised on the 
fundamental objective, which was to set advancement of peace, security and stability. In order 
for this objective to be realised, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was 
created. It affirms the AU’s supremacy in peace and security on the continent and mutually 
empowers the PSC and AUC chairperson to "undertake peace-making and peace-building 
capacities to transform conflicts".  
 
The Peace and Security Department (PSD), charged with administering the fifteen-member 
PSC, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise and other 
mediation activity, as well as four peace support operations, has just 64 regular staff positions, 
26 of which were filled in 2015 (ICG Report, 2016:3). The challenges to securing a sufficient 
workforce to carry out the daunting duties can be attributed to the serious lack of adequate 
funding. Just about $169,833,340 of its evaluated $416.9 million spending (for the year 2016) 
comes from the commitments of the member states. The balance of which is paid off by the 
external partners. In 2016 alone, 92% of the activities and functions of the AU are expected to 
be bankrolled by donors (APSA, 2016). Such a dependence on donors rather than member 
states to fund activities thus jeopardises the ability of the AU to own its agenda and it also 
highlights that member states are not committed to the cause they preach. As a result, it can be 
questionable whether Africa is indeed able to provide African solutions to its problems without 
states having to bankroll these solutions. By the end of the 2015 year, only 68% of the 
commitments had been fulfilled, and only 19 member states had completely met their 
obligations.  As a move towards self-reliance, the leaders of the African states promised to 
bankroll a quarter of the AU peace and security endeavours. They further adopted a strategy 
that in principle seeks to produce $400 million annually to help pay for AU missions, but yet 
still it has not been fulfilled (AUC, 2016). 
 
Peace Mechanisms in Addressing African Conflict Challenges 
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In understanding the dynamics explained above, the findings of this study establish that there 
has been an increasing dominance of hybrid peace mechanisms.  These mechanisms have 
dominated African peace approaches in the past decade as the African Union, United Nations, 
regional organizations and various international agencies of peace among others come together 
to address conflict challenges in the continent. The hybridity in most peace processes has taken 
place in different forms. Firstly, it has taken shape in the form of recognized hybrid-
partnerships. The case of Darfur stands out as one of the perfect examples of a hybrid peace 
solution in which both AU and UN are participating through UNAMID. More so, the AU has 
also collaborated with regional institutions to address conflict challenges as in the case of 
Burundi where the AU has collaborated with East African Community (EAC).  Secondly, there 
are silent partnerships to peace. In this study, this refers to a situation whereby a single 
organization assumes the responsibility of addressing a conflict challenge, but depends on 
external resource support and guidelines. The case of Somalia is a perfect example where silent 
hybrid-partnership is noticed as it is an AU Mission, but it relies heavily on external funds and 
strategies. Thus, this study found out that elements of hybrid peace mechanisms are present in 
these case studies and are increasingly taking over African peace initiatives. 
 
The interaction between UN and AU in joint peacekeeping partnerships witnessed 
comprehensive participation of these organizations towards addressing conflict challenges in 
Africa. The engagement can be traced back to 2006 when the UN and AU started engaging in 
annual consultative meetings, which are conducted by members of the UN Security Council 
and AU Peace & Security Council to coordinate responses on issues pertaining to peace and 
security on the continent. These partnerships have resulted in the formations of ‘AU-UN Joint 
Task Force and desk-to-desk exchanges’, Capacity building for mediation [UN assistance in 
setting African Union Mediation Strategy] and assistance in electoral issues across the African 
continent. In 2010, the UN General Assembly did set up the ‘United Nations Office to the 
African Union’ (UNOAU) as a measure to firstly, strengthen the partnerships between the UN 
and AU in terms of peace and security.  Secondly, they strengthened the role of the UN as a 
“long-term capacity building and short-term operational support” advisor (UNDPA, 2014).  
Finally, they streamlined the role of the UN in AU affairs as a measure to ensure cost-effective 
and efficient delivery support of UN to AU. More so, the UN and AU have engaged in 
comprehensive joint peacekeeping missions in Darfur, and supported peace initiatives in 
Somalia over the past decade.  
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Hybrid peace has been identified as one of most crucial mechanisms in processes of building 
peace. Thus, the study established that AU has relied on hybrid peace mechanisms over the 
past decade as a measure to address African conflict challenges.  However, these partnerships 
have received much criticism from scholars. For instance, the AU-UN partnership has been 
labelled to be of paternalistic nature in which the UN overshadows the role of the AU due to 
the vastness of their resources (Murithi, 2007; Nathan, 2013).  
 
The study establishes that the reliance of AU on external funds jeopardizes its decision-making 
power, hence the goals of ASAP are overly neutralized. For instance, the case of Somalia is an 
AU mission which has attracted a lot of training and financial stakeholders. This is because the 
conflict in Somalia has not only been problematic to the African people alone but it has also 
affected other parts of the world especially with the emergence of the Al Shabaab and the 
pirates.  This has propelled countries such as the UK to consider Somalia as a priority risk in 
terms of terrorism and pirates hence it automatically invokes its involvement in the solutions 
to the Somali crisis. The nature and extent of the problems associated with Somalia make it 
difficult for a single continent to address them independently and thus calls for cooperation and 
unified efforts. This therefore also presents a challenge in as far as the mechanisms are 
implemented and their uniqueness as entirely African. Thus, the rise of hybrid peace 
mechanisms in addressing African challenges is one of the important aspects found in this 
study. However, despite the existence of cooperation and support from other countries, it 
remains important to note that the limitation of the AU to raise its own funds independent of 
external resources has consistently undermined the recognition of localised peace initiatives 
that exist in the Somali traditional structures.  
 
It is important to note that, the AU has often demonstrated a lack of political will and reluctance 
to engage in addressing critical conflict issues on their own despite the existence of designed 
mechanisms. The case of Burundi is a clear example in this study where the early warning 
systems have been highly neglected by the AU. In understanding these findings on how peace 
mechanisms have been put into practice on the African continent in addressing conflict 
challenges, this research further sought to understand if the mechanisms being utilized in 
addressing African conflict problems are inspired by African indigenous mechanisms. This is 
important in identifying and understanding if the AU peace and security structures have been 
designed in a manner that advances ASAP.  
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Were the Mechanisms Inspired by African Indigenous Mechanisms? 
 
As mentioned above, what was noticeable and clearly stood out is that the AU remains highly 
dependent on donors and the UN in addressing conflict challenges. This remains one of the 
major factors identified across literature as a critical marker which exposes the weaknesses that 
exist in effecting pure African Solutions to African Problems in addressing conflict.  The 
existence of quite a number of liberal peace approaches in the African peace process is 
premised on the basis of funding and structural support offered by external actors which 
remains dominant in addressing African conflicts. Thus, despite the demand for more localised 
peace, the implementation remains minimal or side-lined because it does not fit into the 
fundamentals of the liberal peace framework. Therefore, peace mechanisms in the past decade 
have rather adhered more towards engaging hybrid peace, inclusive and integrative peace 
mechanisms to at least divert the peace processes from a more liberal perspective which has 
been consequential to the failure of peace processes across the African continent.  This is 
because various stakeholders have been advocating for peace mechanisms that are driven more 
by local peace initiatives. For instance, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in 2009 
emphasised the need for local ownership of peace as a measure of building sustainable peace 
and avoiding conflict resurgence.  
 
Findings of this study reveal that there has been strong advocacy for inclusive or integrative, 
local and indigenous peace mechanisms in addressing critical conflict challenges in the 
continent. For instance, in addressing the Somali conflict as a whole, integrative peace 
mechanisms have been more frequently utilised since the establishment of AMISOM in 2007. 
Though international efforts have been consistent, it is the crucial role of integration which 
concentrated more on promoting nation-building. This means that transformation and 
development should not be imposed by institutions or individuals from above but it should be 
an organic process from the bottom up. In understanding how Somaliland stands today as a 
safe environment, one can relate how local and indigenous mechanisms played a crucial role 
to build peace. The success of bottom-up approaches also acts as a point of reference which 
highlights the vital role played by locals in crafting, implementing and sustaining peace hence 
the need for African solutions for African problems. In understanding this, it is clear that ASAP 
has been building up as a practice in addressing conflict challenges in Africa way before the 
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establishment of AMISOM and even before the official recognition and adoption of ASAP as 
a concept by NEPAD and the broader African organisational structures. 
 
This study also finds out that the AU has not fully incorporated the African values into the 
mechanisms of finding solutions to African problems. The African Union Panel of the wise is 
one mechanism by the AU which is inspired by the traditional African values on the elders and 
wisdom. However, this has not been fully exploited as the panel continues to be sidelined and 
is seemingly not utilized to its full potential. The African Union Panel of the Wise has the 
capacity to transform conflict by utilizing the traditional means of conflict resolution embedded 
in the African societies. The fact that it is represented by members from all the regions of Africa 
provides it with an avenue to tap into the different cultural practices and explore the ones which 
may be used in the contemporary quest to silence the guns. The panel however needs to work 
collaboratively with the other arms of the APSA structure and should tap into its rich wisdom 
and wealth of governing experience and contribute to the crafting and implementation of 
unique African responses to conflict. 
 
AU, Regional Bodies & Institutional Challenges in Addressing African 
Conflicts 
 
One of the most important mechanisms found to be worthy of addressing African conflicts is 
the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The CEWS is based on the principle of 
promoting good governance, community-oriented means of conflict transformation and the 
smooth transitions of power (Noyes and Yarwood, 2013). It is no doubt that this is one of the 
crucial mechanisms for addressing conflict challenges on the continent. In understanding its 
functions and capabilities, the findings of this research acknowledge its potential in informing 
strategic decisions for addressing conflict challenges on the continent. Therefore, it is 
saddening that in the past decade there has been hesitance by the AU in taking note of the early 
warning signs of conflict challenges across the continent. The case of Burundi and Darfur are 
a testament of such situations. Early warning mechanisms give a roadmap for Africa to partake 
in the timeous engagement and aversion of possible threats to the continent’s security which is 
very important to ASAP. This is encapsulated through three pillars discussed below: 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
a) Good governance 
 
The cultivation of good governance as a desired value within the continent is one of the 
obstacles facing the pioneers of peace and security within the continent. The African continent 
is marred with conflicts emanating from the weak states, failure to provide essential goods, and 
the lack of legitimacy of the governing authorities hence the possible remedy to counteract 
mass actions is through promoting and enhancing good governance. Not only does this act as 
a remedy for internal conflicts but it also builds up the AU’s credibility as an authority where 
its member’s good governance status is unquestionable. This means that, if there is no good 
governance, (or the promotion thereof), member states will turn a blind eye because they are 
also equally guilty. The case of a political escalation in Burundi has witnessed the AU giving 
a mandate to the East African Community (EAC) to act as a mediator in addressing the conflict 
challenges. This mechanism sought to push for stability and therefore establish a platform for 
good governance in the country. However, the EAC’s role in Burundi was observed by many 
as a failure because it did not show any eagerness for peace and security to evolve in the 
country. More so, the EAC had proposed to intervene militarily through East African Standby 
force; a motion which was denied by the AU due to financial constraints and one may conclude 
out of hesitation. This clearly outlines how good governance remains undervalued despite 
being one of the key mandates of the AU. Thus, if the AU and other regional bodies are to 
comprehensively confront these detractors of good governance with the full political will and 
without hesitation ASAP is bound to be effective.   
 
b) Non-tolerant position for illegal changes of government.  
 
The AU condemns any unconstitutional means of transferring power. This is evident from its 
condemnation of every coup within the continent which has also been accompanied by action 
towards the coup leaders for example in Burundi.  At the core of the AU, resolve is the 
understanding that the unconstitutional upsetting of governments derails the democratic 
consolidation and is detrimental to the efforts to build stability and cohesion within the 
continent. This is encapsulated in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act which vehemently forbids 
the unconstitutional transfer of power and provides the various options of sanctions to deal 
with such cases as and when they arise. The case of Burundi was a test for this resolve. 
However, the early warning mechanism did not work to abort the conflict in Burundi although 
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the signs of an upcoming conflict were imminent. In Burundi, the early warning systems have 
been highly neglected by the AU to provide mitigating measures to address the conflict which 
emerged when an attempted coup against president Nkurunziza failed. The AU could have 
engaged to address the challenge based on the guidelines of the early warning systems but they 
chose to look aside. It is incidents and reaction such as this, that weaken the effectiveness of 
ASAP in addressing conflict challenges on the continent. 
 
c) Community-oriented mechanisms to conflict transformation. 
 
Literature suggest the fact that community-oriented action is the panacea to transforming 
conflict that emerges from the self-aggrandizement of leaders.  The African traditional 
framework is centred on the values of the community rather than individualism, hence any 
attempt to effectively transform conflict within the continent should be community centred and 
thus such approaches should be a priority and embedded in any transformation mechanism.  
Such interventions also strive on de-incentivizing individualistic gains. For instance, some of 
the impeding factors to sustainable transformation of society from conflict is the predominance 
of top-down approaches to state building. This points to the need to effectively involve the 
traditional leadership in the crafting and implementation of effective solutions to the Somali 
crisis. The case of Somalia highlights that the disregard of the local traditional systems can be 
so disastrous and hazardous to the state building and peacebuilding efforts. Thus, the failure of 
the Somalia society to sustain the liberal standards of a state has attained it a label of a failed 
state. However, this study acknowledges that Somalia is made up of traditional societies and 
structures, and to build it up requires proper acknowledgement and respect of these values 
hence the importance of localising peace through ASAP.  
 
The role of the locals in the Darfur conflict cannot be denied as they play a crucial role in 
crafting and supporting lasting peace efforts.  It is important that the UNAMID and various 
other stakeholders involved in the crises involve local actors in finding solutions to the Sudan 
long ranging conflict. This is premised on the understanding that the locals bring in a wealth 
of understanding on the conflict and can contribute to peace through key strategic interventions. 
These include the fact that these local actors are a gateway to other sought-after actors within 
the conflict through the relationships that exist between them. For example, “Arab nomad civil 
society and tribal leaders hail from many of the same towns and communities as the Janjaweed 
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and rebel militias and therefore represent a crucial opportunity to engage these groups when 
continental and international efforts have failed.” (Deng, 2000). Furthermore, these 
engagements provide an opportunity to rekindle the seemingly failed efforts at dialogue 
between the conflicting parties in Darfur. In as much as the efforts by the UNAMID have been 
well received, it is also noted that the attitude towards the UNAMID from the Arab nomads 
has been negative. This stems from the feeling of being neglected active participants in the 
peace process that this group of people experience. Meaning that, tapping into the overlooked 
actors in the conflict may thus allow for a better attempt at making peace through inclusivity 
and concerted efforts. In a nutshell, the resolution or effective transformation of the Sudanese 
(as with any other) crisis demands a serious investment in local efforts at peace rather than the 
reliance on external input on the processes. Such efforts will include but not be limited to 
supporting the nomad networks which play a crucial role in building peace and reconciliation. 
For example, as a countermeasure to the scourging Janjaweed, the local tribal leaders have 
advocated for the Ajaweed who are the nomad tribal leaders responsible for administering, 
Judiyya. The Judiyya refers to the indigenous Sudanese mechanisms for building peace and 
reconciliation (Deng, 2000). Deng further emphasizes the Dinka Principle of reaching out as 
being applicable to the management of conflict in all situations of human interaction, as it is 
particularly pertinent to bridging the role of leaders of groups in conflicts (Deng, 2000:97).  
These have culminated in the spearheading of interlocking networks within the five states in 
Darfur which are aimed at dealing with conflict through the identification of local disputes and 
their remedies, thus preventing them from escalating. Thus, the failure of UNAMID to 
incorporate such mechanisms is a challenge and a blow to indigenous or localised peace 
mechanisms. Such initiatives need the adequate support and authentication from the authorities 
as they carry massive potential in as far as lasting peace is concerned. Though the efforts are 
at a micro, grassroots level, if they are managed and supported effectively they may produce 
the much-desired goal of lasting peace in Sudan.  
 
Given the factors identified above, it is clear that the findings of this study expose various 
factors which affect effective peace processes in addressing African conflict challenges. It is 
imperative to note that the success of AU and other regional bodies identified in this study 
remain partial. This is because there is still lack of political will, lack of funds and hesitation 
in confronting the challenges with an aggressive measure. This means for ASAP to be effective 
there is need to draw lessons from these case studies in order to recommend effective policies 
that can bear much impact is addressing African conflict challenges.  
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Lessons learnt and the need for capacity building to respond to conflict 
 
The research acknowledges the fact that 3 case studies cannot be conclusive and present an 
overriding conclusion. However, it also provides an insight into the African situation hence it 
also notes that the responsibility to find lasting solutions lies on the African peoples. A case in 
point for the examination of accomplishments in the usage of the African mechanisms is 
embodied in the AU's mediation in Somalia which highlights Africa's duty regarding 
pioneering endeavours for conflict transformation. Regardless of its constrained finances and 
the difficulties of resuscitating a state in collapse, the AU has shown an admirable will to seek 
after calmness and create a conducive environment for Somali peace. This is commendable 
especially considering the fact that the state suffered abandonment from the UN during the 
1990s. AMISOM has significantly achieved a few accomplishments in its endeavours to 
develop the credibility and legitimacy of the states and its counter rebellion towards the Al 
Shabaab.  In its efforts, the AU has also spearheaded conversations and talks for the return to 
stability in Somalia. Of importance in its quest has been the accomplishment in the form of a 
central government (Federal) in Somalia which culminated in 2012. However, with security 
threats still persistent and the security being delicate, the AU efforts have provided a ray of 
hope for stability and security coupled with enhanced state capacity to provide political goods. 
 
The research postulates that for the maxim of African solution to African problems to 
materialize, stakeholders involved together with the continental body, (the AU), should pursue 
and consider the following standards;   
i) The people-oriented strategies to resolve conflict, which devolves power to the 
community above the elites. This focus will ensure that the people who are directly 
affected by the conflict become active participants in the creation of solutions to 
their own challenges as well as help fix and mend the broken relations amongst 
them. The people-oriented mechanism will also be vital in terms of cultivating 
principles of good governance and accountability. People-oriented resolution of the 
conflict can be achieved through enhanced ownership by ensuring dialogue with 
community leaders. Peace missions such as AMISOM ought to centre its operations 
at the local level and address the community administration on approaches to 
cooperatively engage as one Somali people; and most importantly how to help 
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Somalia rebuild its state without the recourse to voting.  Polls will probably hinder 
AMISOM from concentrating on the vital needs (provision of humanitarian access) 
of the general population in trying to address the root causes of the prolonged crisis. 
Despite the fact that elections are a noteworthy stage towards guaranteeing political 
stability and consolidation of new state institutions, the legitimisation of the 
democratization procedure in a post-conflict scenario relies upon the standard of 
living of the populace and the improvement thereof. In this light, therefore, there 
needs to be a relook on the current policies, fortifying those with insufficiencies and 
guaranteeing their effective implementation in order to guarantee that imbalances 
are solved, while advancing institutional responsibility (ACCORD, 2013). The 
peoples of Somalia need to be actively and progressively involved in the 
transformation of the conflict. Burundi also presents a case in point where 
unsustainable top-down approaches may lead to the future reverting back to 
conflict, as a result of weak institutions, hence the desirability of bottom up and 
inclusive approaches . 
 
ii) The transition from the conventional use of coercion as a means to deter conflict 
into a more inclusive approach which engages the general populace through lengthy 
conversations and dialogue to seek solutions. These efforts need to also include the 
vulnerable members of the society, the women and children and incorporating their 
role in the resolution of the conflict which affects them. There is need to shift the 
focus from the traditional militaristic nature of the missions which operate through 
the use of force and violence to thwart conflict. Conflict transformation and peace 
missions need to invest in the engagements with the populace in the search for 
effective solutions. Spending on militia should be channelled towards more 
peaceful endeavours that are championed by the peoples affected by the conflict. 
 
 
iii) Ensure that there is a long-term restoration when the conflict ends, parties are able 
to co-exist amicably and ensure lasting peace. The African legacy on the conflict 
transformation discourse is established on the need to fix broken relations. This is 
premised on the understanding of the paradigm that African conventional methods 
of resolving conflicts build on the fact that clashes in relationships need to be 
resolved and fixed so as to allow the parties to live harmoniously with each other 
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afterwards. This methodology differs from the ones that seek for punishment and 
retribution as a form of justice.  
 
iv) Inclusive approaches to transforming the conflict which transcends beyond the 
status quo and ensures a multi-faceted approach. African indigenous mechanisms 
are not only limited to political conflict transformation but they extend way beyond 
the rational and political aspects into the emotional and spiritual facets. If the efforts 
of any actors involved in the conflict transformation trajectory are to be successful 
there needs to be an active involvement and inclusion of various interconnected 
actors and factors within the fraternity of peace. The major difficulty with the 
AMISOM is that it has operated on the notion of being a temporary mission for 
almost a decade. It is persistently perceived that the UN will assume control over 
the mission. This brings up issues of how African parties can initiate the 
peacebuilding and the PCRD strategy of the AU as stipulated by the AU PCRD. 
Among many worries here is the manner in which issues associated with the 
reconciliation as well as justice are handled in Somalia. Furthermore, the fact that 
the AU’s role in Somalia remains unprecedented raises concerns over the 
attainability of an inclusive approach to conflict transformation which incorporates 
the multiple facets of the conflict which include the socio-economic, political, 
emotional and religious aspects. 
 
v) Improved capacity to deal with conflict transformation that is purely indigenous. 
Building local capacity to effect solutions. The AU and other players within the 
peace and security circles have shown a great deal of responsibility in tackling 
conflict however these efforts have been dealt a severe blow by the continued 
insufficient funding for the missions. A case in point is the AMISOM operation 
which existed and survived at the mercy of outside donors. This reliance on external 
funding is worrisome as such funding is usually accompanied by the influence, 
which might be detrimental to the peace process.  It has been argued that the premise 
of the AMISOM was rooted in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks 
which raised international concerns that the failed states had become a breeding 
space for terror groups to emerge. Therefore, it is against this background that the 
AMISOM can thus be attributed to a proxy war waged by the western allies against 
terror in Somalia and Africa as a whole. Moreover, the outsourcing of funds to cater 
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for the operations can be viewed as capricious and indeterminate. Therefore, 
AMISOM, from the beginning, experienced the inadequate supply of troops to 
bring about the much-desired environment for stability. Generally, the AU suffers 
from limited capacity and insufficient resources hence this had led to its continued 
dependence on the external assistance which further daunts its independence to 
carry out its own peace and security efforts.  However, this does not call for the 
repudiation of all external support but does point out to the eminent challenges 
posed on the resolve to provide African solutions to African problems. Also, the 
MAPROBU suffered severely in terms of budgetary constraints and hence the 
inability to finance the mission was a challenge. There is a need for the AU thus to 
come up with ways through which it can raise and generate funds for the peace 
missions and engage the communities to provide innovative and less expensive 
ways of dealing with the conflict. If the communities are empowered enough to 
finance their transformation efforts, it is likely that the mechanisms will be 
sustainable. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has presented the findings and discussed them. It explored the key themes of the 
research study that are guided by the key research questions in Chapter 1. The findings identify 
the various loopholes and limitations that exist in the AU hybrid partnerships and structures in 
addressing peace. Thus, the chapter identifies that the challenges to effective implementation 
of indigenous or localized peace lie within the partnerships that have been established. 
Therefore, the idea of the AU establishing its own source of funding which is divorced from 
the external support of it has to gain momentum in advancing ASAP. The chapter discussed, 
on the existing limitations to the full functionality of ASAP giving reference to the case studies 
in question. It outlined the potential factors and strategies that need to be looked at if indigenous 
or localized peace is to be recognized and ASAP is to make an impact. In summary, the research 
study found out that the utilization and implementation of indigenous peace mechanisms in 
transforming conflicts in Africa remain highly limited. This is due to the dominance of 
liberalized peace, the dependence of AU on external resources and support, and the lack of 
political will by the AU to take and execute difficult decisions. 
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Chapter 8: Recommendations and conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 
This research study acknowledges the critical challenges that ravage the continent of Africa. 
The study is premised on the understanding that African conflict challenges have been 
consistent and seem rather unending even after attempted peace, due to the application of 
external solutions. Hence the research was built on the argument that African solutions to 
African conflict challenges lie within African communities. This research acknowledges the 
existence of other external solutions that might be useful but rather it argues that these solutions 
should never take precedence or priority in addressing African conflict challenges as identified 
in most cases. Therefore, this study adhered to the objective of clarifying perspectives around 
the notion of ASAP and its importance in developing effective mechanisms that are localized 
and indigenous in addressing African conflict challenges. 
 
The study traces the concept of ASAP to the ideals of Pan-Africanism and outlines how it is an 
important cause to pursue if effective peace and security are to be established in Africa’s 
conflict plighted territories.9It then unpacks the key perspectives to building peace identified 
across the existing literature.  The study utilizes conflict transformation and positive peace 
theories as a measure to bring understanding to the various dynamics of conflict, understanding 
diversity of society and also promote alternative thinking as the key to addressing African 
conflict challenges10. As a measure to consolidate and understand if there are existing structures 
and institutional capacity to bring to effect ASAP and advance indigenous peace, the research 
outlined the AU peace and security structure and the peace architecture. It outlines the 
resources, capacity and the political will of AU in bringing to effect the assumed changes and 
expected outcomes that are African oriented11. The cases of Somalia, Darfur and Burundi 
provided three unique backdrops which exposed different variations in peace approaches. They 
exposed the weaknesses and strengths that are encountered in addressing typical African 
challenges12. There are also various traditional and indigenous societal tools that are identified 
                                                          
9 See Chapter 1 
10 See Chapter 2 
11 See Chapter 4 
12 See Chapter 5 
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in these communities that can be key in addressing conflict which has often been neglected or 
undermined because they do not exist in the guidelines of liberal peace structures.  
 
The contents of this research utilise 3 main case studies which have unfolded over the past 
decade and demonstrate the African peace approaches that have been implemented from liberal 
peace mechanisms to hybrid peace mechanisms. The adoption of hybrid peace meant the 
promotion of the bridging of top-down and bottom-up approaches, encourage inclusive peace 
initiatives between external and local/indigenous peace approaches and to ensure that there is 
local ownership of peace processes which allows sustainable peace. However, the study 
identifies that the challenge of hybrid paternalism13 replaced liberal peace frameworks such 
that localized/ indigenous peace mechanisms and the effect of ASAP remain undermined. It 
cannot be definitively argued that the findings of this research establish that the AU and peace 
actors in the international community have decided to take the route of hybrid peace. This is a 
more inclusive and integrative approach which acknowledges and supports localized/ 
indigenous peace in the making. However, the implementation of the peace processes 
examined still exposes huge limitations and setbacks14. This research concludes that despite 
the existence and adoption of a perfect platform, ASAP as a mechanism remains far from being 
a reality and the role of indigenous peace is still undermined in practice.  
 
Making Pan Africanism relevant in the context of conflict. 
 
The belief in Pan Africanism has been internalized as a notion mainly connected with the fight 
against imperialism and struggles for liberation on the continent. This has thus blurred the 
ultimate values and integral components of Pan Africanism such as African solidarity, harmony 
and common identity. If Africa is to operationalize the values of African solutions to African 
problems, through pan Africanism, it needs to ensure that the ideals of Pan Africanism are de-
linked from imperialistic struggles and are applied holistically to the continent’s multiple 
struggles which include conflict. With the inception of the Pan Africanist thinking in the mid-
1990s, Africans have been united under the common banner of oneness and shared identity in 
their quest to deal with common challenges. The idea of pan Africanism was crucial in the 
attainment of independence by African states, bringing an end to slavery and colonization. 
                                                          
13 The dominance of one institution’s ideas over another in an assumed partnership. In this study it refers to 
the dominance of UN and external donor policies on AU’s peace mechanisms and approaches (Murithi, 2008).  
14 See Chapter 6 
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These ideas also continue to influence African thinking and actions towards the struggle against 
neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism on the continent. 
 
However, a lot of the contemplations around pan Africanism has been excessively highlighted 
in relation to the battle against foreign powers in the world system. Less consideration is paid 
to the significance of the idea of pan Africanism for societal unity in different African settings.   
There has been recent  motivation for a unified Africa characterized by seamless borders for 
Africa which has attracted many states that seem to support the thought in principle considering 
the presumed Pan African ideals. In any case, there has been little research done on the 
estimated benefit of African solidarity and seamless borders for the different states that make 
up Africa.  
 
Moreover, the less powerful states on the continent are cautious about the position of the 
hegemonic states such as South Africa and Nigeria. This is also coupled with the fact that the 
continent is still being led by selfish leaders (in some states) whose selfish ambitions and greed 
deter and hinder the possibilities of a united continent on African soil. There is need therefore 
for the African players in peace and security, together with the African Union, to mobilize 
resources for the advancement of social cohesion as well as communicate the benefits of having 
such cohesion for the continent. It is paramount that the continental leaders profoundly reflect 
on the idea of Pan Africanism and solidarity to craft strategies and a roadmap that advances 
cohesion beyond the mere racial, colonial and imperial meaning of Pan Africanism. If this is 
achieved, the realization of African solutions to the problems in Africa will be a possibility as 
the continent will have cohesion amongst its people. 
 
Good governance, transparency and human rights promotion. 
 
The major pre-requisite for the accomplishment of the African solutions is the cultivation of 
governance systems that are legitimate, transparent, respect and uphold the rule of law; and 
that account to their citizens. With such governance systems in place, there is less propensity 
for conflict as disputes and discontent are likely to be mitigated amicably. Important to note is 
the fact that most conflicts are as a result of mal-administration, abuse of state authority and 
power. This restricts the freedom for the opposition parties to manoeuvre within their 
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democratic rights hence they resort to avenues outside the democratic space in order for them 
to voice their issues. 
 
The AU is thus compelled to ensure that it provides African solutions, hence this means that it 
needs to ensure that its members have good governance status in order for it to be a credible 
authority to enforce its policies. Where member states have bad records in terms of governance, 
corruption, rule of law and abuse of human rights, it is difficult for the organization to claim 
legitimacy over the states as well as for the rest of the world to respect the continental body. 
 
In the case of Burundi, the MAPROBU was not deployed and article 4(h) was not invoked as 
states that had questionable human rights and good governance records feared that they will 
also be victims of this policy and hence they refrained so as to continue with their bad 
governance. Until this is rectified, incumbents who commit atrocities will always get away 
untouched. The AU already has mechanisms that are in place to achieve this end, what needs 
to be done is to ensure their effective implementation and functionality. These mechanisms 
include the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the African Governance Architecture 
(AGA) and the Pan African Parliament (PAP).   
 
Enhancing Africa's capacity   
 
For Africa to take care of its issues and be regarded as a prominent ally in the international 
community, it needs to boost its resource capacity. In terms of policies, ideas and vision for the 
future, Africa has all that on paper, but its inability to finance these noble ideas and implement 
them remains its greatest stumbling block into Africa’s efforts for lasting solutions. As has 
been demonstrated, this has given leeway for the stronger states to dictate their ideas onto the 
continent’s matters. For this to be overturned, the member states need to take full responsibility 
for the provision of solutions, not just in principle but also through generating the means 
through which these noble ideas can be implemented. 
 
African states need to fulfil their commitments towards the funding of the AU and its operations 
if it is to realise its mandate of owning the peace processes on the continent. As long as the 
operations are funded from the outside, Africa remains far off from providing her own solutions 
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independently. Leaders have to prioritise enhancing the resource base by channelling funds 
into the running of the AU and its operations  
 
Improved financial support 
 
The efforts to transform violent conflict is not the mere responsibility of the state, actors in 
civil society need to be actively involved as well, which means that their efforts also need to 
be funded effectively and this can be mainly achieved through donor support. Relevant civil 
actors can be useful in complementing efforts of the peace operations especially in terms of 
establishing and sustaining governance structures within the post-conflict societies. The 
insufficient financing of eminent civilian components to the peace operations needs urgent 
attention if reconciliation and sustainable institutions are to be attained. 
 
 
Effective collaboration with the UN 
 
The efforts by the AU to take a leading role in the prevention and response to conflict on the 
continent are commendable. However, the continued inability to financially sustain its peace 
projects remains a cause for concern. In this light, it is imperative to note that the AU cannot 
solely bear the responsibility for materializing the solutions for the continent’s challenges, 
hence it also needs to effectively engage the UN in seeking sustainable answers towards its 
plight. 
 
Recommendations to effective ASAP and Indigenous peace 
 
Having explored the various challenges that are affecting effective materialisation of ASAP 
and indigenous peace mechanisms in addressing conflict on the continent, it is important to 
recommend strategies and solutions that can be engaged to empower and enrich African peace 
processes to be self-sustaining and supportive of indigenous mechanisms that are key in 
building sustainable peace. The use of case studies allowed this study to have a detailed analysis 
of approaches, policies and frameworks that are dominant in addressing African conflict 
challenges. Therefore, it is essential to learn from the various loopholes and setbacks that are 
identified in order to forge new blocks that are complementary to ASAP and indigenous peace.  
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Improved collaboration between, AU, CSO, and REC  
 
For the AU to achieve a more sustained ability to address the difficulties it faces, it should seek 
a more improved collaboration between various key African players. A more sustained 
collaboration and partnership with the CSOs and RECs local financial social orders is essential 
for the coordination and harmonization of the African search for its own solutions. The 
centrality of drawing in the CSO is that they connect with the community on critical matters 
they face, meaning that the CSOs assume a crucial place in speaking to and advancing the 
viewpoints of the community and they bring into the limelight the critical contextual realities 
that both local and international players need to be cognizant of.   
 
It is significant to note that the RECs are the substructure of the African Union and they 
function to enhance its functionality. Through the APSA framework, RECs play a crucial role 
in the continent’s structure and with regards to ensuring safety and building peace, they become 
the first in contact and are mandated to deal effectively with the crises that occur within their 
regional jurisdiction. The clashes between the RECs and the AU on how to deal with conflicts 
also points to the gaps which hinder the successful resolution of conflicts. A case in point will 
be the clash of ideas between the AU and the ECOWAS with regards to the Mali conflict (ISS, 
2014) as well as the EAC stalling of the Burundi case. 
 
Promoting intellectual expertise through research enterprise 
 
African solutions need to be crafted from the continent through the promotion of research 
towards African solutions. The upside of local research is that it enriches the findings through 
the reliance on the indigenous knowledge systems and it supports the skills conceived through 
exploring the wealth of principles and mechanisms within the African society. As reflected in 
the literature review, a significant component of the knowledge available on Africa, its 
challenges and how it should respond to it, is mainly from external sources. The major players 
within the continent in terms of conflict should take a cue from these findings and contextualize 
the recommendations by aligning them to the actual realities from the internal perspective. To 
guarantee that Africa is furnished with credible data necessary to yield solutions, there remains 
the need to contribute to and support local indigenous research on the principles and relevant 
circumstances within the continent.  
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Africa has so many state of the art universities whose research findings are being archived and 
shelved in libraries without actually being harnessed to make a significant contribution to the 
challenges crippling the continent. The leaders ought to devise means through which 
universities and other research institutes are encouraged to engage in critical and extensive 
research on the crises in Africa which then feeds into the policies and mechanisms of the AU 
with governments bearing the funding structure of the strategy. 
 
The AU should prioritize the support for local research with special focus on those that look 
into the actual experiences and realities as well as the IKS framework that investigates the 
importance of purely African methodologies in contemporary settings. This should also be 
located in the context that recognizes the fact that the world order is dominated by superpowers 
whose frameworks take the centre stage. In this light, therefore, without sufficient support from 
Africa, research into the importance and applicability of African methodologies will be 
overlooked. 
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